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Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information

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  • Fagart, Marie-Cécile
Abstract
This paper generalizes the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976], and is dealing with a game where two principals compete for an agent, when the agent has private information. The studied game has an efficient equilibrium, when the payoff of the principal does not depend on private information. Competition in markets with asymmetric information does not always imply loss of efficiency. An explain in terms of type of uncertainty is proposed.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Fagart, Marie-Cécile, 1993. "Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9317, CEPREMAP.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9317
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    Cited by:

    1. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    2. Thomas Mariotti, 2016. "Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets," 2016 Meeting Papers 820, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2014. "Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets," TSE Working Papers 14-532, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2016.
    4. Pierre‐André Chiappori & Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2006. "Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 783-798, December.
    5. Anqi Li & Yiqing Xing, 2018. "Intermediated Implementation," Papers 1810.11475, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
    6. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2016. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 274-304, June.
    7. Dionne, Georges & Fombaron, Nathalie & Doherty, Neil, 2012. "Adverse selection in insurance contracting," Working Papers 12-8, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.

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