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Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth: How the tragedy of the anticommons emerges in organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Matthew W. McCarter

    (Argyros School of Business and Economics and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, USA)

  • Shirli Kopelman

    (University of Michigan)

  • Thomas A. Turk

    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, USA)

  • Candace E. Ybarra

    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, USA)

Abstract
In organizations, conflict often revolves around commons resources because they are critical for influence, performance, and organizational survival. Research on property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas suggests that to reduce such conflict, organizations should facilitate the (psychological) privatization of commons resources. We complement these three literatures by drawing from the legal, organizational, and social psychology literatures to model how psychologically privatizing organizational commons resources – to prevent a tragedy of the commons (an overuse problem) – can lead to the emergence of equivalently problematic tragedy in organizations: the tragedy of the anticommons (an underuse problem). Our model contributes to these literatures by conceptualizing a bottom-up behavioral process (in contrast to institutional allocation) of property distribution that leads to the emergence of the tragedy of the anticommons. The implications of this bottom-up behavioral process for property rights theory, territoriality theory, and the social dilemma paradigm are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew W. McCarter & Shirli Kopelman & Thomas A. Turk & Candace E. Ybarra, 2012. "Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth: How the tragedy of the anticommons emerges in organizations," Working Papers 12-14, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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