Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Brian D. Wright & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2000.
"Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June.
- Kenneth M. Kletzer and Brian D. Wright., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C98-100, University of California at Berkeley.
- Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," International Finance 0003004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kletzer, Kenneth M. & Wright, Brian D., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt4qg3c42v, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2006.
"Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 223-245, January.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2000. "Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3591, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Nabil Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2003. "Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-28, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2001. "Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 409, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2003. "Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-27, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Geir B. Asheim, 1997.
"Individual and Collective Time-Consistency,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 427-443.
- Asheim, G.B., 1991. "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Papers 9169, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Asheim, G., 1991. "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Other publications TiSEM b8d92334-24dd-423f-a9b8-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Asheim, G., 1991. "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Discussion Paper 1991-69, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Geir B. Asheim, 1995. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Discussion Papers 1128, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Asheim, G.B., 1996. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Memorandum 1996_020, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 361, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Nir, A., 2004. "Relationships as Commitment Devices : Strategic Silence," Discussion Paper 2004-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, "undated".
""Costly Coasian Contracts'',"
CARESS Working Papres
97-11, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, "undated". "Costly Coasian Contracts," Penn CARESS Working Papers c5b2efc4326ca8bb8162440d6, Penn Economics Department.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1996. "Costly Coasian Contracts," Game Theory and Information 9610006, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Jan 1997.
- Anderlini, L. & Felli, L., 1997. "Costly Coasian Contracts," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9704, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Coasian Contracts," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 362, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998. "Costly coasian contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3583, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberley, 2003.
"Viable Tax Constitutions,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
683, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberley A., 2003. "Viable Tax Constitutions," Economic Research Papers 269567, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1999.
"Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1225, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 2000. "Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt5zd216tw, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Seung-Weon Yoo, 2001.
"Optimal Incentives for Teams,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 525-541, June.
- Che,Y.K. & Yoo,S.W., 1998. "Optimal incentives for teams," Working papers 8, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 2002.
"Contractual Intermediaries,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 362-384, October.
- Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 1999. "Contractual Intermediaries," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt49p1c23g, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1999. "Contractual Intermediaries," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1235, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Nir, A., 2004. "Relationships as Commitment Devices : Strategic Silence," Other publications TiSEM 073fb830-048b-435e-80d2-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Carlos M. Asilis, 1992. "Unionization in a dynamic oligopolistic model of international trade," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 7(2), pages 181-208.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Blonski, Matthias, 2002. "Relational Contracts and Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 3460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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