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Alternating-offer bargaining and common knowledge of rationality

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  • VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J.
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  • VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1999. "Alternating-offer bargaining and common knowledge of rationality," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1432, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1432
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1005032806209
    Note: In : Theory and Decision, 47, 111-137, 1999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996. "Admissibility and Common Knowledge," Discussion Paper 1996-16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Van Damme, Eric & Selten, Reinhard & Winter, Eyal, 1990. "Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 188-201, June.
    4. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
    5. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    6. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    7. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1999. "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 53-68.
    8. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    9. In-Koo Cho, 1994. "Stationarity, Rationalizability and Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(2), pages 357-374.
    10. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April.
    11. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1991. "A Note on Bargaining over a Finite Number of Feasible Agreements," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(3), pages 290-292, July.
    12. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    13. Joel Watson, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(3), pages 573-594.
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    Cited by:

    1. Herings, P.J.J. & Mauleon, A. & Vannetelbosch, V., 2000. "Social rationalizability," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Jeongbin Kim & Wooyoung Lim & Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2023. "Patience Is Power: Bargaining and Payoff Delay," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0015, Berlin School of Economics.
    3. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2005. "Strategic union delegation and strike activity," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(1), pages 149-173, February.
    4. Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2004. "Bargaining with endogenous deadlines," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 321-335, July.
    5. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Delay in a bargaining game with contracts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(4), pages 339-353, December.
    6. Kool, C.J.M. & Thornton, D., 2000. "The expectations theory and the founding of the fed: another look at the evidence," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    7. Goossens, J.H.M. & van Hoesel, C.P.M. & Kroon, L.G., 2002. "On solving multi-type line planning problems," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

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