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The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign Bond Markets, 1815–2007

In: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2009

Author

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  • Marc Flandreau
  • Juan H. Flores
  • Norbert Gaillard
  • Sebastián Nieto-Parra
Abstract
We provide a comparison of salient organizational features of primary markets for foreign government debt over the very long run. We focus on output, quality control, information provision, competition, pricing, charging, and signaling. We find that the market setup experienced a radical transformation in the recent period, and we interpret this as resulting from the rise of liability insurance provided by rating agencies. Underwriters have given up their former role as gatekeepers of liquidity and certification agencies to become aggressive competitors in a new Speculative Grade market.
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Suggested Citation

  • Marc Flandreau & Juan H. Flores & Norbert Gaillard & Sebastián Nieto-Parra, 2010. "The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign Bond Markets, 1815–2007," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2009, pages 53-92, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:11906
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    6. Flores Zendejas, Juan, 2020. "Explaining Latin America's persistent defaults: an analysis of the debtor–creditor relations in London, 1822–1914," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 319-339, December.
    7. Bignon, Vincent & Flandreau, Marc, 2011. "The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France Before World War I," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 616-653, September.
    8. Bradley, Michael & De Lira Salvatierra, Irving & Gulati, Mitu, 2014. "Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the sovereign debt market?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(S), pages 150-168.
    9. Chavaz, Matthieu & Flandreau, Marc, 2015. "‘High and dry’: the liquidity and credit of colonial and foreign government debt in the London Stock Exchange (1880–1910)," Bank of England working papers 555, Bank of England.
    10. David James Gill, 2015. "Rating the UK: the British government's sovereign credit ratings, 1976–8," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 68(3), pages 1016-1037, August.
    11. Marc Flandreau & Juan Flores, 2011. "Bondholders vs. bond-sellers? Investment banks and conditionality lending in the London market for foreign government debt, 1815-1913," Working Papers 0002, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    12. Marc Flandreau & Juan Flores & Norbert Gaillard & Sebastian Nieto-Parra, 2011. "The Changing Role of Global Financial Brands in the Underwriting of Foreign Government Debt (1815-2010)," IHEID Working Papers 15-2011, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    13. Marc Flandreau & Norbert Gaillard & Ugo Panizza, 2009. "Conflicts of Interest, Reputation and the Interwar Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck?," IHEID Working Papers 02-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Feb 2010.
    14. Barry Eichengreen & Asmaa El-Ganainy & Rui Esteves & Kris James Mitchener, 2019. "Public Debt Through the Ages," NBER Working Papers 25494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Passadore, Juan & Xu, Yu, 2022. "Illiquidity in sovereign debt markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    16. Kim Oosterlinck & Loredana Ureche-Rangau & Jacques-Marie Vaslin, 2013. "Waterloo: a Godsend for French Public Finances?," Working Papers 0041, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    17. Flandreau, Marc & Chavaz, Matthieu, 2016. "“High & Dry†: The Liquidity and Credit of Colonial and Foreign Government Debt and the London Stock Exchange (1880-1910)," CEPR Discussion Papers 11679, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2015. "A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(12), pages 3740-3765, December.
    19. Giselle Datz, 2021. "Ties that bind and blur: financialization and the evolution of sovereign debt as private contract," Review of Evolutionary Political Economy, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 571-587, December.
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    21. Flandreau, Marc & Flores, Juan, 2010. "Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark: Relationship banking and conditionality lending in the London market for government debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 7915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    24. Flores Zendejas, Juan, 2015. "Capital Markets and Sovereign Defaults: A Historical Perspective," Working Papers unige:73325, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.
    25. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2013. "On the contribution of game theory to the study of sovereign debt and default," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(4), pages 649-667, WINTER.

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    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General

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