Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/the/publsh/6039.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints

Author

Listed:
  • Imamura, Kenzo

    (Department of Economics, University of Tokyo)

  • Kawase, Yasushi

    (Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, University of Tokyo)

Abstract
This study investigates efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints, ordered accessibility, for which the serial dictatorship mechanism is Pareto-efficient (PE), individually rational (IR), and group strategy-proof (GSP). Then, we prove that accessibility is a necessary condition for the existence of PE, IR, and GSP mechanisms. Moreover, we show that the SD mechanism with a dynamically constructed order satisfies PE, IR, and GSP if one school has an arbitrary accessible constraint and each of the other schools has a capacity constraint. Second, we examine a setting with endowments. We find that the \emph{generalized matroid} is a necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is PE, IR, and strategy-proof (SP). We also demonstrate that a top trading cycles mechanism satisfies PE, IR, and GSP under any generalized matroid constraint. Finally, we observe that any two out of the three properties---PE, IR, and GSP---can be achieved under general constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Imamura, Kenzo & Kawase, Yasushi, 0. "Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:6039
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/6039/40298/1
    File Function: Working paper version. Paper will be copyedited and typeset before publication.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching with constraints; efficient matching; generalized matroid; strategy-proofness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:the:publsh:6039. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Martin J. Osborne (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://econtheory.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.