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Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House*

* This paper has been replicated

Author

Listed:
  • David S. Lee
  • Enrico Moretti
  • Matthew J. Butler
Abstract
There are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation. In one view, voters can affect candidates' policy choices: competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center. In this view, elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise. In the alternative view, voters merely elect policies: politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies, and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented. We assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the U. S. House. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of a "randomized" change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives' roll-call voting records. We find that voters merely elect policies: the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator's voting behavior. For example, a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the Democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties' nominees to the left. Politicians' inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition-induced convergence in policy.

Suggested Citation

  • David S. Lee & Enrico Moretti & Matthew J. Butler, 2004. "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 807-859.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:119:y:2004:i:3:p:807-859.
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    Replication

    This item has been replicated by:
  • Patrick Button, 2018. "A Replication of “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House†(Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004)," Public Finance Review, , vol. 46(5), pages 886-893, September.

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    1. Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House (QJE 2004) in ReplicationWiki

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