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What lessons for economic development can we draw from the Champagne fairs?

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  • Edwards, Jeremy
  • Ogilvie, Sheilagh
Abstract
The medieval Champagne fairs are widely used to draw lessons about the institutional basis for long-distance impersonal exchange. This paper re-examines the causes of the outstanding success of the Champagne fairs in mediating international trade, the timing and causes of the fairs' decline, and the institutions for securing property rights and enforcing contracts at the fairs. It finds that contract enforcement at the fairs did not take the form of private-order or corporative mechanisms, but was provided by public institutions. More generally, the success and decline of the Champagne fairs depended on the policies adopted by the public authorities — for good or ill.

Suggested Citation

  • Edwards, Jeremy & Ogilvie, Sheilagh, 2012. "What lessons for economic development can we draw from the Champagne fairs?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 131-148.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:49:y:2012:i:2:p:131-148
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2011.12.002
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    8. Jeff Davidson & Alfons Weersink, 1998. "What Does It Take for a Market to Function?," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 20(2), pages 558-572.
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    11. Munro, John H., 2000. "The 'New Institutional Economics' and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: the Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs," MPRA Paper 11029, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2001.
    12. Greif, Avner & Milgrom, Paul & Weingast, Barry R, 1994. "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 745-776, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mika Kallioinen, 2017. "Inter‐communal institutions in medieval trade," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1131-1152, November.
    2. Rudolf Cesaretti & José Lobo & Luís M A Bettencourt & Scott G Ortman & Michael E Smith, 2016. "Population-Area Relationship for Medieval European Cities," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(10), pages 1-27, October.
    3. Nadia Matringe, 2022. "Early inventory management practices in the foreign exchange market: Insights from sixteenth‐century Lyon," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 75(3), pages 739-778, August.
    4. Jeroen Puttevils, 2015. "‘Eating the bread out of their mouth’: Antwerp's export trade and generalized institutions, 1544–5," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 68(4), pages 1339-1364, November.
    5. Benito Arruñada, 2016. "Coase and the departure from property," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard & Elodie Bertrand (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase, chapter 22, pages 305-319, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Daniel Smith, 2014. "Heterogeneity and exchange: Safe-conducts in Medieval Spain," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 183-197, June.
    7. Ferrali, Romain, 2012. "The Maghribi industrialists: contract enforcement in the Moroccan industry, 1956-82," Economic History Working Papers 45680, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    8. Bryan Leonard & Gary D. Libecap, 2016. "Collective Action by Contract: Prior Appropriation and the Development of Irrigation in the Western United States," NBER Working Papers 22185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Jedwab, Remi & Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2022. "Medieval cities through the lens of urban economics," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    10. Ogilvie, Sheilagh & Carus, A.W., 2014. "Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 8, pages 403-513, Elsevier.
    11. Remi Jedwab & Noel D. Johnson & Mark Koyama, 2020. "Medieval Cities Through the Lens of Urban Economic Theories," Working Papers 2020-9, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    12. Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2014. "The Economics of Guilds," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 169-192, Fall.
    13. Arnoux, Mathieu, 2019. "Ressources renouvelables et croissance économique : suggestions médiévales et questions contemporaines," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 26.
    14. Sgard, Jérôme, 2015. "Global economic governance during the middle ages: The jurisdiction of the champagne fairs," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 174-184.
    15. Gary D. Libecap, 2018. "Property Rights to Frontier Land and Minerals: US Exceptionalism," NBER Working Papers 24544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Alice Sindzingre, 2021. "Fixation of Belief and Membership: A Contribution to the Understanding of the Detrimental Outcomes of Institutions," Post-Print halshs-03625238, HAL.
    17. Guha, Brishti, 2012. "Who will monitor the monitors? Informal law enforcement and collusion at Champagne," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 261-277.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legal system; Medieval Europe; Trade; Private-order institutions; Community responsibility system;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N73 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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