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A theory of trade policy leadership

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  • Coates, Daniel E.
  • Ludema, Rodney D.
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  • Coates, Daniel E. & Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "A theory of trade policy leadership," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 1-29, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:65:y:2001:i:1:p:1-29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ethier, Wilfred J & Horn, Henrik, 1996. "Results-Oriented Trade Policy," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 17-39, February.
    2. Mussa, Michael, 1978. "Dynamic Adjustment in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 775-791, October.
    3. Wilfred J. Ethier, 1998. "Regionalism in a Multilateral World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1214-1245, December.
    4. Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551, Elsevier.
    5. Rodney D. Ludema & Daniel E. Coates, 1998. "Unilateral Trade Liberalization as Leadership in Trade Negotiations," International Trade 9802002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Schmidt, Klaus M, 1993. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 325-351, March.
    7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, 1985. "Free Trade, Hegemony, and the Theory of Agency," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 348-364, August.
    9. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 4, pages 45-51, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    10. Irwin, Douglas A, 1988. "Welfare Effects of British Free Trade: Debate and Evidence from the 1840s," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1142-1164, December.
    11. Kindleberger, C. P., 1975. "The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820–1875," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(1), pages 20-55, March.
    12. McKeown, Timothy J., 1983. "Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in Europe," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 73-91, January.
    13. Harry G. Johnson, 1953. "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 21(2), pages 142-153.
    14. Baldwin, Richard, 1987. "Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-290.
    15. Robert E. Baldwin, 1984. "The Changing Nature of U.S. Trade Policy since World War II," NBER Chapters, in: The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy, pages 5-32, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-795, September.
    17. repec:bla:kyklos:v:38:y:1985:i:3:p:348-64 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Robert E. Baldwin & J. David Richardson, 1987. "Recent U.S. Trade Policy and Its Global Implications," NBER Chapters, in: Trade and Structural Change in Pacific Asia, pages 121-156, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "The size of trading blocs Market power and world welfare effects," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 411-437, May.
    20. Neary, J Peter, 1978. "Short-Run Capital Specificity and the Pure Theory of International Trade," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 88(351), pages 488-510, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 3, pages 37-63, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, 2012. "Conditional versus unconditional trade concessions for developing countries," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(2), pages 613-631, May.
    3. Paul Missios & Kamal Saggi & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2018. "External trade diversion, exclusion incentives and the nature of preferential trade agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, chapter 10, pages 223-237, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Pravin Krishna & Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 8, pages 147-159, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Baldwin, Richard, 2010. "Unilateral tariff liberalisation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8162, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Kristy Buzard, 2017. "Trade Agreements in the Shadow of Lobbying," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 21-43, February.
    7. Tai‐Liang Chen & Ying Kuang, 2023. "Endogenous timing, strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 74-96, February.
    8. Paul Wonnacott & Ronald J. Wonnacott, 2011. "The Economic Case for Reciprocal Trade Negotiations: Gains from Both Imports and Exports," Chapters, in: Miroslav N. Jovanović (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Integration, Volume I, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Paul Wonnacott & Ronald Wonnacott, 2005. "What's the Point of Reciprocal Trade Negotiations? Exports, Imports, and Gains from Trade," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 1-20, January.
    10. Pierre-Louis Vézina, 2014. "Race-to-the-bottom Tariff Cutting," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 444-458, August.
    11. Emanuel Ornelas, 2016. "Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 5823, CESifo.
    12. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2015. "Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the WTO," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 67-86, January.
    13. Ozden, Caglar & Reinhardt, Eric, 2005. "The perversity of preferences: GSP and developing country trade policies, 1976-2000," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 1-21, October.
    14. Cebi, Pinar & Ludema, Rodney, 2002. "The Rise and Fall of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause," Working Papers 15853, United States International Trade Commission, Office of Economics.
    15. Claire H. Hollweg & Daniel Lederman & Devashish Mitra, 2016. "Structural Reforms and Labour-market Outcomes: International Panel-data Evidence," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(7), pages 925-963, July.
    16. Richard Baldwin, 2014. "WTO 2.0: governance of global supply-chain trade," Chapters, in: Richard Baldwin & Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja (ed.), A World Trade Organization for the 21st Century, chapter 2, pages 12-47, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Christopher S. P. Magee & Stephen P. Magee, 2008. "The United States is a Small Country in World Trade," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 990-1004, November.

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