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La structure des crédits syndiqués comme défense contre les problèmes informationnels - Une analyse empirique sur le marché français

Author

Listed:
  • Karima Bouaiss

    (Université de Tours)

  • Catherine Refait-Alexandre

    (Université de Lille)

Abstract
(VF)Cet article montre que la banque chef de file structure le syndicat et le prêt de manière à limiter les incidences négatives des problèmes informationnels pour les banques, permettant aux firmes les plus opaques de ne pas subir un spread trop élevé. Nous estimons les déterminants du spread des prêts syndiqués sur le marché français, de 2004 à 2006. Nous vérifions que les asymétries d’information déterminent la structure du syndicat et les caractéristiques du prêt, alors que le spread est surtout influencé par le risque de défaut de l’emprunteur, par la structure du syndicat et par les caractéristiques du prêt.(VA)This article shows that, in a loan syndicate, the leading bank determines the syndicate’s structure and the contract design to protect participant banks from the risks of asymmetric information. Consequently, firms are not charged a higher spread for lack of transparency. We provide empirical evidence on spreads of syndicated loans in the French market, from 2004 to 2006. Syndicate structure and loan characteristics are shown to depend on the presence of asymmetric information, whereas the spread is essentially explained by default risk, syndicate structure and loan characteristics.

Suggested Citation

  • Karima Bouaiss & Catherine Refait-Alexandre, 2009. "La structure des crédits syndiqués comme défense contre les problèmes informationnels - Une analyse empirique sur le marché français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(2), pages 35-68, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:12:y:2009:i:q2:p:35-68.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    prêts syndiqués; transparence; asymétrie d’information; financement bancaire; syndicated loans; disclosure; asymmetric information; banking relationship.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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