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Students' Mobility and Regional Disparities in Quality and Returns to Education in Italy

Author

Listed:
  • Patrizia Ordine

    (University of Calabria)

  • Giuseppe Rose

    (Birbeck College, University of London, UK)

Abstract
The paper analyzes the characteristics of the supply of higher education in different geographical macroareas using a strategic interaction framework. We investigate the issue of educational quality differentials in a centralized funding system. In the presence of moving costs and asymmetric information on individuals ability, we show that only highability students acquire education and the quality of education is lower in macroareas where the moving costs are higher in the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium consistent with forward induction. Our model predicts that direct subsidies to universities may be ineffective in improving the quality of education in the less developed areas. When regional disparities are not too large, efficiency can be increased by subsidizing student mobility.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrizia Ordine & Giuseppe Rose, 2007. "Students' Mobility and Regional Disparities in Quality and Returns to Education in Italy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 66(2), pages 149-176, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gde:journl:gde_v66_n2_p149-176
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. De Fraja, Gianni & Iossa, Elisabetta, 2002. "Competition among Universities and the Emergence of the Elite Institution," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 275-293, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ordine, Patrizia & Rose, Giuseppe, 2008. "The supply of education quality in a spatial model with asymmetric moving costs," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 197-214, December.
    2. Vincenzo G. Genova & Michele Tumminello & Fabio Aiello & Massimo Attanasio, 2021. "A network analysis of student mobility patterns from high school to master’s," Statistical Methods & Applications, Springer;Società Italiana di Statistica, vol. 30(5), pages 1445-1464, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    perfect bayesian equilibrium; forward induction; spatial models; propensity score matching;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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