What a lovely hat

This paper presents an architecture for an OAuth 2.0-based i-voting solution using a mobile native client in a variant of the Ara´ujo-Traor´e protocol. We follow a systematic approach by identifying relevant OAuth 2.0 specifications and best practices. Having defined our framework, we identify threats applicable to our proposed methodology and detail how our design mitigates them to provide a safer i-voting process.

We provide a novel perspective on a long-standing challenge to the integrity of votes cast without the supervision of a voting booth: "improper influence,'' which we define as any combination of vote buying and voter coercion. In comparison with previous proposals, our system is the first in the literature to protect against a strong adversary who learns all of the voter's keys---we call this property "extreme coercion resistance.'' When keys are stolen, each voter, or their trusted agents...

We present Hyperion, an end-to-end verifiable e-voting scheme that allows the voters to identify their votes in cleartext in the final tally. In contrast to schemes like Selene or sElect, identification is not via (private) tracker numbers but via cryptographic commitment terms. After publishing the tally, the Election Authority provides each voter with an individual dual key. Voters identify their votes by raising their dual key to their secret trapdoor key and finding the matching...

Coercion is a challenging and multi-faceted threat that prevents people from expressing their will freely. Similarly, vote-buying does to undermine the foundation of free democratic elections. These threats are especially dire for remote electronic voting, which relies on voters to express their political will freely but happens in an uncontrolled environment outside the polling station and the protection of the ballot booth. However, electronic voting in general, both in-booth and remote,...

We introduce ${zkVoting}$, a coercion-resistant e-voting system that utilizes a fake keys approach based on a novel nullifiable commitment scheme. This scheme allows voters to receive both real and fake commitment keys from a registrar. Each ballot includes this commitment, but only the tallier can efficiently discern the fake ballots, simplifying the tally process to $\mathcal{O}(n)$ and ensuring coercion resistance. ${zkVoting}$ also preserves voter anonymity by ensuring each ballot...

Counter-strategies are key components of coercion-resistant voting schemes, allowing voters to submit votes that represent their own intentions in an environment controlled by a coercer. By deploying a counter-strategy a voter can prevent the coercer from learning if the voter followed the coercer’s instructions or not. Two effective counter-strategies have been proposed in the literature, one based on fake credentials and another on revoting. While fake-credential schemes assume that voters...

Typically, a decentralized collaborative blockchain decision-making mechanism is realized by remote voting. To date, a number of blockchain voting schemes have been proposed; however, to the best of our knowledge, none of these schemes achieve coercion-resistance. In particular, for most blockchain voting schemes, the randomness used by the voting client can be viewed as a witness/proof of the actual vote, which enables improper behaviors such as coercion and vote-buying. Unfortunately, the...

In [1], Sarier presents a practical biometric-based non-transferable credential scheme that maintains the efficiency of the underlying Brands credential. In this paper, we design a new Blockchain-Based E-Voting (BBEV) scheme that combines the system of [1] with encrypted Attribute Based Credentials for a non-transferable code-voting approach to achieve efficient, usable, anonymous, transparent, auditable, verifiable, receipt-free and coercion-resistant remote voting system for small/medium...

An interesting approach to achieving verifiability in voting systems is to make use of tracking numbers. This gives voters a simple way of verifying that their ballot was counted: they can simply look up their ballot/tracker pair on a public bulletin board. It is crucial to understand how trackers affect other security properties, in particular privacy. However, existing privacy definitions are not designed to accommodate tracker-based voting systems. Furthermore, the addition of trackers...

Coercion-resistance is one of the most challenging security properties to achieve when designing an e-voting protocol. The JCJ voting scheme, proposed in 2005 by Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson, is one of the first voting systems where coercion-resistance was rigorously defined and achieved, making JCJ the benchmark for coercion-resistant protocols. Recently, the coercion-resistance definition proposed in JCJ has been disputed and improved by Cortier, Gaudry, and Yang. They identified a major...

Deniable encryption (Canetti et al. CRYPTO ’97) is an intriguing primitive, which provides security guarantee against coercion by allowing a sender to convincingly open the ciphertext into a fake message. Despite the notable result by Sahai and Waters STOC ’14 and other efforts in functionality extension, all the deniable public key encryption (DPKE) schemes suffer from intolerable overhead due to the heavy building blocks, e.g., translucent sets or indistinguishability obfuscation. Besides,...

We introduce incoercible digital signature schemes, a variant of a standard digital signature. Incoercible signatures enable signers, when coerced to produce a signature for a message chosen by an attacker, to generate fake signatures that are indistinguishable from real signatures, even if the signer is compelled to reveal their full history (including their secret signing keys and any randomness used to produce keys/signatures) to the attacker. Additionally, we introduce an authenticator...

We solve a long-standing challenge to the integrity of votes cast without the supervision of a voting booth: “improper influence,” which we define as any combination of vote buying and voter coercion. Our approach allows each voter, or their trusted agent(s), to cancel their vote in a way that is unstoppable, irrevocable, and forever unattributable to the voter. In particular, our approach enhances security of online, remote, public-sector elections, for which there is a growing need and the...

Consider a computer user who needs to update a piece of software installed on their computing device. To do so securely, a commonly accepted ad-hoc method stipulates that the old software version first retrieves the update information from the vendor's public repository, then checks that a cryptographic signature embedded into it verifies with the vendor's public key, and finally replaces itself with the new version. This updating method seems to be robust and lightweight, and to reliably...

There are numerous settings in which people's preferences are aggregated outside of formal elections, and where privacy and verification are important but the stringent authentication and coercion-resistant properties of government elections do not apply, a prime example being social media platforms. These systems are often iterative and have no trusted authority, in contrast to the centrally organised, single-shot elections on which most of the literature is focused. Moreover, they require...

There is a growing demand for network-level anonymity for delegates at global organizations such as the UN and Red Cross. Numerous anonymous communication (AC) systems have been proposed over the last few decades to provide anonymity over the internet; however, they either introduce high latency overhead, provide weaker anonymity guarantees, or are difficult to be deployed at the organizational networks. Recently, the PriFi system introduced a client/relay/server model that suitably utilizes...

Coercion-resistance is a security property of electronic voting, often considered as a must-have for high-stake elections. The JCJ voting scheme, proposed in 2005 by Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson, is still the reference paradigm when designing a coercion-resistant protocol. We highlight a weakness in JCJ that is also present in all the systems following its general structure. This comes from the procedure that precedes the tally, where the trustees remove the ballots that should not be...

This paper studies quantitative relationships between privacy, verifiability, accountability, and coercion-resistance of voting protocols. We adapt existing definitions to make them better comparable with each other and determine which bounds a certain requirement on one property poses on some other property. It turns out that, in terms of proposed definitions, verifiability and accountability do not necessarily put constraints on privacy and coercion-resistance. However, the relations...

In an election where each voter may express $P$ preferences among $M$ possible choices, the Amun protocol allows to secure vote casting against over-the-shoulder adversaries, retaining privacy, fairness, end-to-end verifiability, and correctness. Before the election, each voter receives a ballot containing valid and decoy tokens: only valid tokens contribute in the final tally, but they remain indistinguishable from the decoys. Since the voter is the only one who knows which tokens are...

We define and construct Deniable Fully Homomorphic Encryption based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) polynomial hardness assumption. Deniable FHE enables storing encrypted data in the cloud to be processed securely without decryption, maintaining deniability of the encrypted data, as well the prevention of vote-buying in electronic voting schemes where encrypted votes can be tallied without decryption. Our constructions achieve compactness independently of the level of deniability- both...

Incoercible multi-party computation (Canetti-Gennaro ’96) allows parties to engage in secure computation with the additional guarantee that the public transcript of the computation cannot be used by a coercive outsider to verify representations made by the parties regarding their inputs, outputs, and local random choices. That is, it is guaranteed that the only deductions regarding the truthfulness of such representations, made by an outsider who has witnessed the communication among...

Secure electronic voting is a relatively trivial exercise if a single authority can be completely trusted. In contrast, the construction of efficient and usable schemes which provide strong security without strong trust assumptions is still an open problem, particularly in the remote setting. Coercion-resistance is one of, if not the hardest property to add to a verifiable e-voting system. Numerous secure e-voting systems have been designed to provide coercion-resistance. One of these...

Coercion resistance is one of the most important features of a secure voting procedure. Because of the properties such as transparency, decentralization, and non-repudiation, blockchain is a fundamental technology of great interest in its own right, and it also has large potential when integrated into many other areas. Here we propose a decentralized e-voting protocol that is coercion-resistant and vote-selling resistant, while being also completely transparent and not receipt-free. We...

Most electronic voting systems today satisfy the basic requirements of privacy, unreusability, eligibility and fairness in a natural and rather straightforward way. However, receipt-freeness, incoercibility and universal verifiability are much harder to implement and in many cases they require a large amount of computation and communication overhead. In this work, we propose a blockchain-based voting system which achieves all the properties expected from secure elections without requiring...

We explore formal definitions of coercion resistance (WPES'05, FC'09, CRYPTO'10, and CSF'10), conceived to capture the strongest privacy notions achievable by voting systems. We find all but one is unsuitable, demonstrating difficulties faced by our community in formalising this property and raising questions over the security of schemes striving to deliver coercion resistance. We find the remaining definition to be reliant on burdensome combinatorial analysis, prohibiting immediate...

Seminal work by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson delivered a verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with quadratic complexity. This manuscript attempts to advance the state-of-the-art by delivering a voting system with equivalent security and linear complexity.

Deniable encryption (Canetti et al., Crypto 1996) enhances secret communication over public channels, providing the additional guarantee that the secrecy of communication is protected even if the parties are later coerced (or willingly bribed) to expose their entire internal states: plaintexts, keys and randomness. To date, constructions of deniable encryption --- and more generally, interactive deniable communication --- only address restricted cases where only one party is compromised...

Cryptographic techniques are employed to ensure the security of voting systems in order to increase its wide adoption. However, in such electronic voting systems, the public bulletin board that is hosted by the third party for publishing and auditing the voting results should be trusted by all participants. Recently a number of blockchain-based solutions have been proposed to address this issue. However, these systems are impractical to use due to the limitations on the voter and candidate...

In this paper, we present a cryptographic technique for an authenticated, end-to-end verifiable and secret ballot election. Voters should receive assurance that their vote is cast as intended, recorded as cast and tallied as recorded. The election system as a whole should ensure that voter coercion is unlikely, even when voters are willing to be influenced. Currently, almost all verifiable e-voting systems require trusted authorities to perform the tallying process. An exception is the DRE-i...

In this work, we propose a first version of an e-voting scheme that achieves end-to-end verifiability, everlasting privacy and efficient coercion resistance in the JCJ setting. Everlasting privacy is achieved assuming an anonymous channel, without resorting to dedicated channels between the election authorities to exchange private data. In addition, the proposed scheme achieves coercion resistance under standard JCJ assumptions. As a core building block of our scheme, we also propose a new...

Deniable encryption (Canetti et al. CRYPTO '97) is an intriguing primitive that provides a security guarantee against not only eavesdropping attacks as required by semantic security, but also stronger coercion attacks performed after the fact. The concept of deniability has later demonstrated useful and powerful in many other contexts, such as leakage resilience, adaptive security of protocols, and security against selective opening attacks. Despite its conceptual usefulness, our...

We give a survey of existing attacks against end-to-end verifiable voting systems in the academic literature. We discuss attacks on the integrity of the election, attacks on the privacy of voters, and attacks aiming at coercion of voters. For each attack, we give a brief overview of the voting system and a short description of the attack and its consequences.

We propose a new Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE)-based voting system that we call TRVote. The reliability of TRVote is ensured during the vote generation phase where the random challenges are generated by the voters instead of utilizing the random number generator of the machine. Namely, the challenges of voters are utilized to prevent and detect a malicious behavior of a corrupted voting machine. Due to the unpredictability of the challenges, the voting machine cannot cheat voters without...

End-to-end verifiable voting schemes typically involves voters handling an encrypted ballot in order to confirm that their vote is accurately included in the tally. While this may be technically valid, from a public acceptance standpoint is may be problematic: many voters may not really understand the purpose of the encrypted ballot and the various checks that they can perform. In this paper we take a different approach and revisit an old idea: to provide each voter with a private tracking...

Deniable encryption (Canetti et al. CRYPTO '97) is an intriguing primitive that provides a security guarantee against not only eavesdropping attacks as required by semantic security, but also stronger coercion attacks performed after the fact. The concept of deniability has later demonstrated useful and powerful in many other contexts, such as leakage resilience, adaptive security of protocols, and security against selective opening attacks. Despite its conceptual usefulness, our...

We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability. It is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We provide a game-based definition of receipt-freeness for voting protocols with non-interactive ballot casting, which we name strong receipt-freeness (sRF). To our knowledge, sRF is the first game-based definition of receipt-freeness in the literature, and it has the merit of being...

Internet voting continues to enjoy wide interest from both research and practice. Among the Internet voting schemes developed over the last decades, JCJ / Civitas stands out from the masses due to its innovative approach to resist voter coercion. To achieve its ambitious goal, the scheme builds upon particularly restrictive assumptions and an abstract credential handling rendering the scheme impractical for real-world use. At ARES 2012, Neumann and Volkamer presented a proposal which...

Digital signatures are often used by trusted authorities to make unique bindings between a subject and a digital object; for example, certificate authorities certify a public key belongs to a domain name, and time-stamping authorities certify that a certain piece of information existed at a certain time. Traditional digital signature schemes however impose no uniqueness conditions, so a trusted authority could make multiple certifications for the same subject but different objects, be it...

Abstract: We present a paper-based voting method that attempts to achieve the privacy of voters and election universal verifiability and integrity with only paper ballots and without using any cryptography method. The voting procedure is easy and it needs only selecting the intention of voter over screen of an electronic device. The rest of the voting procedure will be carried out by the device. Voter gets a receipt that can be used to verify that his vote has been counted in final tally as...

This paper introduces a special type of symmetric cryptosystem called multi-encryption scheme. It allows users to encrypt multiple plaintexts into a single ciphertext. Each plaintext is protected with its own secret key, meaning that they can be decrypted individually by applying the decryption function with the corresponding key to the ciphertext. Compared to encrypting the ciphertexts one-by-one using a standard symmetric cryptosystem, the main advantage of using a multi-encryption scheme...

We propose a new, widely applicable model for analyzing knowledge-based (epistemic) and strategic properties of cryptographic protocols. We prove that the corresponding model checking problem with respect to an expressive epistemic strategic logic is decidable. As corollaries, we obtain decidability of complex security properties including coercion-resistance of voting protocols, accountability of protocols using a trusted third party, and abuse-freeness of contract signing protocols.

Helios 2.0 is a web-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system, suitable for use in low-coercion environments. In this paper we identify a vulnerability in Helios which allows an adversary to compromise the privacy of voters whom cast abstention votes. The vulnerability can be attributed to the absence of ballot independence and the use of homomorphic ElGamal encryption, in particular, these properties can be exploited by an adversary to construct a ballot related to an abstention...

In this paper, we present new insights into central properties of voting systems, namely verifiability, privacy, and coercion-resistance. We demonstrate that the combination of the two forms of verifiability considered in the literature---individual and universal verifiability---are, unlike commonly believed, insufficient to guarantee overall verifiability. We also demonstrate that the relationship between coercion-resistance and privacy is more subtle than suggested in the literature. Our...

In CRYPTO 1997, Canetti \etal put forward the intruiging notion of \emph{deniable encryption}, which (informally) allows a sender and/or receiver, having already performed some encrypted communication, to produce `fake' (but legitimate-looking) random coins that open the ciphertext to another message. Deniability is a powerful notion for both practice and theory: apart from its inherent utility for resisting coercion, a deniable scheme is also noncommitting (a useful property in...

We present Selections, a new cryptographic voting protocol that is end-to-end verifiable and suitable for Internet voting. After a one-time in-person registration, voters can cast ballots in an arbitrary number of elections. We say a system provides over-the-shoulder coercion-resistance if a voter can undetectably avoid complying with an adversary that is present during the vote casting process. Our system is the first in the literature to offer this property without the voter having to...

A deniable cryptosystem allows a sender and a receiver to communicate over an insecure channel in such a way that the communication is still secure even if the adversary can threaten the parties into revealing their internal states after the execution of the protocol. This is done by allowing the parties to change their internal state to make it look like a given ciphertext decrypts to a message different from what it really decrypts to. Deniable encryption was in this way introduced to...

Helios 2.0 is an open-source web-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system, suitable for use in low-coercion environments. In this article, we analyse ballot secrecy in Helios and discover a vulnerability which allows an adversary to compromise the privacy of voters. The vulnerability exploits the absence of ballot independence in Helios and works by replaying a voter's ballot or a variant of it, the replayed ballot magnifies the voter's contribution to the election outcome and...

By now, many voting protocols have been proposed that, among others, are designed to achieve coercion-resistance, i.e., resistance to vote buying and voter coercion. Scantegrity II is among the most prominent and successful such protocols in that it has been used in several elections. However, almost none of the modern voting protocols used in practice, including Scantegrity II, has undergone a rigorous cryptographic analysis. In this paper, we prove that Scantegrity II enjoys an optimal...

Coercion-resistance is one of the most important and intricate security requirements for voting protocols. Several definitions of coercion-resistance have been proposed in the literature, both in cryptographic settings and more abstract, symbolic models. However, unlike symbolic approaches, only very few voting protocols have been rigorously analyzed within the cryptographic setting. A major obstacle is that existing cryptographic definitions of coercion-resistance tend to be complex and...

To provide a high level of security guarantee cryptography is introduced into the design of the voting machine. The voting machine based on cryptography is vulnerable to attacks through covert channels. An adversary may inject malicious codes into the voting machine and make it leak vote information unnoticeably by exploiting the randomness used in encryptions and zero-knowledge proofs. In this paper a voting machine resistant to covert channels is designed. It has the following properties:...

It is debatable if current direct-recording electronic voting machines can sufficiently be trusted for a use in elections. Reports about malfunctions and possible ways of manipulation abound. Voting schemes have to fulfill seemingly contradictory requirements: On one hand the election process should be verifiable to prevent electoral fraud and on the other hand each vote should be deniable to avoid coercion and vote buying. This work presents a new verifiable and coercion-free voting scheme...

Bribe and coercion are common in conventional voting systems and usually will lead to a biased result that imparts the desired democracy. However, these problems become more difficult to solve when using e-voting schemes. Up to now, many e-voting schemes have been proposed to provide receipt-freeness and uncoercibility to solve these problems. Unfortunately, none is both secure and practical enough. In this paper, we describe an e-voting scheme that can solve or at least lessen the problems...

We introduce a model for electronic election schemes that involves a more powerful adversary than in previous work. In particular, we allow the adversary to demand of coerced voters that they vote in a particular manner, abstain from voting, or even disclose their secret keys. We define a scheme to be _coercion-resistant_ if it is infeasible for the adversary to determine whether a coerced voter complies with the demands. A first contribution of this paper is to describe and characterize...

Consider a situation in which the transmission of encrypted messages is intercepted by an adversary who can later ask the sender to reveal the random choices (and also the secret key, if one exists) used in generating the ciphertext, thereby exposing the cleartext. An encryption scheme is <B>deniable</B> if the sender can generate `fake random choices' that will make the ciphertext `look like' an encryption of a different cleartext, thus keeping the real cleartext private. Analogous...

Current secure multiparty protocols have the following deficiency. The public transcript of the communication can be used as an involuntary <B>commitment</B> of the parties to their inputs and outputs. Thus parties can be later coerced by some authority to reveal their private data. Previous work that has pointed this interesting problem out contained only partial treatment. In this work we present the first general and rigorous treatment of the coercion problem in secure computation. First...