• Word.
  • 1. (word-token) an individual instance of a word.
    
  • 2. (word-type1) word-tokens are of the same word-type if they are typographically identical
    
  • 3. (wordtype2) word-tokens are of the same word-type if they are typographically identical and have the same meaning

• Sentence. (varied usage) Series of words bounded by full stops, etc. and distinguished into sentence-token and sentence-type.

• Token. (word, sentence, proposition, statement). Individual instance of a word &c., a particular.

• Particular. Individual such as material object, event person.: distinguished from non-particulars by feature that there can be two particulars which are indistinguishable except for their location in time and space.

• word-token: A word-token is a sequence of characters (or units of speech).

• word-type. A word-type is an identical sequence of characters (or units of speech).

A word-token is a sequence of characters (or units of speech).
A word-type is an identical sequence of characters (or units of speech).
The sequence of characters A (above) contains four word-types (the word-token can occurring twice)

• Word-meanings
  

• Meaningful Declarative-sentences: A declarative-sentence is a ...
  

• Sentence-tokens. A sentence-token is a sequence of meaningful word-tokens.
  

• Declarative-sentence-tokens: A declarative-sentence-token is a sentence-token which that can be used to communicate truth or convey information.
  

• Meaningful-declarative-sentence-tokens. A meaningful-declarative-sentence-token is a declarative-sentence-token which has meaning.
  

• Nonsense- declarative-sentence-token. A nonsense-declarative-sentence-token is a declarative-sentence-token which is not a meaningful-declarative-sentence-token.
  

• Propositions. A meaningful-declarative-sentence-token expresses a proposition. Two meaningful-declarative-sentence-tokens which have the same meaning express the same proposition.
  

• Statements. Two meaningful-declarative-sentence-tokens which say the same thing of the same object(s) make the same statement.
  

Wolfram (1989). Philosophical Logic: an introduction. Routledge. ISBN 0 415 02317 3 (0 415 02318 (pbk)). {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help); Unknown parameter |Sybil= ignored (help)

http://www.hf.uio.no/ifikk/filosofi/njpl/vol1no1/meaning/node2.html:

Let us first look at the term proposition. It has its origin in the Gr. , used by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics, the third part of the Organon. It was translated, apparently by Cicero, into Lat. propositio, which has its modern counterparts in It.\ proposizione, Eng. proposition and Ger. Satz. In the old, traditional use of the word proposition, propositions are the things that we prove. We talk about proposition and proof, of course, in mathematics: we put up a proposition and let it be followed by its proof. In particular, the premises and conclusion of an inference were propositions in this old terminology. It was the standard use of the word up to the last century. And it is this use which is retained in mathematics, where a theorem is sometimes called a proposition, sometimes a theorem. Thus we have two words for the things that we prove, proposition and theorem. The word proposition, Gr. , comes from Aristotle and has dominated the logical tradition, whereas the word theorem, Gr. , is in Euclid, I believe, and has dominated the mathematical tradition.

With Kant, something important happened, namely, that the term judgement, Ger. Urteil, came to be used instead of proposition. Perhaps one reason is that proposition, or a word with that stem, at least, simply does not exist in German: the corresponding German word would be Lehrsatz, or simply Satz. Be that as it may, what happened with Kant and the ensuing German philosophical tradition was that the word judgement came to replace the word proposition. Thus, in that tradition, a proof, Ger. Beweis, is always a proof of a judgement. In particular, the premises and conclusion of a logical inference are always called judgements. And it was the judgements, or the categorical judgements, rather, which were divided into affirmations and denials, whereas earlier it was the propositions which were so divided.

The term judgement also has a long history. It is the Gr. , translated into Lat. judicium, It. giudizio, Eng. judgement, and Ger. Urteil. Now, since it has as long a history as the word proposition, these two were also previously used in parallel. The traditional way of relating the notions of judgement and proposition was by saying that a proposition is the verbal expression of a judgement. This is, as far as I know, how the notions of proposition and judgement were related during the scholastic period, and it is something which is repeated in the Port Royal Logic, for instance. You still find it repeated by Brentano in this century. Now, this means that, when, in German philosophy beginning with Kant, what was previously called a proposition came to be called a judgement, the term judgement acquired a double meaning. It came to be used, on the one hand, for the act of judging, just as before, and, on the other hand, it came to be used instead of the old proposition. Of course, when you say that a proposition is the verbal expression of a judgement, you mean by judgement the act of judging, the mental act of judging in scholastic terms, and the proposition is the verbal expression by means of which you make the mental judgement public, so to say. That is, I think, how one thought about it. Thus, with Kant, the term judgement became ambiguous between the act of judging and that which is judged, or the judgement made, if you prefer. German has here the excellent expression gefälltes Urteil, which has no good counterpart in English.

Presocratic Fragments and Testimonials adapted from passages in John Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy (1892).] Presocratic Fragments and Testimonials adapted from passages in John Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy (1892).

${\displaystyle \neg }$  ${\displaystyle \to }$  ${\displaystyle \forall }$  ${\displaystyle \exists }$ 

Wikipedia:WikiProject Logic/Standards for notation#Symbols

• (A) cf Wolfram 1989^[1]
• (B) ^[2]
• (C) ^[3]
• (D) ^{[refgroup 1]}

reflist

refgroup

&site=en.wikipedia.org Wannabe Kate

In Aristotle's view, if X is the assertion that s is F and Y is the assertion that s is not-F, then (a) if s exists then X is true or false and Y the contrary depending of whether of not s is F, but (b) if s does not exist then X is false and Y is true ^{[1] [2]}

• Theory (mathematical logic)
• Theory (mathematical logic)#Syntactic consequence in a first order theory
• talk:WikiProject Philosophy#WikiProject Logic
• Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Philosophy#WikiProject Logic

• First-order logic#Validity, satisfiability, and logical consequence
• formula

Name	Description/Usage	Symbol(s)	Preferred Symbol(s)	Template	<math>	See
Definition	${\displaystyle X{\stackrel {\rm {def}}{=}}y_{1},y_{2},\dots }$	${\displaystyle {\stackrel {\rm {def}}{=}}}$	${\displaystyle {\stackrel {\rm {def}}{=}}}$	none	\stackrel{\rm def}=	Definition
Theorem	${\displaystyle X\vdash Y}$ , ${\displaystyle \vdash Z}$ , ${\displaystyle A\vdash _{S}X}$	${\displaystyle \vdash }$	${\displaystyle \vdash }$	{{tee}}	\vdash	Turnstile (symbol)
Semantic Entailment	${\displaystyle A\models _{L}X}$ , ${\displaystyle \models X}$	${\displaystyle \models }$	${\displaystyle \models }$	{{models}}	\models	Double turnstile
True, tautology	${\displaystyle \vDash \top }$	${\displaystyle \top }$  or T or 1	${\displaystyle \top }$	{{true}}	\top	Tee (symbol)
False, contradiction	${\displaystyle \vDash \neg \bot }$	${\displaystyle \bot }$  or F or 0	${\displaystyle \bot }$	{{false}}	\bot	Falsum

• ${\displaystyle \vdash }$  \vdash Turnstile (symbol)
• cf ⊢
• Semantic Entailment , ${\displaystyle \models }$ 
• Definition none \stackrel{\rm def}= Definition
• Theorem , , ${\displaystyle \vdash }$  \vdash Turnstile (symbol)
• Semantic Entailment , ${\displaystyle \models }$  \models Double turnstile
• True, tautology or T or 1 ${\displaystyle \top }$  \top Tee (symbol)
• False, contradiction or F or 0 ${\displaystyle \bot }$  \bot Falsum

Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Logic {{logic}}Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Philosophy#WikiProject Logic tst — Philogo (talk) 02:37, 13 February 2011 (UTC) tst — Philogos (talk) 02:38, 13 February 2011 (UTC)

We say that A is contradictory (according to quantification theory) iff ~A is logically valid, or, equivalently, iff A is false for every interpretation

1. Pn0, Pn1, Pn2, Pn3, … 2. For every integer n ≥ 0 there are infinitely many n-ary function symbols: f n0, f n1, f n2, f n3, … In contemporary mathematical logic, the 3. Pn0, Pn1, Pn2, Pn3, … f n0, f n1, f n2, f n3, …

John F. Kennedy John Fitzgerald "Jack" Kennedy pronunciation (help·info) (May 29, 1917 – November 22, 1963), often referred to by his initials JFK, was the 35th President of the United States, serving from 1961 until his assassination in 1963.

Harry Stanley Harry Stanley (c. 1953–22 September 1999) was a painter and decorator who was fatally shot by police in controversial circumstances.

Roger Sylvester Roger Sylvester (c. 1969–11 January 1999) was a mentally ill black man who died in north London after being detained outside his home in Tottenham by eight Metropolitan police officers.

Christopher Alder Christopher Ibikunle Alder was a trainee computer programmer and former British Army paratrooper who had been decorated for his service with the Army in Northern Ireland.[1] He died while in police custody at Queen's Gardens Police Station, Kingston upon Hull, in April 1998.[2]

Stephen Lawrence Stephen Lawrence, a black British teenager (born 13 September 1974) from Eltham, southeast London, was stabbed to death while waiting for a bus on the evening of 22 April 1993.[1]

Oluwashijibomi Lapite Oluwashijibomi "Shiji" Lapite (died December 16, 1994) was a 34 year-old Nigerian asylum seeker. Married to Olamide Jones and the father of two young children he died in the back of a police van shortly after being detained by two officers from Stoke Newington police station in London, England.[1]

1. Sider, Theodore (1997). "Four-Dimensionalism". Philosophical Review (Oxford University Press) 106 (2): 197–231. http://tedsider.org/papers/4d.pdf.
2. "The Unreality of Time". Wikisource. http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Unreality_of_Time. Retrieved 2008-12-15.
3. "Time". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002-11-25. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#TimTra). Retrieved 2008-12-15.

The following shows the lede before and after my recent edits Before In philosophy, four-dimensionalism may refer to either eternalism or perdurantism. The former is a theory of time, while the latter is a theory about the identity of objects over time. Sider (1997), for example, uses the term four-dimensionalism to refer to perdurantism, the theory that objects (and people) are four dimensional (see below for explanation). Eternalism, by contrast, is the theory that the universe (but not necessarily its contents, e.g., objects and people) is four dimensional, with time being the fourth dimension. Nevertheless, both theories tend to be discussed together, as many philosophers hold the combination of eternalism and perdurantism, considering both as better theories than their counterparts, presentism and endurantism, respectively. Probably, nobody who accepts perdurantism rejects eternalism, and it is unclear if such a position would even be coherent.

After In philosophy, four-dimensionalism (also known as the the doctrine of temporal parts and the theory that objects "perdure") is the philosophical theory that persistanmce through time is like extension through space and an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. (Sider (1997, page 1)) ^[1] Contemporary four-dimensionalists include, according to Sider (1997), Armstrong (1980), Hughes (1986) , Heller (1884, 1990,1992,1992) and Lewis (1983, 1986).

Four-dimensionalism may refer to either eternalism or perdurantism. Eternalism is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time, according to which all points in time are equally "real", as opposed to the presentist idea that only the present is real.^[2] Perdurantism or perdurance theory is a philosophical theory of persistence and identity.^[3] according to which an individual has distinct temporal parts throughout its existence. Thus eternalism is a theory of time, while perdurantism is a theory about the identity of objects over time. Sider (1997) uses the term four-dimensionalism to refer to perdurantism. Eternalism and perdurantism tend to be discussed together because many philosophers argue for a combination of eternalism and perdurantism, considering both as better theories than their counterparts, presentism and endurantism, respectively. It may be argued that the acceptance of perdurantism and rejection of eternalism would would be incoherent.

test template   Please do not add or change content without verifying it by citing reliable sources, as you did to [[test]]. Please review the guidelines at Wikipedia:Citing sources and take this opportunity to add references to the article. Thank you. —

In logic, entailment is a relation between a set of sentences (meaningfully declarative sentences or truthbearers) and another sentence. If a sentence, S1, is the conjunction of all the elements of a set of one or more sentences, Γ, then, Γ entails another sentence, S2, if and only if S1 and not-S2 are logically inconsistent. Using ${\displaystyle \models }$  to stand for entailment we can write:

• If Γ =${\displaystyle \{A_{1},A_{2},\ldots ,A_{n}\}}$  ${\displaystyle \wedge }$  ${\displaystyle S1=A_{1}\wedge A_{2}\wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n}}$  then Γ ${\displaystyle \models }$  S2 ${\displaystyle {\stackrel {\rm {def}}{=}}}$  (S1 ${\displaystyle \wedge }$  ${\displaystyle \neg }$ S2) ${\displaystyle \models }$  ${\displaystyle \bot }$ .

If a set of one or more sentences, Γ, entails a sentence, S2, then S2 is called the logical consequent of the conjunction of the elements of Γ, S1,and the conjunction of the elements of Γ, S1, is said to logically imply S2.

jlkjklj In logic, entailment is a relation between logical propositions: a set of propositions ${\displaystyle \{A_{1},A_{2},\ldots ,A_{n}\}}$  entails a proposition ${\displaystyle B}$  if and only if the conjunction ${\displaystyle A=A_{1}\wedge A_{2}\wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n}}$  logically contradicts the negation ${\displaystyle \neg B}$ . When this is the case, we say that A logically implies B, or that B is a logical consequent of A.

A set of propositions Γ = ${\displaystyle \{A_{1},A_{2},\ldots ,A_{n}\}}$  entails a sentence ${\displaystyle S2}$  if and only if the conjunction ${\displaystyle S1=A_{1}\wedge A_{2}\wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n}}$  logically contradicts the negation ${\displaystyle \neg S2}$ . When this is the case, we say that S1 logically implies S2, or that S2 is a logical consequent of S1.

Γ = ${\displaystyle \{A_{1},A_{2},\ldots ,A_{n}\}}$  entails a sentence ${\displaystyle S2}$  if and only if the conjunction ${\displaystyle S1=A_{1}\wedge A_{2}\wedge \ldots \wedge A_{n}}$  logically contradicts the negation ${\displaystyle \neg S2}$ . When this is the case, we say that S1 logically implies S2, or that S2 is a logical consequent of S1.

test test--31.49.82.106 (talk) 16:52, 16 October 2014 (UTC) test— Philogos (talk) 16:57, 16 October 2014 (UTC) test--— Philogos (talk) 17:01, 16 October 2014 (UTC)

^[4]

Sider (1997), Armstrong (1980): Armstrong, David M. (1980). “Identity Through Time.” In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, 67-68 Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Hughes (1986): Hughes, C. (1986)). “Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85: 213-33.

Heller (1984, 1990,1992,1993) Heller, Mark (1984). “Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects.” Philo- sophical Studies 46: 323-34. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 12.-330. Heller, Mark (1990). The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-dimensional Hunks of Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heller, Mark (1992). “Things Change.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 695-304 Heller, Mark (1993). “Varieties of Four Dimensionalism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 47-59.

Lewis (1983, 1986). Lewis, David (1983). “Survival and Identity.” In Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, 55-7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. With postscripts. Originally published in Amelie O. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 17-40. Lewis, David (1986a). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Lewis, David (1986b). Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Adams, Robert Merrihew †). “Time and Thisness.” In French et al. (1986), 315™. Armstrong, David M. €). “Identity Through Time.” In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, 67À. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Chisholm, Roderick ~). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co. Dau, Paolo †). “Part-Time Objects.” In French et al. (1986), 459¼. Evans, Gareth €). “Can There Be Vague Objects?” Analysis 38: 208. Fine, Kit Œ). “Compounds and Aggregates.” Noûs 28_): 137p. French, Peter, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr. and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) †). Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Geach, Peter z). “Some Problems about Time.” 302. Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press. Graham, George ?). “Persons and Time.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 15: 308. Haslanger, Sally Œ). “Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 339±. Haslanger, Sally and Roxanne Marie Kurtz (eds.) _). Persistence: Contempo- rary Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Heller, Mark „). “Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects.” Philo- sophical Studies 46: 323œ. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 320Ø. — ˆ). The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-dimensional Hunks of Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 31

— Š). “Things Change.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 695Ä. — ‹). “Varieties of Four Dimensionalism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 47±. Hirsch, Eli ‚). The Concept of Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hughes, C. †). “Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85: 213›. Kazmi, Ali Akhtar ˆ). “Parthood and Persistence.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 16: 227¨. Leonard, Henry S. and Nelson Goodman ‘). “The Calculus of Individuals and its Uses.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 5: 45­. Lewis, David ƒ). “Survival and Identity.” In Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 , 55•7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. With postscripts. Originally published in Amelie O. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 17-40. — † a). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. — † b). Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Markosian, Ned ). “Brutal Composition.” Philosophical Studies 92: 211©. Mellor, D. H. ). Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Merricks, Trenton Œ). “Endurance and Indiscernibility.” Journal of Philoso- phy 91: 165Ä. — ). “On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities.” Mind 104: 523Y. Perry, John (ed.) }). Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press. Prior, A.N. x). “Changes in Events and Changes in Things.” In Papers on Time and Tense, 7‘. London: Oxford University Press. 32

Quine, W. V. O. ~). “Whither Physical Objects.” In R.S. Cohen, P.K. Feyerabend and M.W. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, 497D. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. — ). Theories and Things. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rea, Michael (ed.) ). Material Constitution. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Little_eld. Sider, Theodore ‹). “Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk.” Analysis 53: 285É. — Ž a). “All the World’s a Stage.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 433+. Reprinted in Haslanger and Kurtz 2006: 91O. — Ž b). “Merricks on Perdurance/Endurance Incompatibility.” Never published; but material from this paper appeared in chapter 3 of Sider (2001). — _). Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon. Simons, Peter ‡). Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon. Thomson, Judith Jarvis ƒ). “Parthood and Identity across Time.” Journal of Philosophy 80: 201. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 25£. Unger, Peter ). “I Do Not Exist.” In G. F. Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with His Replies to Them, 235©. New York: Macmillan. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 175È. van Inwagen, Peter ). “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts.” Paci_c Philosophical Quarterly 62: 123_. Reprinted in van Inwagen 2001: 75Ì. — ˆ a). “Four-Dimensional Objects.” Noûs 24: 245­. Reprinted in van Inwagen 2001: 111Q. — ˆ b). Material Beings. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. — _). Ontology, Identity and Modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 33

Wiggins, David ). “Mereological Essentialism: Asymmetrical Essential Dependence and the Nature of Continuants.” In Ernest Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm, 297Í. Amsterdam: Rodopi. — €). Sameness and Substance. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Williamson, Timothy Œ). Vagueness. London: Routledge.

The prevailing use of the term argument in logic is that it (a) consists of one or more premises and a conclusion (b) the premises purport to support the conclusion (c) in the case of deductive argument, the premises are purported to entail the conclusion (d) Various terms are used in the literature when saying what the premises and the conclusion are including statements, sentences (by which are meant declarative or indicative sentences), propositions, claims. All authors agree that whichever terms they have used , they are referring to whatever it is they consider to be either true or false (i.e. truthbearers ).

The following citations from reliable sources are offered in evidence for the above:

• The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Ed. CUM, 1995: "Argument: a sequence of statements such that some of them (the premises) purport to give reason to accept another of them, the conclusion"; Stanford Enc. Phil., Classical Logic;
• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy."Argument", <http://www.iep.utm.edu/argument/>: "An argument is a connected series of statements or propositions, some of which are intended to provide support, justification or evidence for the truth of another statement or proposition. Arguments consist of one or more premises and a conclusion. The premises are those statements that are taken to provide the support or evidence; the conclusion is that which the premises allegedly support."
• Standford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, Informal Logic [1]: "The premises of a valid deductive argument guarantee the truth of the conclusion. If the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false. Informal logic tends to categorize arguments in terms of a consequent distinction between "deductive" and "inductive" arguments (a distinction that Govier [1987] aptly calls "the great divide"). In contrast with valid deductive arguments, the premises of a good inductive argument render a conclusion only probable, leaving it possible that the premises are true and the conclusion false (identifying poor arguments as deductive or inductive is inherently problematic: perhaps it can best be said that poor deductive and inductive arguments are arguments that in some way approximate good deductive and inductive forms)."
• Wesley Salman, Logic, PH 1963. pp 2,3 : "Arguments are often used to convince, and this is one of those important and legitimate function; however logic is not concerned with the persuasive power of argument. ..Roughly speaking, an argument is a conclusion standing in relation to its supporting evidence." More precisely, an argument is a group of statements standing in relation to each other. (Footnote: The term "statement" is used to refer to components of arguments because it is philosophically more neutral than alternatives such as "sentence" or "proposition". No technical definition of "statement is offered here, because any definition would raise controversies in the philosophy of language which need not trouble the beginner. More sophisticated readers may supply whatever technical definition seems most appropriate to them.) An argument consists of one statement which is the conclusion and one or more statements of supporting evidence. The statements of evidence are called "premises".
• Mates, Elementary Logic, 1972, p 4, 5 ".. Logic investigates the relation of consequence that holds between the premises and the conclusion of a sound argument... By an argument we mean a system of declarative sentences(of a single language) one of which is designated as the conclusion and the other as premises...Sentences are usually classified as declarative, interrogative, imperative etc. Characteristic of declarative sentences is that they are true or false, and it is these that are of primary interest to the logician."
• Jennifer Fisher, The Philosophy of Logic, 2008, p 6: "An argument ..is a set of sentences in which one or sentences are supposed to give some sort of support to another sentence." and p 24 14 "a set of sentences in which one sentence (sentences) is (are) supposed to give some sort of support to another sentence."
• Anthony Harrison-Barbet, Mastering Philosophy, p 13: "In an argument we pass from one or more propositions called premises to another proposition called the conclusion"
• LTF Gamit, Logic Language and Meaning, 1991, p 1 "For our purposes it is convenient to see an argument as a sequence of sentences, with the premises at the beginning and the conclusion at the end of the argument." p 6 "An argument is composed of indicative sentences. It does not contain any questions, for example."
• Barwise & Ethcmendy, Language Proof and Logic, 1999, page 42: "..an arguments is any series of statement in which one (called the concusion) is meant to follow from, or be supported by the others (called the premises)"
• Sybil Wolfram, Philosophical Logic, 1989: p 10 "An argument is generally said to be valid if the conclusion follows from the premises" p 276 "Sentence: (varied usage) here used of series of words bounded by full stops etc"; p 33 "A meaningful declarative sentence is, as a first approximation, one which could express a truth (convey information)
• Ian Hacking, A concise Introduction to Logic, Random House, NY; 1972, pp 5,6: "We can divide an argument into two parts. There is the part that states the conclusion and the part that gives the reasons. Statements giving reasons are called (27) PREMISES/CONCLUSION. The (28)_______________ give reasons for the (29)______________"
• Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument (2000) "One view of argument sees it as a set of statements, (propositions, assertions, beliefs, and judgments), one of which, the conclusion, is supported by the others — the premises. A definition of this sort can be found in every kind of logic text, whether deductive or inductive, formal or informal. }}
• The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Honderich, 1995)p 47 : "In the most important sense for philosophy an argument is a complex consisting of a set of propositions (called its premises) and a proposition (called its conclusion). You can use an argument by asserting its premises and drawing or inferring its conclusion"

[2]

Michael Rea (Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics) uses the term ‘four-dimensionalism’ to mean the view that presentism is false as opposed to ‘perdurantism’, the view that objects last over time without being wholly present at every time at which they exist. ^[5]