Battle of Chunj

In May 1948,^[11] Indian 163 Brigade launched an offensive in Tithwal sector which raised the threat to Muzaffarabad and the force's advanced from Handwara to Tithwal and from Uri to Urusa, it caused much panic and desperation to the Pakistani High command.^[10][11] The capture of Domel was the main objective of the Indian offensive, since Domel was only Eighteen miles from Tithwal. Tithwal had been captured by Indian forces previously and Domel was a formidable key position for the Pakistani command.^[10]

10th Brigade of Pakistan Army under Brigadier Haji Iftikhar Ahmad, was tasked to stop the Indian advance, and defend Muzaffarabad at all costs.^[11] It was considered necessary by Pakistani command to drive out the Indian troops from the heights of Chunj range and push the Indian troops back into the left bank of Kishanganga.^[12] The regular troops of India and Pakistan fought each other from May onwards.^[19]

Colonel Nausherwan and his Battalion acquainted their routes and their aims.^[12] The Plan was made, the capture of Chunj feature general area (Point 9444) which was the preliminary objective explained to all of the soldiers of 4/16 Punjab on 25 June. The following step was to drive out the Indian forces from Point 7229 and Point 6953,which were high peaks and dominated the main track along the River Neelum.^[7]

All bridges between Tithwal and Keran were eliminated by Indian troops to stop Pakistani troops from accessing the west of the river Kishanganga while the concentration of the Pakistan forces continued.^[20] The Indian positions beyond Kishanganga at Ring contour and Point 7229 were attacked by two groups of Pakistani forces covertly through the smoke coming out of mortar fire on June 24, but the attack was repulsed.^[20] On Tithwal, the shelling increased on Indian positions after this engagement including Ring contour from Point 9444 and the 1 Madras Headquarters for the whole day.^[20]

Colonel Nausherwan organized the force for driving Indian troops away from the Chunj Heights.^[12] Nausherwan called a session with the troops, the engineers, and the gunners, who agreed to bring a 3.7 inch howitzer gun, given the nickname Shahzadi,^[e] to Point 9444 for gunfire assistance. A track was created for mules for 25 miles from Muzaffarabad since no proper track existed.^[12][21] A sling and pulley was used to dismantle the gun and boxes full of ammunition that were brought beyond the Kahori river across the Kishanganga.^[12][22] Once the gun reached the point, it was put together and the engineers then removed the Indian mines and built tracks beside other river.^[21] The bridge was completed in a short time, and the artillery piece, Shahzadi, was brought across with the help of 70 porters.^[7] By June 30, the entire battalion had moved and concentrated in the Ban Forest area.^[7]

On 25 June, an officer with platoon strength was sent by Pakistani force to clear and take control of area Point 4207, the Indian force launched their attack with all of their available artillery and machine guns, but due to darkness, Pakistani forces went unharmed.^[7] After leaving two dead and a significant amount of ammunition and equipment behind, the Indian troops ultimately withdrew from the area.^[7]

On 8 July 1948 Pakistani troops took their positions at Ban Forest went undetected. 3 Madras was new unit on the Indian side which was inducted, it unaware of the movement of the Pakistani troops who had reached their Forming up Place. The Dispatch rider would keep his motorbike on to make it appear as tanks were present.^[7] The early actions facilitated the subsequent attack. Early morning the first wave of the assault commenced.^[23] The attack on Point 6953, descending from Point 9444, took place along a narrow ridgeline, making a conventional two-company frontal assault impossible, instead 'A' Company led the attack but faced a delay. several Indian bunkers were destroyed with direct hits from Shahzadi early in the engagement.^[7]

After shelling the Point 7229 and ring contour for thirty minutes, Major Ghulam Rasul, whose advance was hindered by a single machine gun position, decided to approach the enemy from the southwest, targeting their rear from the direction of the village of Chilean.^[7] The process took several hours meanwhile 'A' Company managed to capture part of the Indian defenses.^[7] By night time the 'B' company reached the positions. After intense hand-to-hand combat and heavy Indian casualties, Point 6953 was ultimately captured. The Indian force abandoned their defensive positions, leaving behind 30 dead and 13 prisoners. With no fire support from their deeper positions, the remaining Indian troops forces surrendered.^[23][7]

An Indian platoon was ordered to backup Ring contour, was engaged with Pakistani troops and shelling meanwhile the machine gun section at Point 7229 gave cover to the force and it retreated to False crest.^[23]Pakistani forces used deception successfully to capitalize on Indian concerns about an impending counterattack on Keran position.^[23] Two companies of Indian forces were given orders to attack Shardi on 7th July and set off for this mission on 8th July, they were informed of Ring contour being captured and would return by 9 July.^[23]

On July 9, C and D Companies advanced to initiate the second phase of the operation. Orders were given which indicated that Point 7229 was unoccupied and ordered both companies to join them there immediately. The Indian forces, in a state of panic, blew up the bridge at Tithwal while retreating across the River Neelum. The unit requested permission to pursue the retreating Indian troops across the river, but the request was denied. The Indian forces planned a counter-attack to retake ring contour and requested an airstrike on the Pakistani position, however the airstrike never took place.^[24]

The brigade commander instructed the troops to withdraw and also to blow up the bridge beyond the river.^[24] The Indian troops had withdrawn along their equipment and heavy arms from kishanganga after facing attacks and the Pakistani troops captured Point 7229 after they saw it unoccupied.^[24]

At Kishanganga Eight Indian Platoons were spread throughout including the Group at False crest and were engaged with Pakistani troops.^[24] At Tithwal ridge all of the machine guns were assembled and the Indian forces withdrew under the cover of an IAF jet which bombarded the Pakistani troops for 20 minutes, meanwhile the Indian sappers prepared to destroy the bridge and it was destroyed after two attempts.^[24] Two Indian Platoons were ordered to collect ammunition which was stored close River Kishanganga and Jarara.^[25] Pakistani troops shelled these platoons and they withdrew back.^[25] The IAF jets again bombarded the Pakistani positions and the Indian troops made their way back and another party destroyed the track at the junction.^[25]

North of Tithwal an Indian Piquet was attacked, which resulted in all the positions being deserted. Following this, the 3/12 Frontier Force was ordered to move immediately and occupy the Pir Sahaba feature.^[7]

With the evacuation of all the advanced positions across the kishanganga, the Indian command considered it a major loss.^[13] The commanding officer of 1 Madras considered the Brigade Headquarters tactical errors and obstacles including not occupying Point 9444 a tactical blunder. The Major of Brigade 163 discredited the allegations and insisted that the troops were demoralized, which caused the loss. Gen Thimmya therefore held no one accountable for the failure.^[13]

The Indian forces had gained success by capturing Tithwal before but with the fall of Chunj feature to Pakistan, the summer offensive of the Indian army failed towards Muzaffarabad from Tithwal and was halted.^[14] It added a huge area to the Pakistani controlled side on the left bank of Kishanganga.^[15] Major Sloan was praised for his actions which lead to the capture of crucial peaks in the Tithwal sector in July 1948.^[16] The Pakistani forces switched their focus towards Chakothi area after achieving remarkable victory in Tithwal which later also included another victory in Pandu by pushing out 2 Bihar from the Pandu feature, which overlooked the other features, due to this reason it was noteworthy.^[17] Stalemate Ensued afterwards in this sector till ceasefire occurred.^[18]

For the present, however, we had to accept the fact. that the weather, the terrain and Pakistan’s fresh reinforcements had prevented us from reaching our goal Domel. Yet our gains had been substantial and in this respect we had got the better of the enemy.^[26]

— Sinha, Operation Rescue military operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-49, Pg 78

• Tithwal
• Battle of Shalateng
• Battle of Pandu
• Battle of Badgam
• Battle of Rawalakot
• Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948

Notes

Citations

Works Cited

• Sinha, S.K. (1977). Operation Rescue Military Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947-49. Vision Books. Archived from the original on 20 January 2021.
• Prasad, Sri Nandan (1987). History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947-48. History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Archived from the original on 17 January 2017.
• Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf (2015) [first published 1979 by Ferozsons], Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2, Mirpur: National Institute Kashmir Studies, archived from the original on 29 March 2021
• Ali, Ahmad (2022). "Major Sloan in Kashmir (Story of a British officer serving with the Pakistan Army, killed in action during the Kashmir Liberation War, 1947-48)". 9-Bugle-Trumpet-Summer-2023.PDF. IV. Archived from the original on 18 July 2024 – via Aimh.gov (Army Website).
• Ankit, Rakesh (2010). "1948: The Crucial Year in the History of Jammu and Kashmir". Economic and Political Weekly. 45 (11): 49–58. ISSN 0012-9976. JSTOR 25664224 – via JSTOR.
• Suharwardy, Abdul Haq (1983), Tragedy in Kashmir, Wajidalis
• Cheema, Amar (2014). The Crimson Chinar the Kashmir Conflict : a Politico Military Perspective. United Service Institution of India. ISBN 9788170623014. Retrieved 7 August 2024.