Talk:States' rights/Archive 1

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Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Rights are limits on governmental power. Thus, state and federal rights don't exist. States and the federal government can not have rights, only people may have rights. ♥

"Conservatives also protested when the Supreme Court in 2005 in Kelo v. New London took a states' rights position on Eminent domain; conservatives wanted federal courts to overrule state and local government when private property was involved."

The fifth amendment of the Constitution states, "...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The property being taken was to be sold to a higher tax base buisness occupation. New London argued that this was Constitutional as it was for the public good, but as you can see above, private property can ONLY be taken for public use, not public good. Therefore, there was not a states' rights issue here, but a citizen's rights issue. As the federal goverment is supposed to be there to regulate the interrelation of the states and protect the citizens' rights from the states it was a Constitutionally correct viewpoint to oppose New London and most definitely not a states' rights violation.

The question is who should decide what is "public use"? The Supreme Court in Kelo said the states should make the decisions about what is "public use", not the federal courts. If you support state's rights you have to support Kelo. In fact most conservatives are MORE interested in protecting private property than in state rights, which is the whole point. They support states rights ONLY when it is convenient for them. (ditto for Oregon assisted suicide and the Schiavo case) Rjensen 08:15, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

Public use is pretty clear in my opinion. The public uses a road or railway. It doesn't use the property a mall is built on even if it patronizes the mall. The property is being put to private use, a buisness. Whether or not it benefits the public is irrelevant. That citizen's right to their property overrules the cities desire for an increased income. I support states' rights, but I don't support Kelo, because I also support citizen's rights. If they had taken the same property, with due compensation, to build a road they would've been constitutionally within the rights of a state, but by giving it to buisness they were violating a citizen's constitutional rights.

I have deleted the aforementioned passage for the aforementioned reasons, seeing no further opposition.

you miss the point of Kelo--who makes the decision? not you or me, but states or feds? Rjensen 19:01, 15 March 2006 (UTC)

The article contains the following: "But with [sic] now the ground has shifted to general issues of federal versus state power, especially to moralistic issues such as abortion, gay rights, same-sex marriage, which conservatives want decided at the state level. In this regard, "states' right" remains a code word for opposition on the part of conservatives to these social issues, and is used by the Republican Party as part of its southern strategy."

I have two problems with this. First, I think it is, at least partially, incorrect. On the issue of gay marriage, the majority of the Republicans (The President, Bill Frist etc) are not taking a States' Rights position on this issue. They have proposed an amendment to the U.S. Constituion to Federalize the issue of marriage and to take it away from the States. Under their proposal, no state (through its courts, legislature or popular vote to amend its constitution) would be allowed to grant same sex marriages, nor would state courts be allowed to interpret state constitutions to grant the "incidents of marriage" to gay couples. This is not a states' rights position. My second problem involves the language used. There is a clear point of view expressed in this section. I hate to raise this, as it is a point of view that I happen to agree with, but it is a POV nonetheless. I think that this section needs to be revised. What do others think? Franklin Moore 18:19, 13 June 2006 (UTC)

ADD:

The 10th Amendment, if read, does not guarantee anything. There is no part of the Constitution giving the states ANY rights other than those not dealt with under Federal powers. Federal authority usually and will almost always trump state's rights (since there aren't any).

The Contemporary debates section contains some inaccuracies such as:

• With regard to the Kelo v. New London decision, I think it's inaccurate to describe it as conservatives wanting the federal government to decide what "public use" means. My understanding was that they simply felt the Supreme Court should have restricted the concept of "public use" to prohibit taking of property for private commercial use. This is not quit the same as saying the federal government should decide.
• The position of conservative regarding states rights and moral issues has changed somewhat in recent years. It's inaccurate to say that they always want control over such issues as abortion and gay rights to be solely at the state level since recently they have proposed or even passed measures dealing with such issues at the federal level. When they where not in complete power at the federal level, they may have advocated that but now it seems they are willing to cede such control to the federal level such as via the anti-gay marriage amendment or the partial birth abortion ban. Generally, it is only when a congressman's party is not in control that they push for states rights.

--Cab88 17:18, 8 July 2006 (UTC)

In Kelo, the conservatives wanted the Supreme Court to overrule states rights and move the issue, in the future, into federal district courts. That is pretty much a repudiation of states rights in order to achieve a specific result re weaking the ability of states to take private property. Rjensen 23:04, 10 July 2006 (UTC)

I wonder if Wikipedia shouldn't make claims about "liberals" and "conservatives" as those terms are fairly charged words with little in the way of objective meaning. Generalizing that "conservatives (all of them?) support X" seems NPOV. Maybe we should say "Republican leaders" or something, if that's what's meant. --SuperNova |T|C| 23:34, 10 July 2006 (UTC)

Liberal and conservative are the actual terms people use to describe themselves today. Rjensen 23:57, 10 July 2006 (UTC)

Right, I know that -- though other terms, like "progressive", "libertarian", etc., are often used in place of or as clarifiers for those terms. Beyond the terms, there's a huge issue with this section of the article that could make it much better: Citations. Some past editor has made all kinds of analysis of political calculus that is certainly questionable, probably not verifiable, and completely uncited. It's easy to see: The article talks about SCOTUS cases in 2006 yet no work cited has a post-2002 date. Especially on controversial, often disputed issues, it's important to stay on top of this. Much, much better to list specific "conservatives" who support something rather than (almost weaselly) generalize huge swaths of ideologies. (Remember that the religious right and libertarians probably disagree on almost all this stuff, yet both might be referred to as "conservatives" -- for their support of economic liberalism. This is why I'd prefer other terms ;-))

I may try to work on this when I get a minute, but I wanted to register here how badly this section seems to be in need of cleanup to add citations and make it NPOV. Help, anyone?--SuperNova |T|C| 02:25, 11 July 2006 (UTC)

While I agree with the opinions of 68.122.10.113, five U.S. Supreme Court judges did not. Or at least, when Congress made an extreme effort to pass a law to enforce equal protection of the laws for women, and made an extreme effort to prove their case with what one judge called a mountain of evidence, five judges thought the the "sovereign immunity" of states was, if not absolute, at least very close to absolute. They said that the Fourteenth Amendment could be enforced by Congress in theory, but what would it take for them to agree with this in fact? Read the decisions for yourself and decide from there.Jimmuldrow 17:21, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

Also, Rhenquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy and O'Conner certainly thought they were limiting federalism with these decisions.Jimmuldrow 17:24, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

If you read the decisions for these cases, and the arguments used, it's clear that five Supreme Court judges were opposed to equal protection of the laws to a degree that caused them to overlook a mountain of evidence in favor of allowing the fourteenth amendment to amend an implied (but not specifically stated) part of the eleventh amendment. You don't have to necessarily agree with their opinion to say that their opinion is what they said it was.Jimmuldrow 17:50, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

Scalia was inconsistant on these issues. He preferred states' rights to the equal protection clause, but preferred federalism over states' rights on other issues.Jimmuldrow 18:01, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

As for the Garrett and Kimel decisions, these decisions interpreted the equal protection clause very narrowly to very specific groups that don't include the disabled or the elderly. What's written is 10%, interpretation is 90%.Jimmuldrow 18:12, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

First, Congress can override sovereign immunity through 14th amendment, as decisions state, but have not done it in these cases. It would take congressional action obviously then in answer to your question. You are using "federalism" incorrectly, as it means the coequal nature of state and federal government, as state's are still sovereign in areas not ceded to federal government. These decisions could be seen as limiting federal power, not federalism. No state may ever violate equal protection, but you can't sue your state in that state's court unless they let you. You can still sue in federal court, but the Violence Against Women Act was ruled as not being within the powers of federal government.

In theory, yes. In theory the Court was correct in recognizing that the fourteenth amendment exists, and that Congress can enforce it. But in fact, they did interprete the fourteenth amendment to apply only to a small fraction of the total population, and then they interpreted an implied but unwritten part of the eleventh amendment as retroactively amending a future amendment, limiting further what little remained of the equal protection clause.

And with the U. S. Supreme Court, interpretation is what counts for a specific case, whether that should be true or not.

At the time, five judges (two swing judges and three others) interpreted what you say to be true in theory, but any attempt to apply it in fact was interpreted away.Jimmuldrow 20:30, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

At first these five judges said the equal protection clause applies only to blacks and women. Then they seemed to change their minds about that even. If it wasn't one thing, it was another. There was always some kind of problem with enforcing the equal protection clause in fact, if not in theory.Jimmuldrow 20:41, 11 August 2006 (UTC)

Dude, you're just making stuff up. Please give actual quotations from the decisions where the fourteenth amendment doesn't apply to everyone, which is just stupid. They did no such thing with the 11th amendment. Sovereign immunity preceeds the creation of the constitution itself and goes back to English law and as I remember the court said the 14th amendment can trump immunity if Congress plainly authorizes such an action and said action is necessary and proper in accordance with the amendment, as for instance the Voting Rights Act. The questions in these cases were did congress authorize such action and was it necessary and proper.

I didn't make anything up. Do your research. I can agree with everything you say, but this is about the opinions of Rhenquist, Scalia and so forth. I can agree that it's stupid. But not in a Wikipedia article.

For the Morrison decision, the answer to you're question again is that Congress did pass a law to enforce equal protection of the laws for women, and the Court said they couldn't do that. As to whether it was necessary and proper, did you read up on the details? I did.Jimmuldrow 00:02, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

For instance in Kimel the court held "Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is an affirmative grant of power to Congress. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517. That power includes the authority both to remedy and to deter the violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s text. Congress cannot, however, decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States. Id., at 519. The ultimate interpretation and determination of the Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch. This Court has held that for remedial legislation to be appropriate under §5, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end"

and "Age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470. States therefore may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Kids for instance can't do everything adults can legally do, but this is not a violation of the equal protection clause.

In Morris they held "Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which permits Congress to enforce by appropriate legislation the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process or deny any person equal protection of the laws, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517, also does not give Congress the authority to enact §13981. Petitioners' assertion that there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of gender-motivated violence is supported by a voluminous congressional record. However, the Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on the manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. Foremost among them is the principle that the Amendment prohibits only state action, not private conduct. This was the conclusion reached in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, which were both decided shortly after the Amendment's adoption. The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions stems not only from the length of time they have been on the books, but also from the insight attributable to the Members of the Court at that time, who all had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding the Amendment's adoption. Neither United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, nor District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, casts any doubt on the enduring vitality of the Civil Rights Cases and Harris. Assuming that there has been gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities in this case, it would not be enough to save §13981's civil remedy, which is directed not at a State or state actor but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias. Section 13981 visits no consequence on any Virginia public official involved in investigating or prosecuting Brzonkala's assault, and it is thus unlike any of the §5 remedies this Court has previously upheld. See e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301. Section 13981 is also different from previously upheld remedies in that it applies uniformly throughout the Nation, even though Congress' findings indicate that the problem addressed does not exist in all, or even most, States. In contrast, the §5 remedy in Katzenbach was directed only to those States in which Congress found that there had been discrimination. Pp. 19-27." So someone raping you is not the state violating your rights, it's the rapist doing it, and the 14th applies to states, not individual people.

and in Board of Trustees they said "For example, while it would be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees able to use existing facilities, the ADA requires employers to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by disabled individuals, §§12112(5)(B), 12111(9). The ADA does except employers from the “reasonable accommodatio[n]” requirement where the employer can demonstrate that accommodation would impose an “undue hardship” upon it, §12112(b)(5)(A), but, even with this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required. The ADA’s constitutional shortcomings are apparent when it is compared to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Holding the latter Act to be “appropriate” legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s protection against racial discrimination in voting, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, this Court emphasized that Congress had there documented a marked pattern of unconstitutional action by the States, see id., at 312, and had determined that litigation had proved ineffective to remedy the problem, see id., at 313. The contrast between the kind of evidence detailed in Katzenbach, and the evidence that Congress considered in the present case, is stark. To uphold the ADA’s application to the States would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in Cleburne. Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional authority." 68.124.70.178 00:29, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

Well that's pretty much what I've been saying, so why'd you keep deleting my stuff? In other words, the Eleventh Amendment is interpreted broadly, and the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause is interpreted narrowly to include very specific groups. So you're arguing with yourself.

Thanks for proving you wrong.Jimmuldrow 05:34, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

Also, before you said the Court was stupid to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to only narrowly defined groups. Now you seem to agree with it.Jimmuldrow 05:36, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

No, I'm changing this article, not "your stuff", because it contains inaccurate descriptions of the court's reasoning. The eleventh amendment is absolute as is the fourteenth, as are they all. No specific groups are "more" protected by the equal protection clause than others, but not all discrimination is a violation of equal protection. Saying someone can't drive because they are asian or male would be an unreasonable discrimination, but stopping your four year old or senile grandpa from driving is reasonable discrimination, which does not violate the amendment. And not all remedies are allowed for any unreasonable discrimination, which is what the "necessary and proper" clause is all about. And I didn't say the court was stupid, your reasoning was. And I deleted your personal commentary on the issues. Write a book if you want to get your personal opinions out. 68.124.70.178 10:59, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

Well, you're arguing with yourself anyway. The court did apply the equal protection clause to a changing small list of protected groups. You can say you agree. You can say it's stupid. You can say one and then the other. Which you did.

I know some people would rather die than admit their wrong. That's ok.Jimmuldrow 14:00, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

Besides, arguments for your point of view were mentioned at length in quotes from Supreme Court judges. You seem to want only your opinion without ever stating the fact.Jimmuldrow 14:35, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

As far as my "opinions" are concerned, you're the one that needs to read these Supreme Court opinions, since you missed some parts of them at least. You're the one who's "making stuff up."Jimmuldrow 15:22, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

One of my "opinions" you didn't like was a direct quote from O'Connor's Supreme Court opinion. Which is why it was in quotes.Jimmuldrow 15:43, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

Also, this wasn't anything like whether asians should be allowed to drive. The specific issues were age discrimination, violence against women including rape victims and discrimination against the disabled including a cancer survivor.Jimmuldrow 16:30, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

I'm still amazed that a direct quote from O'Connor's decision, in quotation marks, was called "inaccuracies" and "uncited and unsupported conclusions and personal commentary."Jimmuldrow 17:20, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

How am I argueing with myself? Don't be vague. It's not my POV (as opposed to what you're writing), it's the facts of the case. What did I make up? Don't be vague. Where is that a "quote" from O'Conner stating 14th doesn't apply to everyone. Page and paragraph please. The issues were can sovereign immunity be violated through section five of 14th (yes), then can a state reasonably discriminate by age (they can) or disability (they can) without offending equal protection clause, or whether Congress can let people sue each other in federal court if a state doesn't arrest someone (no matter the crime, as this decision applies well beyond rape cases). You seem to be making the point these people got screwed, which is true, but that's irrelevent to the issues of the law. Marbury certainly got screwed by Marbury v. Madison, but that doesn't make the case incorrectly decided. Hard cases make bad law. 68.125.197.0 20:47, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

Whether it was "correctly decided" or not, let readers think for themselves. All kinds of Supreme Court Justices interprete the Constitution. It's enough to say that they did so, and what those interpretations were.

As to O'Connor's interpretation of the Equal Protection clause overriding the sovereign immunity of states in the case of discrimination based on race and (sometimes) gender but not age discrimination and (later in the Garrett decision) discrimination against the disabled, see her opinion in the Kimel decision.

If you read these decisions, there's no doubt that Justices chose to balance the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments. As to whether Justices balanced the Twenty-First Amendment against Prohibition, or the Thirteenth Amendment against the Fugitive Slave clause and so forth, do some research. Most amendments are just that. They amend what went before.

To say that there were inconsistencies in to what degree an amendment amends the Constitution is stating a fact. Whether or how that inconsistancy should be resolved goes beyond the scope of an encyclopedia article.

Also, there was a factual inconsistency as to whether discrimination based on gender should get more protection under the Equal Protection clause than other kinds of discrimination. O'Connor's decision in the Kimel decision said that this is true, and the Morrison decision strongly implied the opposite. Again, whether or how that descrepancy should be resolved goes beyond the scope of this article.

As far as this article is concerned, I wish to neither agree nor disagree with interpretive limits on the Equal Protection clause, but quote what judges had to say for themselves about a rationality test and so forth. We're not supposed to be rah-rah cheerleaders for this opinion or that.

All the equal protection clause says is just that. "Equal protection of the laws." The rest is Court interpretations, and saying whether these interpretations are right or wrong is POV.

As to how you're inconsistant, you say that the Fourteenth Amendment applies the same to everybody, and then argue as to how the opposite of that is factual. Both sides of a contradiction at once. Jimmuldrow 21:13, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

You don't see what you don't want to see. It's in quotes. You don't see it. It's in a longer quote that gives the extended version of the story. You don't see it. The sub-article has in-line references. You don't see them. The references have links to a site where you can read all the Court opinions for yourself. You don't see them. But they're there.Jimmuldrow 21:57, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

As far as the line "prohibits citizens of a state from sueing it unless it consents to being sued or Congress has allowed it to be sued under the 14th Amendment." that you keep adding, it's true as far as it goes, but doesn't go very far, and you would understand why if you ever did your homework on the subject. The Justices who decided these case said that Congress had a Fourteenth Amendment right to override the sovereign immunity of states and had properly exercised that right. So that wasn't the issue. The issue was that because of a rational test and so on, states could still discriminate against the elderly and the disabled. The argument clearly spelled out that these types of discrimination weren't in the same category as discrimination based on "race or gender" because of a rationality test and so forth, at least according to O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy.Jimmuldrow 23:33, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

According to our Trustee article

The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, held that Congress, in the legislative record of the ADA, failed to show a pattern of state discrimination against Americans with disabilities that rose to the level of irrationality. (Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held, only irrational discrimination against the disabled was prohibited. See Equal Protection Clause.) And (the Court said) since citizens' substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are determined by the Supreme Court alone, Congress cannot remedy violations of rights where those rights do not exist. Thus, the ADA did not meet the congruent-and-proportional test of City of Boerne v. Flores, and so unconstitutionally abrogated the states' sovereign immunity.

According to Morris

United States v. Lopez, a case decided five years before Morrison, held that Congress may regulate "activities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce … activities that substantially affect interstate commerce". (Lopez decided that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, making possession of a firearm in a school zone a federal crime, was not a valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority.) As with Lopez, this case does not directly involve any kind of economic activity, nor is it limited to things that have a special connection to interstate commerce. While in this case the Congressional record finds that such activity, in the aggregate, has an impact on commerce, allowing Congress to regulate everything that had an "attenuated effect" on interstate commerce would essentially remove all limits on what Congress may enact.

As for the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress did have evidence that there was a bias that could deny victims of gender-motivated crimes equal protection of the laws. However, Congress refrained from correcting the problems that denied equal protection, and instead created an additional way to punish the criminals themselves. This causes two problems. First, the Fourteenth Amendment limits itself to states and state actors, of which the criminal is neither. Second, Fourteenth Amendment legislation must have a "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end"—additionally punishing criminals for the faults of the judicial system lacks the required proportionality.

These clearly support my position and the true reasoning on the case, as no rights were violated as they did not exist. You are trying to insert your opinions about the cases into the article. As I said, write a book. Next. 68.125.197.0 00:16, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

Was that four reverts in one day? Also, if you never do your homework, that doesn't mean you're right. If you did your research, you'd find that the quotes are a copy and paste from the opinions of O'Connor, Rehnquist and so on. If you don't, you're the one that's wrong. And a 3RR violation besides.

It's not my fault that you never know, never find out, and never blame yourself.

You seem to want me to add something saying I agree with Rehnquist and others instead of letting them speak for themselves. Which is more objective, and which is POV? Jimmuldrow 00:34, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

Also, you're again arguing for both sides of a contradiction, which is a logical impossibility. You keep saying in effect that

• Everyone has Equal Protection rights and
• Because of rationality, congruance and other Court test, NOT everyone has equal protection rights.Jimmuldrow 01:39, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

With your combination of arrogance and ignorance, are you a manager?Jimmuldrow 01:49, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

You reverted me, as I made the original edit, so you are in violation, not me. What's with the snot tone and, again, generalities? I don't want you to agree with anything, only that this article get the reasoning of the court correct. Where did I argue or state that people don't have equal protection rights. I said, as the court did, you don't have rights to never be reasonably discriminated against by age or disability (can a blind man demand a right to work as a school bus driver?), or Congress can't allow you to sue people to remedy things the state may have done to you, do you disagree? And what's up with the manager comment. Bad boss or something. Join the club. Don't take it out on me or here.

Plus, Morris doesn't involve sovereign immunity at all, as no state was sued. It was one individual suing another in federal court. Disagree? 68.125.197.0 12:01, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

Before I called it limits on federalism, as did the newspapers when Morrison made headlines at the time. I took that out since you didn't like it.Jimmuldrow 15:06, 13 August 2006 (UTC)

Also, you just said "Where did I argue or state that people don't have equal protection rights. I said, as the court did, you don't have rights ..."

You're not saying that people don't have rights. You're just saying that there are reasons why people don't have rights. And it had nothing to do with a blind bus driver.Jimmuldrow

Taking quotes out of context eh? I clearly said "you don't have rights to never be reasonably discriminated against by age or disability" do you disagree? Yes or no please. The bus driver was a theoretical example of a reasonable discrimination, as I'm sure you know. Please don't play dumb.

And I asked you how Morris involves sovereign immunity as no state was ever sued? Let's take this simply. Just answer those two questions. 4.243.105.230 23:17, 13 August 2006

I believe the word used more by Court judges was rational, not reasonable, although the ADA law (a different issue) mentions "reasonable accommodation."

The Morrison (not Morris) decision (Rehnquist's opinion) mentioned state sovereignty.

The blind bus driver remark didn't have anything to do with the ADA law or anything else.

Did you look up O'Connor's Kimel decision yet? You don't have facts until you do the research and find out what they are, and are wrong for that reason. After you get the facts, you can admit they prove you wrong. But pretending to check the facts when you don't adds dishonesty to lack of research.Jimmuldrow 02:58, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

You still haven't answered the first question. Do the decisions say reasonable (or rational) discrimination based on age or disability (hence the blind bus driver analogy) by the state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, and hence can not be a reason to suspend sovereign immunity?

And in Morrison Rehnquist nowhere as far as I can see mentions sovereign immunity at all, and even if I missed it it certainly was not used as any rationale for the decision. The only questions tackled were commerce clause power and letting Congress allow people to use the federal courts to punish another individual for something the state did or did not do under the Equal Protection Clause. If I am wrong, quote it and cite the section and paragraph. We'll finish these two points before moving onto others. 68.125.68.217 5:48, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

Five justices did agree with "rational" reasons for discrimination, four did not. I quoted mainly from the ones that did, and the rational argument was mentioned more than once. So what's your point?

As for Rehnquist's decision, "we held that “the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Apparently, five justices thought state sovereignty extended not only beyond immunity from being sued by someone from another state, but also beyond being sued by a resident of the same state.

Also, one of your incorrect corrections removed the following:

“

As Rehnquist said in the Garrett decision, "We have recognized, however, that Congress may abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and “act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority." The first of these requirements is not in dispute here." The same argument was made for the Kimel decision. The majority opinions for both decisions said that this was not the issue. The issue, as O'Conner said in her Kimel decision, was whether the discrimination was in the same category as "governmental conduct based on race or gender" and "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." The Court argued that only "irrational" discrimination could overrule the sovereign immunity of states, and that age, disability and other forms of discrimination weren't as "irrational" as discrimination based on "race or gender." The Kimel decision was cited as a precedent for the Garrett decision. The following was commented out in the original!--Tip for a lazy editor: see the in-line reference in the first paragraph? The one for the Kimel decision? Click on it. See the link? Click on it. See the option for O'Connor's decision? Click on it. This is a repetition of what was mentioned before. Next time, don't say you checked the facts until it's true.--

”

You missed the point entirely due to lack of research. The issue at that point was not whether these people were allowed to sue their states, or whether their sovereign immunity to being sued could be overruled by Congress. Those issues were mentioned by O'Connor and Rehnquist only to explain why they were non-issues.

Do you understand by now at least what was wrong with your previous comment that: "First, Congress can override sovereign immunity through 14th amendment, as decisions state, but have not done it in these cases. It would take congressional action obviously then in answer to your question."

Congressional action was taken, and whether they properly overrode the sovereign immunity of states to being sued was not in dispute.

Why do you keep repeating the same mistakes over and over?

Also, did you find the part of O'Connor's Kimel opinion that said that age discrimination was rational and distinguished it from discrimination based on "race or gender"? If not, you're wrong again.

You can use Edit/Find, if you use IE.

Also, age disability and gender discrimination covered by the parts of the laws that were overturned are more relevent than blind bus drivers.

I don't mind dealing with intelligent, honest people with good intentions. But it's getting difficult to believe those categories apply to you.

Jimmuldrow 08:59, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

You still haven't answered the first question. Do the decisions state that or not? And what the hell does this mean? "Apparently, five justices thought state sovereignty extended not only beyond immunity from being sued by someone from another state, but also beyond being sued by a resident of the same state." That is exactly what sovereign immunity means, not being liable to suits from those you govern, not found in 11th amendment, it dates to English law, pre constitution. I can tell you are not a lawyer.

Then you said "The issue at that point was not whether these people were allowed to sue their states, (it was) or whether their sovereign immunity to being sued could be overruled by Congress. Those issues were mentioned by O'Connor and Rehnquist only to explain why they were non-issues." (Where is you're cite for this). Those were the exact issues, as the wiki articles linked show. Do you disagree with those articles? And you didn't give me the info I requested about section and paragraph, and this seems to be him talking about another decision, not the one he is deciding on.

Then you said "...O'Connor's Kimel opinion that said that age discrimination was rational and distinguished it from discrimination based on "race or gender"?", which is what I've been arguing all along. If those weren't the issues, what was?

So once again I ask you, were the two first decisions based on a reasonable discrimination based on age or disability not being in violation of fourteenth amendment. Yes or no please followed by reason. And Morrison does not involve sovereign immunity at all until you can cite section and paragraph to the contrary. And once again, reasonable people don't stoop to insults and snot tones. 68.125.68.217 10:53 14 August 2006 (UTC)

I did answer your question. These were all five to four decisions. Five justices voted for these decisions (including ones that mention the “rational” discrimination argument), four justices voted against. The five that voted for were (as mentioned before, and of which this is a repetition) Scalia, Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy and Thomas.

The phrase Rehnquist used in the Morrison decision was “state sovereignty”, not sovereign immunity, so you’re wrong again. As to why he used that phrase, I would say you’d have to ask him, but he’s dead.

Where’s my cite? If you looked at the in-line references and followed the links, you’d know. So you admit that you never look at the facts, which is why you’re wrong again. I didn’t write the other Wikipedia articles you mention, and am not responsible for their errors or yours.

As for how to find stuff (and this is another repitition), use the Edit/Find option on any IE web browser.

I’m glad we agree so well on the O’Connor opinion now, since you said you couldn’t find it before. You’ve been inconsistent on that issue up to now.

Again, the phrase I saw was “rational”, not “reasonable.” And that was mentioned more than once in the sub-article. This is another repitition of what I said before.

I think I've been more than fair in presenting the "rational" argument for discrimination in the sub-article. And I didn't even mention Rehnquist's memo opposing the Brown v. Board of Education decision as a law clerk, or the fact that he was a law adviser to Goldwater when Goldwater campaigned for states' rights and against civil rights. Or the fact that he opposed expansion of desegregation. Jimmuldrow 14:03, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

So now it comes out. You have some kind of ax to grind against Rehnquist. That's fine. Write a book.

You still haven't answered the question. I didn't ask who voted for them. I asked was that the reasoning of the case.

After thinking about it, Morrison doesn't involve state's rights at all as the question was can Congress create a law through either the commerce clause or 14th amendment to let someone sue another individual if the state fails to prosecute them. If they had let them sue the state for not enforcing it's own laws, that would be a state's rights issue. Until I see that cite which you can't seem to find saying otherwise. You keep saying go and look, and I do and can't find it and you refuse to provide directions. I think that means you are wrong about it existing or don't know yourself or are just being mean. And do you now dispute he was talking about another case and not the one under consideration? Notice it said "we held" not we hold.

I see you admit those other articles go against you. Thank you. Where did I say I couldn't find the O'Conner decision? 69.104.3.26 5:23, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

As to whether I haven't told you how to look it up, in spite of in-line references with links to all the cases in question, which in turn have links to all the individual opinions for each case, and step-by-step directions on how to use Edit/Find on IE web browsers, let me know if you don't have IE or MS Word or some other way of searching text, and I'll apologize for assuming bad intentions and provide clearer direction.

Here are the answers to your questions:

The items in dispute are: Whether seven references to the issue of whether discrimination is rational or irrational are enough to make it clear that the issue with Kimel and Garrett was whether the discrimination was rational and

Whether Rehnquist's reference to "States historically have been sovereign" and the fact that he cited the Kimel decision (a states' rights decision) in his Morrison opinion indicate that Rehnquist and four other justices saw Morrison as a states' rights decision. In addition, Rehnquist mentioned Civil Rights Cases decided by the Court in 1883 that overruled the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as a precedent, a case that allowed segregation, and stressed "enumerated powers" that limit federal actions toward states. Also, referring to the Lopez decision, Rehnquist said, "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur" when arguing that the effect of crime on interstate commerce is indirect, no matter how extreme, and that it was necessary to defer to the states in an area where "States historically have been sovereign."

There are more than enough references to the "rational" argument for any reasonable person with good intentions.

And Morrison was clearly a states' rights decision.

Jimmuldrow 12:04, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

Morrison was a case about Congressional power to punish individuals, police power of the federal government. No police power of the state was expanded or reduced, or decided on at all. The state is still perfectly free to arrest him or let her sue him according to it's own laws. No state was sued, nor was any power of a state decided in the issue. The state was not sued, punished, or rewarded in any way. If Congress had compelled the state to arrest him or let her sue the state that would have been state's rights. No action or inaction of the state was decided, as the state was not a party to the case at all. The issue was Congressional power over individuals, not over states or state power over their people. And the wiki article on the case goes with me, as you already know. 68.124.177.175 21:48, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

Here is the law at issue

TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 136 > SUBCHAPTER III > Part C > § 13981

§ 13981. Civil rights

(a) Purpose Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender. (b) Right to be free from crimes of violence All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d) of this section). (c) Cause of action A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate. (d) Definitions For purposes of this section— (1) the term “crime of violence motivated by gender” means a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender; and (2) the term “crime of violence” means— [1] (A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of title 18, whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and (B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom such action is taken. (e) Limitation and procedures (1) Limitation Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under subsection (c) of this section for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender (within the meaning of subsection (d) of this section). (2) No prior criminal action Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action under subsection (c) of this section. (3) Concurrent jurisdiction The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over actions brought pursuant to this part. (4) Supplemental jurisdiction Neither section 1367 of title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section shall be construed, by reason of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody decree.

Notice that she could have sued even if he had been arrested and convicted, thus the action or inaction of the state was not at issue, only if Congress had the power to do this. 68.124.177.175 22:23, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

Rehnquist certainly thought Morrison was a states' rights issue, and there's a chance he might have known something about law.

Also, by the same logic you used, the Cruikshank (Colfax Massacre) decision would also be correct and not a states' rights decision. It was cited by Rehnquist for the Morrison decision. Jimmuldrow 00:29, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Rehnquist said no such thing. If I'm wrong please tell me where he said this was a state's rights decision, section and paragraph please. It's really easy. Here, I'll show you how. One of you're cites for this being a state's rights decision was this, which you claimed Rehnquist said in article. "Also, referring to the Lopez decision, Rehnquist said, "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur" This comes from section 2, paragraph 9 where he does not say it, it is an entire quote from Lopez. And Lopez was not a state's rights decision but like Morrison a case over the extent of Congressional power.

The statements about state sovereignty refer to the fact that the federal government has no general police power, as the states have always had, such as in section 2 paragraph 22 where he said "Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims." Nowhere in the decision was any police power of the state under consideration.

Rehnquist then in section 3 paragraph 5 cited United States v. Harris "Shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, we decided two cases interpreting the Amendment's provisions, United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In Harris, the Court considered a challenge to §2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. That section sought to punish "private persons" for "conspiring to deprive any one of the equal protection of the laws enacted by the State." 106 U.S., at 639. We concluded that this law exceeded Congress' §5 power because the law was "directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State, or their administration by her officers." Id., at 640. In so doing, we reemphasized our statement from Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880), that " 'these provisions of the fourteenth amendment have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals.' " Harris, supra, at 639 (misquotation in Harris)." Thus this was about actions of private individuals.

Then in section 3 paragraph 7 they cited the Civil Rights Cases, once again to show how 14th did not apply to individual actions. "We reached a similar conclusion in the Civil Rights Cases. In those consolidated cases, we held that the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which applied to purely private conduct, were beyond the scope of the §5 enforcement power. 109 U.S., at 11 ("Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment"). See also, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628 (1996) ("[I]t was settled early that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress a general power to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations"); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power"); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n. 2 (1970); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876) ("The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society").

In section 18 they stated "Section 13981 is not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias."

Thus there were two issues in the case. Does gender motivated violence affect interstate commerce enough to justify Congress regulating it? And does letting an individual sue another individual fall within Congress's power under 14th amendment. It was all Congressional power. Please tell me how any state's action or inaction is affected by this decision? What could a state do or not do after it that they could or could not do before? 68.124.177.175 09:12, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

When the issue is one of federal power with relation to the states, it's a states' rights issue. Also, aside from Rehnquist, there aren't very many Colfax Massacre decision fans out there, but like Morrison, it dealt with the issue of whether the equal protection clause and other amendments allowed Congress to compel a state to provide equal protection of the laws. Lopez was also a states' rights decision, and was cited as a precedent for the Morrison decision. It dealt with the authority of Congress with relation to the states.

The issue here is that, if a state doesn't provide equal protection of the laws, the state can neither be compelled to do so nor can federal courts intervene. The reason nothing can be done about a state violation of the written text of the equal protection clause is because of states' rights interpretations by various courts that modify the way the written text is applied.

As to whether you're normally at fault if you don't do anything when the written text of the law requires more, try telling the IRS it's not your fault if you don't pay taxes since you didn't do anything. States can use this kind of reasoning because of implied states' rights interpretations that change the way the written text of the law is applied to states.

And yes, Rehnquist did say that states are "sovereign" in the area of law enforcement, which is the reason why federal courts couldn't intervene.

Also, I mentioned Lopez for the Lopez quote in the sub-article.

Also, Morrison is much more of a states' rights issue than Kelo, which is also in the states' rights article. If you just want to prune the article, why start with Morrison? Jimmuldrow 12:24, 18 August 2006 (UTC)

Got to start somewhere, and I'm not sure Kelo is a state's rights decision either, but at least it involves state action, as Morrison does not in any way. And you have not provided even one thing the state could or could not do differently after the decision. The issue was federal power over an individual. At no point in the case was any state compelled to do anything, nor did the case ask that anything be done to the state, but that Morrison be punished through the federal courts. Please tell me what the state was compelled to do or not do? Or what it would have been compelled to do no matter who won the case?

The issue is that states were not compelled to follow the written text of the equal protection clause because because of states' rights interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Don't you wish you could tell the IRS that you were that sovereign?Jimmuldrow 13:46, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Who tried to compel them as is was an individual suing another individual? As I said before, even if the state had castrated him, flayed his skin, and sentenced him to hell she still could have sued him as an individual for individually violating her rights. No matter what the state did, she could have sued. And you still haven't answered my question. Please tell me what the state was compelled to do or not do? Or what it would have been compelled to do no matter who won the case?

The equal protection clause states just that: equal protection of the laws. The reason the state was compelled to neither provide equal protection of the laws nor allow the feds to do so was because of states' rights interpretations.Jimmuldrow 01:46, 20 August 2006 (UTC)