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Plan W (sometimes referred to as "the W Plan"^{[citation needed]}), was a joint Irish & British plan of military operations drawn up in the period mid 1940 - 1942. Plan W was an attempt to fight off an invasion of Ireland by German forces.

Discussions over the possible German invasion of Ireland had been ongoing in Britain since the beginning of 1939. In June 1940, Britain's political and military establishment had witnessed the seemingly invincible German Blitzkrieg which led to the defeat of Poland, the Low Countries, and of France followed by the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force. The British rightly suspected that plans were being drawn up to invade mainland Britain next - Operation Sealion. They did not know, but also suspected, that there was a plan to invade neutral Ireland - Operation Green.

In this context, they embarked on the controversial policy of planning, jointly with the Irish authorities, for the defence of the island of Ireland.^[1]

After the invasion of Belgium and Netherlands, the British were convinced that an invasion of Ireland would come from the air, via paratroopers. They were not satisfied with Irish Government's defence capability, particularly against airborne troops. The topic of reoccupying the 26 counties of Éire had been a matter of political conversation in Britain since the beginning of the war. In June 1940, Malcolm MacDonald offered to "give back" the 6 counties comprising Northern Ireland - an offer of Irish unity - if Éire would join with the allies. The same month Major General Bernard "Monty" Montgomery was busy planning the seizure^[2] of what he referred to as "Cork and Queenstown (Cobh) in Southern Ireland" (sic).

Winston Churchill was to also refer to the

"...[the] most heavy and grievous burden placed upon Britain by the Royal Navy's exclusion from the three Treaty Ports [in Éire].."^[3]

The Economist reported that Britain should seize the ports if they become "a matter of life and death".^[4]

The remarks were made in the face of mounting losses in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Attempts were also made on 26 June 1940 to split the consensus in Ireland over the neutrality policy via a possible coup attempt. An approach was made to Richard Mulcahy (leader of Fine Gael) by an Irish born ex-British Army Lieutenant Colonel who was a city councillor in Éire. Mulcahy recorded that the ex-officer:

"...called to say that 'the people in the North are prepared to make a military convention with this country [Éire] without reference to the Northern Government... He wanted someone to go up there from here unofficially, to speak to someone in authority and say how the land lay. In reply to questioning, he stated that the people he referred to were the British Army authorities in the North."^[5]

This was in effect a proposal for a joint military command of Éire and Northern Ireland, which the unidentified ex-British Army Lieutenant Colonel said had been stimulated after discussion with "important members of the British Army in the North of Ireland."^[6] It is possible that the simultaneous discussions could have been an attempt to pressure Éamon de Valera, the Taoiseach. Unionist politician Sir Emerson Herdman also called to speak with de Valera about obtaining "unity of command" and to ask if Éire would enter the war in return for an end to partition. Herdman appears to have been acting on behalf of Craigavon, but when de Valera rebuffed him, he was of the view that:

"the only thing to do now for Britain is to send in powerful forces here, and prevent this country being seized, or prevent them [the British] having to use and lose large numbers of troops in putting the Germans out if they got here."^[7]

Therefore the W-Plan had a dual purpose:

• a joint plan of action in the event of a compliant Éire,
• an invasion plan in the event of an invasion and subsequent resistance from de Valera.

Planning began for Operation Green in May 1940, but the British had intercepted chatter about Operation Green beginning around June 1940. The British were interested in securing Ireland as its capture by German forces would expose their western flank, and provide a base of operations for Luftwaffe in the Battle of the Atlantic and in any operations launched to conquer Britain as part of Operation Sealion. The British suspected that the Germans target for an invasion attempt would be Cork, particularly Cork Harbour with the naval base at Cobh because it was the nearest to Luftwaffe bases in north west France.

The first meeting on establishing a joint action plan in the event of a German invasion was on 24 May 1940.^[8] The meeting was held in London and had been convened to explore every conceivable way in which the German forces may attempt an invasion of Ireland. At the meeting were Joseph Walshe, Irish secretary of External Affairs, Colonel Liam Archer of Irish Military Intelligence G2, and officers from the British Navy, Army, and Airforce. The British War Office wanted direct liaisons between the Irish military authorities in Dublin and the British General Officer Commanding in Belfast. Walshe and Archer therefore agreed to fly in secret to Belfast with Lieutenant Colonel Dudley Clarke.^[9] In Belfast, two British Army staff officers were collected and the group travelled back to Dublin by rail. This meeting was held underneath Government buildings in Kildare Street and included a number of Irish Army officers. The meeting was informed that General Sir Hubert Huddleston, the General Officer Commanding (GOC.) Northern Ireland, was already under orders to take a mobile column south of the border to help the Irish Army if the Germans invaded.^[10]

Clarke also met with the Irish Army Chief of Staff, General Daniel McKenna, who explained that the British would not be allowed into Éire before the Germans arrived. Clarke also met with the Irish Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, Frank Aiken and discussed "new ideas for the mechanical improvement of the war."^[11] The point of these meetings was to secure an understanding on the threat faced by both Britain and Ireland, and the benefit of joint action — the details would later be worked out by the respective armed services.

Clarke returned to London on 28 May 1940, where he reported that the Irish Army had given him full details of their organisation and equipment "without reservation" and had in return requested information on British troop strength in Northern Ireland.^[12] It had been agreed that in the event of a German invasion, the Irish would call for assistance from Huddleston in Belfast. The British Army's advance from Northern Ireland into neutral Ireland was to be called Plan W.

As noted, Cork was the suspected target of an invasion because it was the nearest landfall between Luftwaffe bases in north-western France and the island of Ireland. Northern Ireland was to serve as the base of a new BEF, that would move into Éire to repeal the invaders from any beach-head that was established. Troops of the 53rd Division in Belfast were held in readiness for the advance. Royal Marine units at Milford Haven were also prepared to seize a bridge-head in Éire the moment the Germans landed. Officers at the headquarters (HQ) of British troops in Northern Ireland, Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn, County Antrim estimated that the Germans could embark five divisions by sea to Ireland although "not more than 2 to 3 would reach land".^[13] Up to 8000 German airborne troops could be flown into Éire, some of them by seaplanes which would land on the lakes. The British striking force of 53 Division, later augmented by the 5th Battalion, Cheshire Regiment, were to concentrate on the west of Down and Armagh borders, then drive across the border and race towards Dublin along three main roads — the Belfast—Dublin coastal road through Dundalk, Drogheda and Balbriggan, the inland road through Ardee and Slane, and the Castleblaney—Carrickmacross—Navan road.^[14] It not clear who would have had the operational authority over the British troops invited into Ireland by de Valera, but it is assumed the British would retain command.^[15]

By December 1940 the plan had been extended. While the first British striking force headed for Dublin, the British 61st Division, in a separate operation, would move across the border into County Donegal and secure the Treaty port of Lough Swilly for the Royal Navy, providing the British Government with a third of the naval defence requirements that they had been requesting from de Valera for more than a year. The British Troops in Northern Ireland (BTNI) war diary of the time lists 278 Irish troops at Lough Swilly and only 976 Irish troops in the rest of Donegal.^[16] Perhaps the British were prepared to take advantage of a German invasion when Irish troops would be fending off attack by retaking the Treaty ports. They may also have been prepared to act if they felt de Valera was slow in asking for intervention.

The diary goes on to say that in the event of an invasion "close cooperation is to be maintained with Éire forces including Local Security Force if friendly". Why the LSF forces should not be friendly is not explained although it is known that the British considered invading Ireland without consulting de Valera. It is a feature of other British documents from the time; for example one reads "If Éire be hostile it may be necessary for Royal Signals units to take over the civil telephone system".^[17]

According to a restricted file prepared by the British Army's 'Q' Movements Transport Control in Belfast, the British would not have crossed the border "until invited to do so by the Éire Government", but the document added that although most people in Éire probably would have helped the British Army, "there would have been a small disaffected element capable of considerable guerrilla activities against us."^[18]

Sir John Loader Maffey, the British representative to Éire since 1939, was to transmit the code word "Pumpkins" (later replaced by "Measure") to begin the troop movement of the 53rd Division onto Irish soil.^[19] This codeword would be received by Huddleston and General Sir Frank Franklyn, the BTNI commander.^[20]

Elaborate plans were made in Belfast to supply the BEF with guns, ammunition, petrol, and medical equipment by rail. The British marshalling yards at Balmoral, south of Belfast, were extended to take long ammunition and fuel trains which were loaded and ready on new sidings. In addition three ambulance trains were equipped and positioned around Belfast and an ambulance railhead established to take the wounded returning from the south of Ireland. British soldiers stripped the sides from dozens of coal trucks transforming them into flat cars for armoured vehicles and tanks that would be sent southwards. Once the 53rd Division was committed in Éire, the British military authorities planned to run thirty-eight supply trains on the two railway lines to Dublin every day — thirty down the main line through Drogheda (if the viaduct over the Boyne river remained undamaged), and the remainder along the track which cut through County Cavan. The Port of Belfast was estimated to have needed to handle 10,000 tons of stores a week and could receive up to 5000 troops every day for the battle-front.^[21]

The RAF were to fly three Hurricane fighter squadrons into Baldonnel Airfield southwest of Dublin and two Fairy Battle light bomber squadrons into Collinstown to attack German troops in Cork. The British 1st Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment was to be moved into Éire to defend the Drogheda viaduct, Collinstown, and Baldonnel. The Royal Navy was to issue instructions that all British and foreign ships from Irish ports. Vessels in Londonderry were to head for the Clyde and boats in Belfast were to head for Holyhead and Liverpool. As many ships as possible would be cleared from Irish ports and taken to the Clyde, Holyhead and Fishguard. Royal Navy officers in Dublin were to direct this exodus and the taking on of refugees was not to be encouraged. British submarines were to patrol off Cork and the Shannon in readiness for an invasion, and should one occur the Royal Navy was to declare a "sink on sight" zone in the western approaches and off the south and west coasts of Ireland.

By April 1941, the new BTNI commander, General Sir Henry Pownall extended his planning for a German invasion to cover fifty percent of the entire Irish coastline. He believed that German troops were likely to land in Cork, Limerick, Waterford, Westport, Galway, Sligo, and Donegal. British Army personnel also carried out secret intelligence gathering trips to gleen information on the rail system south of the border.

By May 1940 Irish troops were already organised in mobile columns to deal with parachute landings.^[22]

Assuming the Germans were going to land where the British and Irish expected them to, they would have been engaged by General Michael Joe Costello's 1st Irish Division from Cork, supported by General Hugo MacNeill's 2nd Division. The British would establish their railhead near the Fairyhouse race course and be given billets at Lusk, Howth, and Portmarnock north of Dublin.

By October 1940, four more regular army brigades had been raised in Éire and LSF recruiting figures were increasing. The German style helmets of the army had been replaced by the pale green uniforms and rimmed style helmets of the British Army. They had a total of sixteen medium armoured cars, and thirteen old Rolls-Royce light armoured cars. The cadre squadron of four Gloster Gladiators provided the only fighter defense of the country. In 1940 however six second-hand Hawker Hinds were added to the Air Corps, and later in the war the Irish cannibalised and repaired several German and Allied aircraft that had crash landed in their territory eventually putting two RAF Hurricanes, a Fairey Battle, and an American Lockheed Hudson into service.

The Irish Naval Service only acquired its first motor torpedo-boat in January 1940, leading to a total of six by 1942. However, the only patrol vessels were the "Mirchu" and the "Fort Rannoch", two former British gunboats.^[23] Besides these vessels there was one "mine planter" and a barge. The Naval Service never acquired another ship during the war.

The LSF was split into two, the 'A' force moving from police to military control and taking the new title Local Defence Force.

Irish preparations for defense of the island included protecting against the possibility of British or German attack. For example, in Cork, MacNeill's 2nd Division faced north, and the Irish Army spent weeks preparing two lines of defence against British invasion, placing explosives beneath bridges along rivers and canals in County Donegal to County Louth.. The first line of defense, through Longford and Cavan was centered on the Ballinamore-Ballyconnell canal. The second line chosen was the Boyne. After a delaying action a conventional static defence, the 2nd Division was to "split up into smaller groups and start guerilla resistance against the British."^[24]

de Valera's policy of neutrality widened the gap between Éire and Northern Ireland. Often the charge was made that the Irish had shirked their responsibilities in World War II, and from this viewpoint it can be seen as reinforcing the identity the Unionists of Northern Ireland sought with Britain.

• Robert Fisk, "In Time of War" (Gill and Macmillan) 1983 ISBN 0-7171-2411-8

• Operation Lobster
• Operation Lobster I
• Operation Seagull (Ireland)
• Operation Seagull I
• Operation Seagull II
• Operation Whale
• Operation Dove (Ireland)
• Operation Osprey
• Operation Sea Eagle
• Plan Kathleen
• Operation Maintau
• Operation Innkeeper

• The Emergency
• Operation Green (Ireland)

• Irish Army Air Corps use of the Gloster Gladiator during the Second World War.