publication description The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2020
The paper serves as an introduction to a dedicated special issue of the IJMCL, which comprises a ... more The paper serves as an introduction to a dedicated special issue of the IJMCL, which comprises a number of papers looking at challenges for the external Common Fisheries Policy. The paper sets out the context of the external dimension of the EU Common Fisheries Policy and then briefly sketches out the papers in the issue. The special issue benefited from a foreword by Esa Paasivirta - a legal adviser at the European Commission and an adjunct Professor at the University of Helsinki.
As with every EU Member State, the Euro crisis had an impact in Bulgaria, albeit limited. Bulgari... more As with every EU Member State, the Euro crisis had an impact in Bulgaria, albeit limited. Bulgaria’s initial reactions to the Euro crisis started in late 2009 with the newly-formed (at the time) Government. The European emergency measures – the EFSF and the EFSM – were not subject of public discussions in Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s position in the negotiations of these measures is also not publicly available, probably due to their limited applicability to the Eurozone Member States and, as such, not to Bulgaria.
However, with the intensification of the Euro crisis and its increased economic impact across Europe, in late 2010 and the beginning of 2011, Bulgaria was getting increasingly involved in the preparation of the Euro-crisis measures. The Bulgarian Government realised that the new measures were going to restructure the Eurozone regime. Since Bulgaria has Eurozone membership aspirations, the Government saw an increased involvement as vital for protecting Bulgaria’s interests. Furthermore, since the Bulgarian currency is pegged to the Euro, saving the Euro was just as important to Bulgaria.
Initially, Bulgaria’s participation in the negotiations and the adoption of the Euro crisis measures in early 2011, namely the Euro-Plus Pact and the amendment of Article 136 TFEU, was marked by a high level of criticisms for lack of transparency and accusations by the opposition of back-door dealings at the EU level. Once bitten, twice shy, the Government involved the National Assembly much more in the negotiation process of the Six Pack and the Fiscal Compact and explained its participation in the negotiations of the ESM, to which Bulgaria was not going to participate before joining the Eurozone. A main point of discussion in Bulgaria, with respect to the Euro-crisis measures, has been preserving Member States’ competence in taxation matters. The debates on the Euro-crisis measures stayed only at the political level and did not reach the Bulgarian Constitutional Court. Bulgaria also did not participate in any bail-out schemes.
In late 2010 and early 2011 the Finance Minister of Bulgaria started developing and looking for political support for a Bulgarian Pact for Financial Stability. This Pact envisioned a constitutional amendment and an amendment of the Law on the Planning of the State Budget. The main aspect of this Pact were the inclusion of (stricter than EU’s requirements) numerical fiscal rules as well as putting in place a ⅔ qualified majority for introducing new taxes or changing already existing ones. The Pact had limited success. The proposed constitutional amendment eventually failed but the strict numerical fiscal rules were nevertheless included in an ordinary law.
The implementation of the Euro-crisis measures itself, has not faced particular political or legal difficulties, with the exception of the long delay in the creation of a Fiscal Council for which infringement proceedings were initiated. Until late 2012, the political situation in Bulgaria remained stable, notwithstanding the crisis. However, since late 2012 the political situation has been in turmoil. It involved the resignation of two Governments and the respective appointment of two Caretaker Governments, the formation of two minority Governments, a recent banking crisis and raging protests for the bigger part of this, less than triannual, period.
An op-ed discussing some points arising from the Commission v Council (IMO) case with focus on th... more An op-ed discussing some points arising from the Commission v Council (IMO) case with focus on the external representation of the EU through the lenses of international law and the Normative Power Europe concept.
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2019
The EU has entered into many binding undertakings (international agreements) with third States on... more The EU has entered into many binding undertakings (international agreements) with third States on access to fisheries resources. In the Venezuelan Fisheries case, the ECJ was, for the first time, confronted with an EU unilateral declaration granting fishing opportunities in EU waters to Venezuela-flagged vessels. We argue, contrary to ECJ’s conclusion, that the declaration is a binding unilateral act and not an international agreement. This case is important for the burgeoning debate on the ECJ’s approach to international law. It represents a missed opportunity for the ECJ to clarify its previous case-law on the broad concept of ‘international agreement’ and align it with relevant international jurisprudence and doctrine. More fundamentally, it is a missed opportunity for the ECJ to truly develop and shape international law practice and doctrine on unilateral acts by international organisations – an omission that does not comport with the EU’s self-projection as an internationally e...
The preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eur... more The preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is instrumental for the so-called “judicial dialogue” within the European Union (EU). The goals of the preliminary reference procedure are to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law and to contribute to the harmonious development of the law throughout the EU. It was through the preliminary reference procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the principles of direct effect and supremacy were developed. It took many years before the first request by a Constitutional Court was sent to the CJEU. So far, the Constitutional Courts of Belgium, Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and most recently Slovenia, have sent requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. By far the most active of these in sending requests has been the Belgian Court. The Portuguese Constitutional Court has indicated that it can request prelimi...
This paper examines the effects of changes in the geographical distribution (CGDs) of shared (tra... more This paper examines the effects of changes in the geographical distribution (CGDs) of shared (transboundary and straddling) fish stocks on the legal duties of state to cooperate on the conservation and management of marine living resources. CGD can involve changes in the (1) nature of the stock, (2) the States involved in the fishery, or (3) the zonal attachment of the stock. The CGD phenomenon, while not completely novel, appears to have intensified in recent years, in large part due to the impact of climate change on the oceans. The paper explores what States must do in order to satisfy their obligation to cooperate in a CGD situation and the consequences should they fail to do so. The Mackerel War is used as a case study throughout the paper because it is a recent and comprehensive CGD dispute, which fittingly exemplifies a wide array of the legal issues that CGDs can raise. In its analysis of the duty of cooperation, the paper finds that states have a large amount of discretion in deciding how to deal with a CDG, including ignoring the CGD if they so agree. However, there is less discretion if the viability of a stock is threatened by the CGD and the conservation obligations of states under international law are triggered. In analysing the consequences of unsuccessful cooperation, the paper focuses on three issues – pre-CGD agreements, dispute settlement and self-help measures. The paper argues that CGDs can be a basis for the termination of international agreements. The paper also suggests that, while existing dispute settlement mechanisms may provide some answers for CGD-related issues, the sweeping jurisdictional limitations for fisheries cases can provoke retaliation and counter-measures instead of further cooperation. Overall, the paper concludes that States and scholars alike must be very attentive to CGDs in the future for the issues they can create.
Recently, a new twist to the phenomenon of conflicting jurisdictions was introduced by the Macker... more Recently, a new twist to the phenomenon of conflicting jurisdictions was introduced by the Mackerel War between the Faroe Islands and the European Union. Complicating this fishingquotas dispute is the peculiar position of the Faroe Islands as a self-governing territory within Denmark but outside of the European Union. The Mackerel War, originally little more than a political spat, came to involve both the WTO and the UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms. This article focuses on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under art.344 TFEU and examines whether Denmark complied with it. The relationship of the Faroe Islands with Denmark, the EU, the WTO, and the UNCLOS is examined first. Then, Denmark's EU law obligations are analysed in light of art.344 TFEU, art.4 TEU, and Declaration 25 to the Maastricht Treaty. The findings overwhelmingly support the legality of Denmark's actions and urther elucidate the relationship between dependent territories and the European U...
Recently, a new twist to the phenomenon of conflicting jurisdictions was introduced by the Macker... more Recently, a new twist to the phenomenon of conflicting jurisdictions was introduced by the Mackerel War, between the Faroe Islands and the EU. Complicating this fishing-quotas dispute is the peculiar position of the Faroe Islands as a self-governing territory within Denmark but outside of the EU. The Mackerel War, originally little more than a political spat, came to involve both the WTO and the UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms. This article focuses on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under Article 344 TFEU and examines whether Denmark complied with it. The relationship of the Faroe Islands with Denmark, the EU, the WTO and the UNCLOS is examined first. Then, Denmark’s EU law obligations are analysed in light of Article 344 TFEU, Article 4 TEU and Declaration 25 to the Maastricht Treaty. The findings overwhelmingly support the legality of Denmark’s actions and further elucidate the relationship between dependent territories and the EU.
The European Union (EU) has been supporting its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) through its trade p... more The European Union (EU) has been supporting its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) through its trade powers for 40 years. This practice has evolved significantly over the years. This paper explores this evolution with respect to achieving sustainable fishing beyond EU waters. In particular, this paper examines two major ways in which the EU trade agreements impact sustainable fishing abroad. First, the discussion looks at the EU’s use of trade agreements to leverage access to the fishing resources of third States. The paper finds this EU practice to be lacking the necessary coherence and transparency and it raises doubts about the balance between commercial and sustainability concerns. Second, the discussion looks at the fisheries cooperation provisions included in the various EU trade agreements. In that regard the paper examines the changing and evolving emphasis on sustainable fishing. The paper finds that the EU’s trade agreements have evolved greatly. The contemporary EU trade agree...
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2020
The EU has entered into many binding undertakings (international agreements) with third States on... more The EU has entered into many binding undertakings (international agreements) with third States on access to fisheries resources. In the Venezuelan Fisheries case, the ECJ was, for the first time, confronted with an EU unilateral declaration granting fishing opportunities in EU waters to Venezuela-flagged vessels. We argue, contrary to ECJ’s conclusion, that the declaration is a binding unilateral act and not an international agreement. This case is important for the burgeoning debate on the ECJ’s approach to international law. It represents a missed opportunity for the ECJ to clarify its previous case-law on the broad concept of ‘international agreement’ and align it with relevant international jurisprudence and doctrine. More fundamentally, it is a missed opportunity for the ECJ to truly develop and shape international law practice and doctrine on unilateral acts by international organisations – an omission that does not comport with the EU’s self-projection as an internationally engaged polity.
The case note provides a concise report on the case as a whole (issues and what the ECJ held) as ... more The case note provides a concise report on the case as a whole (issues and what the ECJ held) as well as a 1000-words analysis of international law-related issues. It was prepared in November 2016.
publication description The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2020
The paper serves as an introduction to a dedicated special issue of the IJMCL, which comprises a ... more The paper serves as an introduction to a dedicated special issue of the IJMCL, which comprises a number of papers looking at challenges for the external Common Fisheries Policy. The paper sets out the context of the external dimension of the EU Common Fisheries Policy and then briefly sketches out the papers in the issue. The special issue benefited from a foreword by Esa Paasivirta - a legal adviser at the European Commission and an adjunct Professor at the University of Helsinki.
As with every EU Member State, the Euro crisis had an impact in Bulgaria, albeit limited. Bulgari... more As with every EU Member State, the Euro crisis had an impact in Bulgaria, albeit limited. Bulgaria’s initial reactions to the Euro crisis started in late 2009 with the newly-formed (at the time) Government. The European emergency measures – the EFSF and the EFSM – were not subject of public discussions in Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s position in the negotiations of these measures is also not publicly available, probably due to their limited applicability to the Eurozone Member States and, as such, not to Bulgaria.
However, with the intensification of the Euro crisis and its increased economic impact across Europe, in late 2010 and the beginning of 2011, Bulgaria was getting increasingly involved in the preparation of the Euro-crisis measures. The Bulgarian Government realised that the new measures were going to restructure the Eurozone regime. Since Bulgaria has Eurozone membership aspirations, the Government saw an increased involvement as vital for protecting Bulgaria’s interests. Furthermore, since the Bulgarian currency is pegged to the Euro, saving the Euro was just as important to Bulgaria.
Initially, Bulgaria’s participation in the negotiations and the adoption of the Euro crisis measures in early 2011, namely the Euro-Plus Pact and the amendment of Article 136 TFEU, was marked by a high level of criticisms for lack of transparency and accusations by the opposition of back-door dealings at the EU level. Once bitten, twice shy, the Government involved the National Assembly much more in the negotiation process of the Six Pack and the Fiscal Compact and explained its participation in the negotiations of the ESM, to which Bulgaria was not going to participate before joining the Eurozone. A main point of discussion in Bulgaria, with respect to the Euro-crisis measures, has been preserving Member States’ competence in taxation matters. The debates on the Euro-crisis measures stayed only at the political level and did not reach the Bulgarian Constitutional Court. Bulgaria also did not participate in any bail-out schemes.
In late 2010 and early 2011 the Finance Minister of Bulgaria started developing and looking for political support for a Bulgarian Pact for Financial Stability. This Pact envisioned a constitutional amendment and an amendment of the Law on the Planning of the State Budget. The main aspect of this Pact were the inclusion of (stricter than EU’s requirements) numerical fiscal rules as well as putting in place a ⅔ qualified majority for introducing new taxes or changing already existing ones. The Pact had limited success. The proposed constitutional amendment eventually failed but the strict numerical fiscal rules were nevertheless included in an ordinary law.
The implementation of the Euro-crisis measures itself, has not faced particular political or legal difficulties, with the exception of the long delay in the creation of a Fiscal Council for which infringement proceedings were initiated. Until late 2012, the political situation in Bulgaria remained stable, notwithstanding the crisis. However, since late 2012 the political situation has been in turmoil. It involved the resignation of two Governments and the respective appointment of two Caretaker Governments, the formation of two minority Governments, a recent banking crisis and raging protests for the bigger part of this, less than triannual, period.
An op-ed discussing some points arising from the Commission v Council (IMO) case with focus on th... more An op-ed discussing some points arising from the Commission v Council (IMO) case with focus on the external representation of the EU through the lenses of international law and the Normative Power Europe concept.
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2019
The EU has entered into many binding undertakings (international agreements) with third States on... more The EU has entered into many binding undertakings (international agreements) with third States on access to fisheries resources. In the Venezuelan Fisheries case, the ECJ was, for the first time, confronted with an EU unilateral declaration granting fishing opportunities in EU waters to Venezuela-flagged vessels. We argue, contrary to ECJ’s conclusion, that the declaration is a binding unilateral act and not an international agreement. This case is important for the burgeoning debate on the ECJ’s approach to international law. It represents a missed opportunity for the ECJ to clarify its previous case-law on the broad concept of ‘international agreement’ and align it with relevant international jurisprudence and doctrine. More fundamentally, it is a missed opportunity for the ECJ to truly develop and shape international law practice and doctrine on unilateral acts by international organisations – an omission that does not comport with the EU’s self-projection as an internationally e...
The preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eur... more The preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is instrumental for the so-called “judicial dialogue” within the European Union (EU). The goals of the preliminary reference procedure are to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law and to contribute to the harmonious development of the law throughout the EU. It was through the preliminary reference procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the principles of direct effect and supremacy were developed. It took many years before the first request by a Constitutional Court was sent to the CJEU. So far, the Constitutional Courts of Belgium, Austria, Lithuania, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and most recently Slovenia, have sent requests for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. By far the most active of these in sending requests has been the Belgian Court. The Portuguese Constitutional Court has indicated that it can request prelimi...
This paper examines the effects of changes in the geographical distribution (CGDs) of shared (tra... more This paper examines the effects of changes in the geographical distribution (CGDs) of shared (transboundary and straddling) fish stocks on the legal duties of state to cooperate on the conservation and management of marine living resources. CGD can involve changes in the (1) nature of the stock, (2) the States involved in the fishery, or (3) the zonal attachment of the stock. The CGD phenomenon, while not completely novel, appears to have intensified in recent years, in large part due to the impact of climate change on the oceans. The paper explores what States must do in order to satisfy their obligation to cooperate in a CGD situation and the consequences should they fail to do so. The Mackerel War is used as a case study throughout the paper because it is a recent and comprehensive CGD dispute, which fittingly exemplifies a wide array of the legal issues that CGDs can raise. In its analysis of the duty of cooperation, the paper finds that states have a large amount of discretion in deciding how to deal with a CDG, including ignoring the CGD if they so agree. However, there is less discretion if the viability of a stock is threatened by the CGD and the conservation obligations of states under international law are triggered. In analysing the consequences of unsuccessful cooperation, the paper focuses on three issues – pre-CGD agreements, dispute settlement and self-help measures. The paper argues that CGDs can be a basis for the termination of international agreements. The paper also suggests that, while existing dispute settlement mechanisms may provide some answers for CGD-related issues, the sweeping jurisdictional limitations for fisheries cases can provoke retaliation and counter-measures instead of further cooperation. Overall, the paper concludes that States and scholars alike must be very attentive to CGDs in the future for the issues they can create.
Recently, a new twist to the phenomenon of conflicting jurisdictions was introduced by the Macker... more Recently, a new twist to the phenomenon of conflicting jurisdictions was introduced by the Mackerel War between the Faroe Islands and the European Union. Complicating this fishingquotas dispute is the peculiar position of the Faroe Islands as a self-governing territory within Denmark but outside of the European Union. The Mackerel War, originally little more than a political spat, came to involve both the WTO and the UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms. This article focuses on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under art.344 TFEU and examines whether Denmark complied with it. The relationship of the Faroe Islands with Denmark, the EU, the WTO, and the UNCLOS is examined first. Then, Denmark's EU law obligations are analysed in light of art.344 TFEU, art.4 TEU, and Declaration 25 to the Maastricht Treaty. The findings overwhelmingly support the legality of Denmark's actions and urther elucidate the relationship between dependent territories and the European U...
Recently, a new twist to the phenomenon of conflicting jurisdictions was introduced by the Macker... more Recently, a new twist to the phenomenon of conflicting jurisdictions was introduced by the Mackerel War, between the Faroe Islands and the EU. Complicating this fishing-quotas dispute is the peculiar position of the Faroe Islands as a self-governing territory within Denmark but outside of the EU. The Mackerel War, originally little more than a political spat, came to involve both the WTO and the UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms. This article focuses on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under Article 344 TFEU and examines whether Denmark complied with it. The relationship of the Faroe Islands with Denmark, the EU, the WTO and the UNCLOS is examined first. Then, Denmark’s EU law obligations are analysed in light of Article 344 TFEU, Article 4 TEU and Declaration 25 to the Maastricht Treaty. The findings overwhelmingly support the legality of Denmark’s actions and further elucidate the relationship between dependent territories and the EU.
The European Union (EU) has been supporting its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) through its trade p... more The European Union (EU) has been supporting its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) through its trade powers for 40 years. This practice has evolved significantly over the years. This paper explores this evolution with respect to achieving sustainable fishing beyond EU waters. In particular, this paper examines two major ways in which the EU trade agreements impact sustainable fishing abroad. First, the discussion looks at the EU’s use of trade agreements to leverage access to the fishing resources of third States. The paper finds this EU practice to be lacking the necessary coherence and transparency and it raises doubts about the balance between commercial and sustainability concerns. Second, the discussion looks at the fisheries cooperation provisions included in the various EU trade agreements. In that regard the paper examines the changing and evolving emphasis on sustainable fishing. The paper finds that the EU’s trade agreements have evolved greatly. The contemporary EU trade agree...
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2020
The EU has entered into many binding undertakings (international agreements) with third States on... more The EU has entered into many binding undertakings (international agreements) with third States on access to fisheries resources. In the Venezuelan Fisheries case, the ECJ was, for the first time, confronted with an EU unilateral declaration granting fishing opportunities in EU waters to Venezuela-flagged vessels. We argue, contrary to ECJ’s conclusion, that the declaration is a binding unilateral act and not an international agreement. This case is important for the burgeoning debate on the ECJ’s approach to international law. It represents a missed opportunity for the ECJ to clarify its previous case-law on the broad concept of ‘international agreement’ and align it with relevant international jurisprudence and doctrine. More fundamentally, it is a missed opportunity for the ECJ to truly develop and shape international law practice and doctrine on unilateral acts by international organisations – an omission that does not comport with the EU’s self-projection as an internationally engaged polity.
The case note provides a concise report on the case as a whole (issues and what the ECJ held) as ... more The case note provides a concise report on the case as a whole (issues and what the ECJ held) as well as a 1000-words analysis of international law-related issues. It was prepared in November 2016.
Recently, a new twist to the phenomenon of conflicting jurisdictions was introduced by the Macker... more Recently, a new twist to the phenomenon of conflicting jurisdictions was introduced by the Mackerel War, between the Faroe Islands and the EU. Complicating this fishing-quotas dispute is the peculiar position of the Faroe Islands as a self-governing territory within Denmark but outside of the EU. The Mackerel War, originally little more than a political spat, came to involve both the WTO and the UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanisms. This article focuses on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under Article 344 TFEU and examines whether Denmark complied with it. The relationship of the Faroe Islands with Denmark, the EU, the WTO and the UNCLOS is examined first. Then, Denmark’s EU law obligations are analysed in light of Article 344 TFEU, Article 4 TEU and Declaration 25 to the Maastricht Treaty. The findings overwhelmingly support the legality of Denmark’s actions and further elucidate the relationship between dependent territories and the EU.
The Kadi saga has been in the centre of considerable number of academic contributions and, now th... more The Kadi saga has been in the centre of considerable number of academic contributions and, now that it was finally settled by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), a final wave of comments is approaching. This contribution takes part in this wave by looking at what the CJEU did with the ‘hot potato’ that the Kadi saga became over the years. In particular, attention is devoted to the backtracking of the CJEU from its judgment in Kadi I. The impeccable, yet hesitant, application of the CJEU's (then ECJ) Kadi I judgment by the General Court (GC) resulted in inducing the CJEU to think twice. Despite the backtracking, which is identified in this contribution, the ECJ still preserved the high level of protection of fundamental rights and indirectly continues to require more from the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the Sanctions Committee in terms of procedural safeguards within the context of the "blacklisting" of individuals and organisations suspected to be associated with terrorism.
The European Union (EU) has been using its trade powers to support its Common Fisheries Policy (C... more The European Union (EU) has been using its trade powers to support its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) for almost forty years. The way in which the EU has made use of its trade powers in that regard has evolved significantly over the years. This paper explores this evolution of EU’s practice towards achieving sustainable fishing and addresses matters of coherence that emerge from it. In particular, it examines, first, the use of competence in the post-Lisbon practice, second, the trade-for-access arrangements, and, third, the evolution of the fisheries cooperation provisions in the various trade agreements. The paper finds that the practice experienced evolution peaks at times of broader developments in the area of international environmental protection and fisheries law. In its contemporary practice, the EU is managing to operationalise its trade agreements in order to further sustainable fishing. It is successfully using them as vessels for its external CFP by setting the agenda in the international fora or diffusing specific norms that are part of the CFP. During this process, a core of cooperation commitments is emerging. Nevertheless, there still are important matters of coherence that the EU needs to address in the relationship with its partners.
Abstract:
Global fisheries governance faces many challenges. One of them is the change in the geo... more Abstract: Global fisheries governance faces many challenges. One of them is the change in the geographical distribution (CGD) of shared stocks, which is intensifying with climate change. Stocks that are highly responsive to changing hydrographic conditions will require continuous, yet flexible and adjustable management.1 The international regime comprising the UNCLOS and the UNFSA prescribes (regional) cooperation for such stocks but lacks explicit solutions where stocks alter their zonal attachment. In cases of CGDs of shared stocks important environmental and economic concerns are at stake and cooperation, expressed mainly in agreements on total allowable catch (TAC) and quota allocations, can become significantly harder to achieve.
The Mackerel War exemplified this. It was a fishing quota dispute involving the European Union (EU), Norway, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Greenland and concerned Atlanto-Scandian herring (herring) and North-East Atlantic mackerel (mackerel). The EU and the Faroe Islands headed the legal dispute. After failing to agree with the Faroe Islands on the quotas, the EU found itself lacking relevant international legal instruments to address the issue and decided to innovate through a unilateral instrument – Regulation 1026/2012. Led by the success of Regulation 1005/2008 on IUU fishing, the EU sought to expand the cases in which it can adopt trade measures against non-cooperating third States. However, Regulation 1026/2012 did not prove a successful innovation. This paper will examine it in the following way. Section 2 will explore the Mackerel War as it provides the context of Regulation 1026/2012. Section 3 will, first, examine the deficiencies in the global fisheries regime that prompted Regulation 1026/2012 and, second, provide an overview of the Regulation. Section 4 will focus on why Regulation 1026/2012 failed as an innovation. Section 5 will conclude.
Ever since the drafting of its first Constitution in 1879, Bulgaria has had a unicameral parliame... more Ever since the drafting of its first Constitution in 1879, Bulgaria has had a unicameral parliament called National Assembly. However, bicameralism has been a recurring theme and a point of debate from this very beginning. In this almost century-and-a-half-long modern Bulgarian history, bicameralism debates have appeared prominently on the agenda at three points in time.
First, during the Constitutive Assembly in 1879, bicameralism was a central point that was fiercely debated. It was a point that defined the conservatives and the liberals for the future to come and even ended up in a scuffle. Unicameralism was eventually chosen and it was not until the mid-1930s that bicameralism in Bulgaria was considered again. However, the proposal failed yet again in the turmoil that prevailed. The third time that bicameralism was given any (albeit poor) consideration was in the post-socialist period in Bulgaria. This post-socialist discussion had two occurrences – (1) during the 7th Grand National Assembly (GNA) in 1991, when the current Bulgarian Constitution was drafted and (2) during Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union.
While the bicameralism idea did not prevail at any point in these debates and discussions, its shadow has never disappeared and even grew more sophisticated in the post-socialism. Certain standing and former high officials such as a Constitutional Judge, Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Assembly, as well as academics, have claimed (albeit not unchallenged) that there are institutions in the Bulgarian Constitutional order fulfilling certain ‘second-chamber’ functions. These claims themselves differ considerably in terms of the particular institution (the GNA, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court (BCC) and the President of the Republic) as well as in the way it mirrors a second chamber. Unfortunately, these claims have usually been made in passing and never thoroughly examined. This paper will attempt to do exactly this by providing a comprehensive analysis.
Cooperation is one of the cornerstones of the international fisheries regime. It requires States ... more Cooperation is one of the cornerstones of the international fisheries regime. It requires States to work together for the conservation and management of the fisheries resources. This applies even stronger with respect to shared fisheries resources. However, negotiating a cooperative solution is not always easily achievable for the parties involved and the international regime does not provide for consequences in such cases. Faced with such a problem and seeking a new solution to it, the EU adopted Regulation 1026/2012, equipping itself with a framework for adopting measures against third countries. This innovative solution challenges certain aspects of the international duty to cooperate and its negotiations aspect. The EU's innovation has so far failed because it lacks clear international support and basis in the international regime. This failure exemplifies one of the limits of unilateralism for generating developments in international fisheries law.
This paper examines the effects of changes in the geographical distribution (CGDs) of shared (tra... more This paper examines the effects of changes in the geographical distribution (CGDs) of shared (transboundary and straddling) fish stocks on the legal duties of state to cooperate on the conservation and management of marine living resources. CGD can involve changes in the (1) nature of the stock, (2) the States involved in the fishery, or (3) the zonal attachment of the stock. The CGD phenomenon, while not completely novel, appears to have intensified in recent years, in large part due to the impact of climate change on the oceans. The paper explores what States must do in order to satisfy their obligation to cooperate in a CGD situation and the consequences should they fail to do so. The Mackerel War is used as a case study throughout the paper because it is a recent and comprehensive CGD dispute, which fittingly exemplifies a wide array of the legal issues that CGDs can raise. In its analysis of the duty of cooperation, the paper finds that states have a large amount of discretion in deciding how to deal with a CDG, including ignoring the CGD if they so agree. However, there is less discretion if the viability of a stock is threatened by the CGD and the conservation obligations of states under international law are triggered. In analysing the consequences of unsuccessful cooperation, the paper focuses on three issues – pre-CGD agreements, dispute settlement and self-help measures. The paper argues that CGDs can be a basis for the termination of international agreements. The paper also suggests that, while existing dispute settlement mechanisms may provide some answers for CGD-related issues, the sweeping jurisdictional limitations for fisheries cases can provoke retaliation and counter-measures instead of further cooperation. Overall, the paper concludes that States and scholars alike must be very attentive to CGDs in the future for the issues they can create.
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Reports by Mihail Vatsov
However, with the intensification of the Euro crisis and its increased economic impact across Europe, in late 2010 and the beginning of 2011, Bulgaria was getting increasingly involved in the preparation of the Euro-crisis measures. The Bulgarian Government realised that the new measures were going to restructure the Eurozone regime. Since Bulgaria has Eurozone membership aspirations, the Government saw an increased involvement as vital for protecting Bulgaria’s interests. Furthermore, since the Bulgarian currency is pegged to the Euro, saving the Euro was just as important to Bulgaria.
Initially, Bulgaria’s participation in the negotiations and the adoption of the Euro crisis measures in early 2011, namely the Euro-Plus Pact and the amendment of Article 136 TFEU, was marked by a high level of criticisms for lack of transparency and accusations by the opposition of back-door dealings at the EU level. Once bitten, twice shy, the Government involved the National Assembly much more in the negotiation process of the Six Pack and the Fiscal Compact and explained its participation in the negotiations of the ESM, to which Bulgaria was not going to participate before joining the Eurozone. A main point of discussion in Bulgaria, with respect to the Euro-crisis measures, has been preserving Member States’ competence in taxation matters. The debates on the Euro-crisis measures stayed only at the political level and did not reach the Bulgarian Constitutional Court. Bulgaria also did not participate in any bail-out schemes.
In late 2010 and early 2011 the Finance Minister of Bulgaria started developing and looking for political support for a Bulgarian Pact for Financial Stability. This Pact envisioned a constitutional amendment and an amendment of the Law on the Planning of the State Budget. The main aspect of this Pact were the inclusion of (stricter than EU’s requirements) numerical fiscal rules as well as putting in place a ⅔ qualified majority for introducing new taxes or changing already existing ones. The Pact had limited success. The proposed constitutional amendment eventually failed but the strict numerical fiscal rules were nevertheless included in an ordinary law.
The implementation of the Euro-crisis measures itself, has not faced particular political or legal difficulties, with the exception of the long delay in the creation of a Fiscal Council for which infringement proceedings were initiated. Until late 2012, the political situation in Bulgaria remained stable, notwithstanding the crisis. However, since late 2012 the political situation has been in turmoil. It involved the resignation of two Governments and the respective appointment of two Caretaker Governments, the formation of two minority Governments, a recent banking crisis and raging protests for the bigger part of this, less than triannual, period.
Papers by Mihail Vatsov
conclusion, that the declaration is a binding unilateral act and not an international agreement. This case is important for the burgeoning debate on the ECJ’s approach to international law. It represents a missed opportunity for the ECJ to clarify its previous case-law on the broad concept of ‘international agreement’ and align it with relevant
international jurisprudence and doctrine. More fundamentally, it is a missed opportunity for the ECJ to truly develop and shape international law practice and doctrine on unilateral acts by international organisations – an omission that does not comport with the EU’s self-projection as an internationally engaged polity.
However, with the intensification of the Euro crisis and its increased economic impact across Europe, in late 2010 and the beginning of 2011, Bulgaria was getting increasingly involved in the preparation of the Euro-crisis measures. The Bulgarian Government realised that the new measures were going to restructure the Eurozone regime. Since Bulgaria has Eurozone membership aspirations, the Government saw an increased involvement as vital for protecting Bulgaria’s interests. Furthermore, since the Bulgarian currency is pegged to the Euro, saving the Euro was just as important to Bulgaria.
Initially, Bulgaria’s participation in the negotiations and the adoption of the Euro crisis measures in early 2011, namely the Euro-Plus Pact and the amendment of Article 136 TFEU, was marked by a high level of criticisms for lack of transparency and accusations by the opposition of back-door dealings at the EU level. Once bitten, twice shy, the Government involved the National Assembly much more in the negotiation process of the Six Pack and the Fiscal Compact and explained its participation in the negotiations of the ESM, to which Bulgaria was not going to participate before joining the Eurozone. A main point of discussion in Bulgaria, with respect to the Euro-crisis measures, has been preserving Member States’ competence in taxation matters. The debates on the Euro-crisis measures stayed only at the political level and did not reach the Bulgarian Constitutional Court. Bulgaria also did not participate in any bail-out schemes.
In late 2010 and early 2011 the Finance Minister of Bulgaria started developing and looking for political support for a Bulgarian Pact for Financial Stability. This Pact envisioned a constitutional amendment and an amendment of the Law on the Planning of the State Budget. The main aspect of this Pact were the inclusion of (stricter than EU’s requirements) numerical fiscal rules as well as putting in place a ⅔ qualified majority for introducing new taxes or changing already existing ones. The Pact had limited success. The proposed constitutional amendment eventually failed but the strict numerical fiscal rules were nevertheless included in an ordinary law.
The implementation of the Euro-crisis measures itself, has not faced particular political or legal difficulties, with the exception of the long delay in the creation of a Fiscal Council for which infringement proceedings were initiated. Until late 2012, the political situation in Bulgaria remained stable, notwithstanding the crisis. However, since late 2012 the political situation has been in turmoil. It involved the resignation of two Governments and the respective appointment of two Caretaker Governments, the formation of two minority Governments, a recent banking crisis and raging protests for the bigger part of this, less than triannual, period.
conclusion, that the declaration is a binding unilateral act and not an international agreement. This case is important for the burgeoning debate on the ECJ’s approach to international law. It represents a missed opportunity for the ECJ to clarify its previous case-law on the broad concept of ‘international agreement’ and align it with relevant
international jurisprudence and doctrine. More fundamentally, it is a missed opportunity for the ECJ to truly develop and shape international law practice and doctrine on unilateral acts by international organisations – an omission that does not comport with the EU’s self-projection as an internationally engaged polity.
Global fisheries governance faces many challenges. One of them is the change in the geographical distribution (CGD) of shared stocks, which is intensifying with climate change. Stocks that are highly responsive to changing hydrographic conditions will require continuous, yet flexible and adjustable management.1 The international regime comprising the UNCLOS and the UNFSA prescribes (regional) cooperation for such stocks but lacks explicit solutions where stocks alter their zonal attachment. In cases of CGDs of shared stocks important environmental and economic concerns are at stake and cooperation, expressed mainly in agreements on total allowable catch (TAC) and quota allocations, can become significantly harder to achieve.
The Mackerel War exemplified this. It was a fishing quota dispute involving the European Union (EU), Norway, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Greenland and concerned Atlanto-Scandian herring (herring) and North-East Atlantic mackerel (mackerel). The EU and the Faroe Islands headed the legal dispute. After failing to agree with the Faroe Islands on the quotas, the EU found itself lacking relevant international legal instruments to address the issue and decided to innovate through a unilateral instrument – Regulation 1026/2012. Led by the success of Regulation 1005/2008 on IUU fishing, the EU sought to expand the cases in which it can adopt trade measures against non-cooperating third States. However, Regulation 1026/2012 did not prove a successful innovation. This paper will examine it in the following way. Section 2 will explore the Mackerel War as it provides the context of Regulation 1026/2012. Section 3 will, first, examine the deficiencies in the global fisheries regime that prompted Regulation 1026/2012 and, second, provide an overview of the Regulation. Section 4 will focus on why Regulation 1026/2012 failed as an innovation. Section 5 will conclude.
First, during the Constitutive Assembly in 1879, bicameralism was a central point that was fiercely debated. It was a point that defined the conservatives and the liberals for the future to come and even ended up in a scuffle. Unicameralism was eventually chosen and it was not until the mid-1930s that bicameralism in Bulgaria was considered again. However, the proposal failed yet again in the turmoil that prevailed. The third time that bicameralism was given any (albeit poor) consideration was in the post-socialist period in Bulgaria. This post-socialist discussion had two occurrences – (1) during the 7th Grand National Assembly (GNA) in 1991, when the current Bulgarian Constitution was drafted and (2) during Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union.
While the bicameralism idea did not prevail at any point in these debates and discussions, its shadow has never disappeared and even grew more sophisticated in the post-socialism. Certain standing and former high officials such as a Constitutional Judge, Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Assembly, as well as academics, have claimed (albeit not unchallenged) that there are institutions in the Bulgarian Constitutional order fulfilling certain ‘second-chamber’ functions. These claims themselves differ considerably in terms of the particular institution (the GNA, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court (BCC) and the President of the Republic) as well as in the way it mirrors a second chamber. Unfortunately, these claims have usually been made in passing and never thoroughly examined. This paper will attempt to do exactly this by providing a comprehensive analysis.
involved and the international regime does not provide for consequences in such cases. Faced with such a problem and seeking a new solution to it, the EU adopted Regulation 1026/2012, equipping itself with a framework for adopting measures against third countries. This innovative solution challenges certain aspects of the international duty to cooperate and its negotiations aspect. The EU's innovation has so far failed because it lacks clear international support and basis in the international regime. This failure exemplifies one of the limits of unilateralism for generating developments in international fisheries law.