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Markov perfect Nash equilibria in models with a single capital stock

Engelbert Dockner and Florian Wagener

Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 56, issue 3, 585-625

Abstract: Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock. We study necessary as well as sufficient conditions that allow us to characterise Markov perfect Nash equilibria for these games. These conditions can be translated into an auxiliary system of ordinary differential equations that helps us to explore stability, continuity and differentiability of these equilibria. The techniques are used to derive detailed properties of Markov perfect Nash equilibria for several games including voluntary investment in a public capital stock, the inter-temporal consumption of a reproductive asset and the pollution of a shallow lake. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Capital accumulation games; Markov equilibria; Resource games; Differential games; C73; D92; Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Markov=Perfect Nash Equilibria in Models With a Single Capital Stock (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in models with a single capital stock (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria in Models With a Single Capital Stock (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria in Models with a Single Capital Stock (2006) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-014-0805-3

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