Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union

Robert Pahre
Additional contact information
Robert Pahre: Department of Political Science University of Michigan

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1997, vol. 41, issue 1, 147-174

Abstract: Many scholars argue that domestic politics can tie the hands of diplomats, who can sometimes exploit these constraints for bargaining leverage in international negotiations. The author examines domestic institutions that make such constraints permanent, and thus credible, in a parliamentary system. Existing “divided government†theories are unable to explain the pattern of parliamentary constraints that we find because they treat executive preferences as exogenous to the legislature. In the author's model of parliamentary politics, in contrast, parties may constrain the government by forming governing coalitions or establishing effective oversight institutions. This model explains the variation in these oversight mechanisms among the members of the European Union (EU). The most interesting of these is Denmark's system of parliamentary oversight, which the author analyzes in detail. Among the newest members of the EU, analogous institutions are most likely in Sweden and least likely in Austria.

Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002797041001007 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:41:y:1997:i:1:p:147-174

DOI: 10.1177/0022002797041001007

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().