Regulatory Arbitrage in Teacher Hiring and Retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools

Jesse M. Bruhn, Scott Imberman and Marcus A. Winters

No 27607, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study personnel flexibility in charter schools by exploring how teacher retention varies with teacher and school quality in Massachusetts. Charters are more likely to lose their highest and lowest value-added teachers. Low performers tend to exit public education, while high performers tend to switch to traditional public schools. To rationalize these findings, we propose a model in which educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs. The model suggests charter schools create positive externalities for traditional public schools by increasing the average quality of available teachers.

JEL-codes: I21 J45 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lma and nep-ure
Note: ED LS
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Jesse Bruhn & Scott Imberman & Marcus Winters, 2022. "Regulatory arbitrage in teacher hiring and retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools," Journal of Public Economics, vol 215.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27607.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Regulatory arbitrage in teacher hiring and retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27607

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27607

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().