External Monitors and Score Manipulation in Italian Schools: Symptomatic Treatment or Cure?

Marco Bertoni, Giorgio Brunello, Marco Alberto De Benedetto () and Maria De Paola ()
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Marco Alberto De Benedetto: University of Calabria

No 12591, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to school institutes in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners, and is stronger for open-ended questions, for small school institutes, and for institutes located in the northern and central regions of the country. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that monitoring is a symptomatic treatment rather than a cure of score manipulation. We discuss learning, reputational concerns, peer pressure and teacher preferences as potential mechanisms behind our findings, and present some evidence on the role played by social capital and high stakes.

Keywords: long-run effects; external monitoring; testing; education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-exp and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published as 'Does monitoring deter future cheating? The case of external examiners in Italian schools' in: Economics Letters, 2021, 201, 109742

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Working Paper: EXTERNAL MONITORS AND SCORE MANIPULATION IN ITALIAN SCHOOLS: SYMPTOMATIC TREATMENT OR CURE? (2019)
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