Sovereign Debt

Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador

Chapter Chapter 11 in Handbook of International Economics, 2014, vol. 4, pp 647-687 from Elsevier

Abstract: In this chapter, we use a benchmark limited-commitment model to explore key issues in the economics of sovereign debt. After highlighting conceptual issues that distinguish sovereign debt as well as reviewing a number of empirical facts, we use the model to discuss debt overhang, risk-sharing, and capital flows in an environment of limited enforcement. We also discuss recent progress on default and renegotiation; self-fulfilling debt crises; and incomplete markets and their quantitative implications. We conclude with a brief assessment of the current state of the literature and highlight some directions for future research.

Keywords: Sovereign debt; Debt overhang; Default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 F21 F32 F34 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:intchp:4-647

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-54314-1.00011-2

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