We consider multiplayer stochastic games with finitely many players and actions, and countably many states, in which the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borel-measurable function of the infinite play. By using a generalization of the technique of ...

In this paper, we extend previous results on weak approachability in generalized quitting games with vector payoffs to the general case of absorbing games. Specifically, we show that a necessary condition and a different sufficient condition for weak ...

We consider a heterogeneous distributed service system consisting of n servers with unknown and possibly different processing rates. Jobs with unit mean arrive as a renewal process of rate proportional to n and are immediately dispatched to one of several ...

Orthogonal direct-sum decompositions of finite games into potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components exist in the literature. In this paper we study the issue of decomposing games that are strategically equivalent from a game-theoretical point of ...

We provide a new tool for simulation of a random variable (target source) from a randomness source with side information. Considering the total variation distance as the measure of precision, this tool offers an upper bound for the precision of simulation,...

We consider an N-player multiarmed bandit game in which each player chooses one out of M arms for T turns. Each player has different expected rewards for the arms, and the instantaneous rewards are independent and identically distributed or Markovian. ...

We provide a characterization of subgame-perfect equilibrium plays in a class of perfect information games where each player's payoff function is Borel measurable and has finite range. The set of subgame-perfect equilibrium plays is obtained through a ...

We consider n-player perfect information games with payoff functions having a finite image. We do not make any further assumptions, so in particular we refrain from making assumptions on the cardinality or the topology of the set of actions and ...

We prove the existence of a pure subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, in multiplayer perfect information games, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and exhibit common preferences at the limit. If, in addition, the ...

We prove the existence of a pure subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, in multiplayer perfect information games, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and exhibit common preferences at the limit. If, in addition, the ...

We prove the existence of a pure subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, in multiplayer perfect information games, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and exhibit common preferences at the limit. If, in addition, the ...

We prove the existence of a pure subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, in multiplayer perfect information games, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and exhibit common preferences at the limit. If, in addition, the ...

In routing games with infinitesimal players, it follows from well-known convexity arguments that equilibria exist and are unique. In routing games with atomic players with splittable flow, equilibria exist, but uniqueness of equilibria has been ...