It is our great pleasure to welcome you to the Fourth ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense -- MTD'17. The mission of MTD is to provide a forum for researchers and practitioners in this area to exchange their novel ideas, findings, experiences, and lessons learned. The fourth MTD workshop will also have a focus on the lessons learned from the past years of research in the area of moving target, and the challenges and opportunities faced by the community moving forward.
The call for papers attracted submissions from the United States, Europe, and Asia. Each submission received at least three, and in some cases as many as five reviews. Each submission was then discussed and carefully debated by the members of the program committee. In some cases, the lengths and detailed of the comments and discussions even surpassed the reviews. After careful considerations, the program committee accepted 9 full technical papers out of 26 submissions (an acceptance rate of 34%). The program committee further recommended 2 of the submissions to be accepted as short papers.
We also encourage attendees to attend the keynotes. These insightful talks discuss the history and prospects of security as a scientific pursuit and the lessons learned on the effectiveness of randomization over the past years. Their aim is to spark debate and discussion within the MTD community, and chart a vision for future research in this area. The keynotes are:
Science, Security and Academic Literature: Can We Learn from History? Prof. Paul C. Van Oorschot (Canada Research Chair in Authentication and Computer Security and Professor of Computer Science, Carleton University, Canada)
Moving Targets vs. Moving Adversaries: On the Effectiveness of System Randomization, Prof. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (Professor of Computer Science at the Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany)
Proceeding Downloads
Science, Security and Academic Literature: Can We Learn from History?
A recent paper (Oakland 2017) discussed science and security research in the context of the government-funded Science of Security movement, and the history and prospects of security as a scientific pursuit. It drew on literature from within the security ...
U-TRI: Unlinkability Through Random Identifier for SDN Network
Traffic analysis within switches is threatening the security of large enterprise networks built with SDN. Adversaries are able to monitor all traffic traversing a switch by exploiting just one vulnerability in it and obtain linkage information for ...
WebMTD: Defeating Web Code Injection Attacks using Web Element Attribute Mutation
Existing mitigation techniques for Web code injection attacks have not been widely adopted, primarily due to incurring impractical overheads on the developer, Web applications, or Web browsers. They either substantially increase Web server/client ...
Mixr: Flexible Runtime Rerandomization for Binaries
Mixr is a novel moving target defense (MTD) system that improves on the traditional address space layout randomization (ASLR) security technique by giving security architects the tools to add "runtime ASLR" to existing software programs and libraries ...
Mutated Policies: Towards Proactive Attribute-based Defenses for Access Control
Recently, both academia and industry have recognized the need for leveraging real-time information for the purposes of specifying, enforcing and maintaining rich and flexible authorization policies. In such a context, security-related properties, a.k.a.,...
Moving Targets vs. Moving Adversaries: On the Effectiveness of System Randomization
Memory-corruption vulnerabilities pose a severe threat on modern systems security. Although this problem is known for almost three decades it is unlikely to be solved in the near future because a large amount of modern software is still programmed in ...
Performance Modeling of Moving Target Defenses
In recent years, Moving Target Defense (MTD) has emerged as a potential game changer in the security landscape, due to its potential to create asymmetric uncertainty that favors the defender. Many different MTD techniques have then been proposed, each ...
Evaluation of Deception-Based Web Attacks Detection
A form of moving target defense that is rapidly increasing in popularity consists of enriching an application with a number of deceptive elements and raising an alert whenever an interaction with such elements takes place. The use of deception can ...
Detecting Stealthy Botnets in a Resource-Constrained Environment using Reinforcement Learning
Modern botnets can persist in networked systems for extended periods of time by operating in a stealthy manner. Despite the progress made in the area of botnet prevention, detection, and mitigation, stealthy botnets continue to pose a significant risk ...
Multi-Stage Attack Graph Security Games: Heuristic Strategies, with Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis
We study the problem of allocating limited security countermeasures to protect network data from cyber-attacks, for scenarios modeled by Bayesian attack graphs. We consider multi-stage interactions between a network administrator and cybercriminals, ...
Online Algorithms for Adaptive Cyber Defense on Bayesian Attack Graphs
Emerging zero-day vulnerabilities in information and communications technology systems make cyber defenses very challenging. In particular, the defender faces uncertainties of; e.g., system states and the locations and the impacts of vulnerabilities. In ...
Path Hopping: an MTD Strategy for Quantum-safe Communication
Moving target defense (MTD) strategies have been widely studied for securing computer communication systems. We consider using MTD strategies as a cryptographic mechanism for providing secure communication when the adversary has access to a quantum ...
If You Can't Measure It, You Can't Improve It: Moving Target Defense Metrics
We propose new metrics drawing inspiration from the optimization domain that can be used to characterize the effectiveness of moving target defenses better. Besides that, we propose a Network Neighborhood Partitioning algorithm that can help to measure ...
Index Terms
- Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Moving Target Defense