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Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments
In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale, and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items rather than just on the individual items. A key problem in this and similar settings is that of strategic bidding, where ...
A mechanism for multiple goods and interdependent valuations
This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agent system consisting of selfish, rational agents and develop an auction mechanism ...
A budget-balanced, incentive-compatible scheme for social choice
Many practical scenarios involve solving a social choice problem: a group of self-interested agents have to agree on an outcome that best fits their combined preferences. We assume that each outcome presents a certain utility to an agent and that the ...
An options-based method to solve the composability problem in sequential auctions
Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding agents often have the opportunity to participate in successive auctions selling the same good, with no dominant bidding strategy in any single auction. ...
“CONFESS”. eliciting honest feedback without independent verification authorities
Reputation mechanisms offer an efficient way of building the necessary level of trust in electronic markets. In the absence of independent verification authorities that can reveal the true outcome of a transaction, market designers have to ensure that ...
Generalized knapsack solvers for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: analysis and application to computational resource allocation
The problem of allocating discrete computational resources motivates interest in general multi-unit combinatorial exchanges. This paper considers the problem of computing optimal (surplus-maximizing) allocations, assuming unrestricted quasi-linear ...
Designing auctions for deliberative agents
In many settings, bidding agents for auctions do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they must actively determine them through deliberation (e.g., information processing or information gathering). Agents are faced not only with the problem of ...
An evolutionary game-theoretic comparison of two double-auction market designs
In this paper we describe an analysis of two double auction markets—the clearing house auction and the continuous double auction. The complexity of these institutions is such that they defy analysis using traditional game-theoretic techniques, and so we ...
Auctions and bidding with information
An approach to auctions and bidding is founded on observations and expectations of the opponents' behavior and not on assumptions concerning the opponents' motivations or internal reasoning. A bidding agent operates in an information-rich environment ...
Multi-attribute bilateral bargaining in a one-to-many setting
Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller negotiates over ...
Bidding for customer orders in TAC SCM
Supply chains are a current, challenging problem for agent-based electronic commerce. Motivated by the Trading Agent Competition Supply Chain Management (TAC SCM) scenario, we consider an individual supply chain agent as having three major subtasks: ...
Agents' strategies for the dual parallel search in partnership formation applications
In many two-sided search applications, autonomous agents can enjoy the advantage of parallel search, powered by their ability to handle an enormous amount of information, in a short time, and the capability to maintain interaction with several other ...
Three automated stock-trading agents: a comparative study
This paper documents the development of three autonomous stock-trading agents within the framework of the Penn Exchange Simulator (PXS), a novel stock-trading simulator that takes advantage of electronic crossing networks to realistically mix agent bids ...
Specifying and monitoring market mechanisms using rights and obligations
We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of well-defined principles, and is designed to capture an agent's rights, as derived from property, and an agent's obligations, as ...
iAuctionMaker: a decision support tool for mixed bundling
This paper presents iAuctionMaker as a novel tool that serves as a decision support for e-sourcing professionals on their pursuing of auction optimisation. Given a set of items to auction, iAuctionMaker helps an auctioneer determine how to separate ...