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The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: message authentication

Published: 05 November 2001 Publication History

Abstract

Dolev and Yao initiated an approach to studying cryptographic protocols which abstracts from possible problems with the cryptography so as to focus on the structural aspects of the protocol. Recent work in this framework has developed easily applicable methods to determine many security properties of protocols. A separate line of work, initiated by Bellare and Rogaway, analyzes the way specific cryptographic primitives are used in protocols. It gives asymptotic bounds on the risk of failures of secrecy or authentication.In this paper we show how the Dolev-Yao model may be used for protocol analysis, while a further analysis gives a quantitative bound on the extent to which real cryptographic primitives may diverge from the idealized model. We develop this method where the cryptographic primitives are based on Carter-Wegman universal classes of hash functions. This choice allows us to give specific quantitative bounds rather than simply asymptotic bounds.

References

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cover image ACM Conferences
CCS '01: Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
November 2001
274 pages
ISBN:1581133855
DOI:10.1145/501983
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 05 November 2001

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  • (2009)Soundness and completeness of formal encryption: The cases of key cycles and partial information leakageJournal of Computer Security10.5555/1662658.166266517:5(737-797)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2009
  • (2009)Computational Semantics for First-Order Logical Analysis of Cryptographic ProtocolsFormal to Practical Security10.1007/978-3-642-02002-5_3(33-56)Online publication date: 14-May-2009
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