Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

skip to main content
10.1145/2459976.2459983acmotherconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagescsiirwConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article

Modeling and verification of security properties for critical infrastructure protection

Published: 08 January 2013 Publication History

Abstract

Recently, studies have revealed new security issues in critical infrastructures, emphasizing the need for verification of security properties. Any mechanism to verify the security of such systems should merge the cyber and physical aspects in a unified way. This paper proposes a novel direction using process algebras to model and verify security properties within a cyber-physical system (CPS). Specifically, we adopt the π-calculus to perform security analysis of a representative CPS, an advanced electric smart grid. We present the verification of an information flow security property, non-deducibility, defined in terms of more discriminating behavioral equivalences available in π-calculus compared to other process algebras.

References

[1]
M. Abadi and A. D. Gordon. A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus. In 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 36--47. ACM Press, 1997.
[2]
S. Amin, X. Litrico, S. Sastry, and A. Bayen. Stealthy deception attacks on water SCADA systems. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM international conference on Hybrid systems: computation and control (HSCC'10), pages 161--170. ACM, 2010.
[3]
R. Bakhshi and D. Gurov. Verification of peer-to-peer algorithms: a case study. Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 181:35--47, June 2007.
[4]
J. A. Goguen and J. Meseguer. Security policies and security models. In Proc. of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SSP'82), pages 195--204. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2002.
[5]
Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter. False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids. In ACM Transactions on Information Systems Security, volume 14(1), June 2011.
[6]
T. McEvoy and S. Wolthusen. A formal adversary capability model for SCADA environments. In C. Xenakis and S. Wolthusen, editors, Critical Information Infrastructures Security, volume 6712 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 93--103. Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2011.
[7]
R. Milner, J. Parrow, and D. Walker. A calculus of mobile processes i. Information and Computation, 100(1):1--40, 1992.
[8]
A. Platzer. Integrative challenges of cyber-physical systems. In Workshop on Usable Verification, November 2010.
[9]
R. Akella, F. Meng, D. Ditch, B. McMillin and M. Crow. Distributed power balancing for the FREEDM system. In The 1st IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, pages 7--12, October 2010.
[10]
D. Sangiorgi and D. Walker. The π-Calculus - A Theory of Mobile Processes. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
[11]
D. Sutherland. A model of information. In Proceedings of the 9th National Security Conference., pages 175--183, 1986.

Index Terms

  1. Modeling and verification of security properties for critical infrastructure protection

      Recommendations

      Comments

      Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

      Information & Contributors

      Information

      Published In

      cover image ACM Other conferences
      CSIIRW '13: Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop
      January 2013
      282 pages
      ISBN:9781450316873
      DOI:10.1145/2459976

      Sponsors

      • Los Alamos National Labs: Los Alamos National Labs
      • Sandia National Labs: Sandia National Laboratories
      • DOE: Department of Energy
      • Oak Ridge National Laboratory
      • Lawrence Livermore National Lab.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
      • BERKELEYLAB: Lawrence National Berkeley Laboratory
      • Argonne Natl Lab: Argonne National Lab
      • Idaho National Lab.: Idaho National Laboratory
      • Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
      • Nevada National Security Site: Nevada National Security Site

      Publisher

      Association for Computing Machinery

      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      Published: 08 January 2013

      Permissions

      Request permissions for this article.

      Check for updates

      Qualifiers

      • Research-article

      Funding Sources

      Conference

      CSIIRW '13
      Sponsor:
      • Los Alamos National Labs
      • Sandia National Labs
      • DOE
      • Lawrence Livermore National Lab.
      • BERKELEYLAB
      • Argonne Natl Lab
      • Idaho National Lab.
      • Nevada National Security Site
      CSIIRW '13: Cyber Security and Information Intelligence
      January 8 - 10, 2013
      Tennessee, Oak Ridge, USA

      Contributors

      Other Metrics

      Bibliometrics & Citations

      Bibliometrics

      Article Metrics

      • 0
        Total Citations
      • 264
        Total Downloads
      • Downloads (Last 12 months)4
      • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)1
      Reflects downloads up to 23 Nov 2024

      Other Metrics

      Citations

      View Options

      Login options

      View options

      PDF

      View or Download as a PDF file.

      PDF

      eReader

      View online with eReader.

      eReader

      Media

      Figures

      Other

      Tables

      Share

      Share

      Share this Publication link

      Share on social media