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Off-Path TCP Exploits of the Challenge ACK Global Rate Limit

Published: 01 April 2018 Publication History

Abstract

In this paper, we report a subtle yet serious side channel vulnerability CVE-2016-5696 introduced in a recent transmission control protocol TCP specification. The specification is faithfully implemented in Linux kernel version 3.6 from 2012 and beyond, and affects a wide range of devices and hosts. In a nutshell, the vulnerability allows a blind off-path attacker to infer if any two arbitrary hosts on the Internet are communicating using a TCP connection. Further, if the connection is present, such an off-path attacker can also infer the TCP sequence numbers in use, from both sides of the connection; this in turn allows the attacker to cause connection termination and perform data injection attacks. We illustrate how the attack can be leveraged to disrupt or degrade the privacy guarantees of an anonymity network such as Tor, and perform web connection hijacking. Through extensive experiments, we show that the attack is fast and reliable. On average, it takes about 40 to 60 s to finish and the success rate is 88% to 97%. Finally, we propose changes to both the TCP specification and implementation to eliminate the root cause of the problem.

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Cited By

View all
  • (2023)Bijack: Breaking Bitcoin Network with TCP VulnerabilitiesComputer Security – ESORICS 202310.1007/978-3-031-51479-1_16(306-326)Online publication date: 25-Sep-2023
  • (2021)The Side-Channel Vulnerability in Network ProtocolProceedings of the 2021 11th International Conference on Communication and Network Security10.1145/3507509.3507510(1-8)Online publication date: 3-Dec-2021
  • (2021)Realtime Robust Malicious Traffic Detection via Frequency Domain AnalysisProceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3460120.3484585(3431-3446)Online publication date: 12-Nov-2021
  • Show More Cited By

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Published In

cover image IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking  Volume 26, Issue 2
April 2018
377 pages

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IEEE Press

Publication History

Published: 01 April 2018
Published in TON Volume 26, Issue 2

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View all
  • (2023)Bijack: Breaking Bitcoin Network with TCP VulnerabilitiesComputer Security – ESORICS 202310.1007/978-3-031-51479-1_16(306-326)Online publication date: 25-Sep-2023
  • (2021)The Side-Channel Vulnerability in Network ProtocolProceedings of the 2021 11th International Conference on Communication and Network Security10.1145/3507509.3507510(1-8)Online publication date: 3-Dec-2021
  • (2021)Realtime Robust Malicious Traffic Detection via Frequency Domain AnalysisProceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3460120.3484585(3431-3446)Online publication date: 12-Nov-2021
  • (2020)Off-Path TCP Exploits of the Mixed IPID AssignmentProceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3372297.3417884(1323-1335)Online publication date: 30-Oct-2020

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