survey

A Survey and Analysis of the GNSS Spoofing Threat and Countermeasures

Authors:

Desmond Schmidt,

Michał RenAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), Volume 48, Issue 4

Article No.: 64, Pages 1 - 31

https://doi.org/10.1145/2897166

Published: 02 May 2016 Publication History

Abstract

Detection and prevention of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) “spoofing” attacks, or the broadcast of false global navigation satellite system services, has recently attracted much research interest. This survey aims to fill three gaps in the literature: first, to assess in detail the exact nature of threat scenarios posed by spoofing against the most commonly cited targets; second, to investigate the many practical impediments, often underplayed, to carrying out GNSS spoofing attacks in the field; and third, to survey and assess the effectiveness of a wide range of proposed defences against GNSS spoofing. Our conclusion lists promising areas of future research.

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cover image ACM Computing Surveys

ACM Computing Surveys Volume 48, Issue 4

May 2016

605 pages

ISSN:0360-0300

EISSN:1557-7341

DOI:10.1145/2891449

Editor:
Sartaj Sahni
Department of Computer and Information Science and Engineering/University of Florida/Gainesville, FL

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Publication History

Published: 02 May 2016

Accepted: 01 February 2016

Revised: 01 January 2016

Received: 01 November 2014

Published in CSUR Volume 48, Issue 4

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Mao WRen JNi S(2025)Fast GNSS spoofing detection based on LSTM-detect modelGPS Solutions10.1007/s10291-025-01819-729:1Online publication date: 1-Jan-2025
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10291-025-01819-7
Li JChen ZYuan XXie TXu YZheng ZZhu X(2025)A real-time GNSS time spoofing detection framework based on feature processingGPS Solutions10.1007/s10291-024-01802-829:1Online publication date: 1-Jan-2025
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10291-024-01802-8
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