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How bad is selfish routing?

Published: 01 March 2002 Publication History

Abstract

We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route traffic such that the sum of all travel times---the total latency---is minimized.In many settings, it may be expensive or impossible to regulate network traffic so as to implement an optimal assignment of routes. In the absence of regulation by some central authority, we assume that each network user routes its traffic on the minimum-latency path available to it, given the network congestion caused by the other users. In general such a "selfishly motivated" assignment of traffic to paths will not minimize the total latency; hence, this lack of regulation carries the cost of decreased network performance.In this article, we quantify the degradation in network performance due to unregulated traffic. We prove that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency (subject to the condition that all traffic must be routed). We also consider the more general setting in which edge latency functions are assumed only to be continuous and nondecreasing in the edge congestion. Here, the total latency of the routes chosen by unregulated selfish network users may be arbitrarily larger than the minimum possible total latency; however, we prove that it is no more than the total latency incurred by optimally routing twice as much traffic.

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    cover image Journal of the ACM
    Journal of the ACM  Volume 49, Issue 2
    March 2002
    162 pages
    ISSN:0004-5411
    EISSN:1557-735X
    DOI:10.1145/506147
    Issue’s Table of Contents

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 01 March 2002
    Published in JACM Volume 49, Issue 2

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    Author Tags

    1. Braess's Paradox
    2. Nash equilibria
    3. network flow
    4. selfish routing

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