Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

skip to main content
10.1145/3372297.3417247acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesccsConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article

BDoS: Blockchain Denial-of-Service

Published: 02 November 2020 Publication History

Abstract

Proof-of-work (PoW) cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin secure vast amounts of money. Their operators, called miners, expend resources to generate blocks and receive monetary rewards for their effort. Blockchains are, in principle, attractive targets for Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: There is fierce competition among coins, as well as potential gains from short selling. Classical DoS attacks, however, typically target a few servers and cannot scale to systems with many nodes. There have been no successful DoS attacks to date against prominent cryptocurrencies. We present Blockchain DoS (BDoS), the first incentive-based DoS attack that targets PoW cryptocurrencies. Unlike classical DoS, BDoS targets the system's mechanism design: It exploits the reward mechanism to discourage miner participation. Previous DoS attacks against PoW blockchains require an adversary's mining power to match that of all other miners. In contrast, BDoS can cause a blockchain to grind to a halt with significantly fewer resources, e.g., 21% as of March 2020 in Bitcoin, according to our empirical study. We find that Bitcoin's vulnerability to BDoS increases rapidly as the mining industry matures and profitability drops. BDoS differs from known attacks like Selfish Mining in its aim not to increase an adversary's revenue, but to disrupt the system. Although it bears some algorithmic similarity to those attacks, it introduces a new adversarial model, goals, algorithm, and game-theoretic analysis. Beyond its direct implications for operational blockchains, BDoS introduces the novel idea that an adversary can manipulate miners' incentives by proving the existence of blocks without actually publishing them.

Supplementary Material

MOV File (Copy of CCS20_fp166_MichaelMirkin - Brian Hollendyke.mov)
Presentation video

References

[1]
2016. [release/1.3.4] core: Added new TD strategy which mitigate the riskf...·ethereum/go-ethereum@bcf5657. https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/bcf565730b1816304947021080981245d084a930
[2]
2018. Bitcoin Price Crash Caused by Panic Sellers and Manipulation (NotCoinrail). https://bitcoinist.com/bitcoin-price-panic-sellers-manipulation-coinrail/
[3]
2020. Confirmation - Bitcoin Wiki. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Confirmation
[4]
Maria Apostolaki, Gian Marti, Jan Müller, and Laurent Vanbever. 2018. SABRE: Protecting Bitcoin against Routing Attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.06254 (2018).
[5]
Maria Apostolaki, Aviv Zohar, and Laurent Vanbever. 2017. Hijacking bitcoin: Routing attacks on cryptocurrencies. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 375--392.
[6]
Robert J Aumann. 1976. Agreeing to disagree. The annals of statistics (1976), 1236--1239.
[7]
Christian Badertscher, Peter Gavz i, Aggelos Kiayias, Alexander Russell, and Vassilis Zikas. 2018. Ouroboros genesis: Composable proof-of-stake blockchains with dynamic availability. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 913--930.
[8]
Qianlan Bai, Xinyan Zhou, Xing Wang, Yuedong Xu, Xin Wang, and Qingsheng Kong. 2018. A Deep Dive into Blockchain Selfish Mining. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.08263 (2018).
[9]
Billy Bambrough. 2019. Bitcoin Threatens To 'Take Power' From The U. S. Federal Reserve. https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2019/05/15/a-u-s-congressman-is-so-scared-of-bitcoin-and-crypto-he-wants-it-banned/
[10]
Billy Bambrough. 2020 a. Bitcoin Has Halved?What Now? https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2020/05/12/bitcoin-has-halved-what-now/
[11]
Billy Bambrough. 2020 b. The U. S. Is Very Worried About Bitcoin?And It?s Finally Doing Something About It. https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2020/02/18/the-us-is-very-worried-about-bitcoinand-its-finally-doing-something-about-it/
[12]
Christopher Bendiksen, Samuel Gibbons, and E Lim. 2018. The Bitcoin Mining Network-Trends, Marginal Creation Cost, Electricity Consumption & Sources. CoinShares Research, Vol. 21 (2018).
[13]
Christopher Bendiksen, Samuel Gibbons, and E Lim. 2019. The Bitcoin Mining Network-Trends, Marginal Creation Cost, Electricity Consumption & Sources. CoinShares Research (2019).
[14]
Billfodl. 2020. bitcoinfees. https://billfodl.com/pages/bitcoinfees
[15]
Bitmain. 2019. https://shop.bitmain.com/product/detail?pid=000201910231616554895rHmxLOT06C2
[16]
Joseph Bonneau. 2018. Hostile blockchain takeovers (short paper). In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 92--100.
[17]
Joseph Bonneau, Edward W Felten, Steven Goldfeder, Joshua A Kroll, and Arvind Narayanan. 2016. Why buy when you can rent? bribery attacks on bitcoin consensus. (2016).
[18]
Danny Bradbury. 2013. Feathercoin hit by massive attack. https://www.coindesk.com/feathercoin-hit-by-massive-attack
[19]
BTC.com. 2020. Pool Distribution. https://btc.com/stats/pool?pool_mode=month
[20]
Eric Budish. 2018. The economic limits of bitcoin and the blockchain. Technical Report. National Bureau of Economic Research.
[21]
Vitalik Buterin. 2018. Discouragement Attacks. (2018). https://github.com/ethereum/research/blob/master/papers/discouragement/discouragement.pdf
[22]
Vitalik Buterin et al. 2014. A next-generation smart contract and decentralized application platform. white paper, Vol. 3 (2014), 37.
[23]
Miles Carlsten, Harry Kalodner, S Matthew Weinberg, and Arvind Narayanan. 2016. On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 154--167.
[24]
Miguel Castro, Peter Druschel, Ayalvadi Ganesh, Antony Rowstron, and Dan S Wallach. 2002. Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, Vol. 36, SI (2002), 299--314.
[25]
Ethan Cecchetti, Ian Miers, and Ari Juels. 2018. PIEs: Public Incompressible Encodings for Decentralized Storage. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Vol. 2018 (2018), 684.
[26]
Lin Chen, Lei Xu, Nolan Shah, Zhimin Gao, Yang Lu, and Weidong Shi. 2017. On security analysis of proof-of-elapsed-time (poet). In International Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems. Springer, 282--297.
[27]
Thomas M Chen and Saeed Abu-Nimeh. 2011. Lessons from stuxnet. Computer, Vol. 44, 4 (2011), 91--93.
[28]
CoinDesk. 2019. Bitcoin Mining Power Sees Short-Term Drop as Rainy Season Ends in China. https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-mining-power-sees-short-term-fallback-as-rainy-season-ends-in-china
[29]
CoinMarketCap. 2019. Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations. https://coinmarketcap.com/
[30]
Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler. 2017. Russia's Approach to Cyber Warfare (1Rev). Technical Report. Center for Naval Analyses Arlington United States.
[31]
Matt Corallo. 2016. BIP 152: compact block relay. See https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0152.mediawiki (2016).
[32]
CryptoDataDownload. 2020. Kraken exchange data. https://www.CryptoDataDownload.com
[33]
Philip Daian, Steven Goldfeder, Tyler Kell, Yunqi Li, Xueyuan Zhao, Iddo Bentov, Lorenz Breidenbach, and Ari Juels. 2019 a. Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges. arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.05234 (2019).
[34]
Phil Daian, Rafael Pass, and Elaine Shi. 2019 b. Snow White: Robustly Reconfigurable Consensus and Applications to Provably Secure Proof of Stake. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 23--41.
[35]
Coin Dance. 2020. Daily Bitcoin Cash Profitability Against Bitcoin. https://cash.coin.dance/blocks/profitability
[36]
Bernardo David, Peter Gavz i, Aggelos Kiayias, and Alexander Russell. 2018. Ouroboros praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake blockchain. In Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, 66--98.
[37]
Allen Day and Colin Bookman. 2018. Bitcoin in BigQuery: blockchain analytics on public data. https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/bitcoin-in-bigquery-blockchain-analytics-on-public-data
[38]
Matthew De Silva. 2019. Ethereum Classic is under attack. https://qz.com/1516994/ethereum-classic-got-hit-by-a-51-attack/
[39]
Oscar Delgado-Mohatar, Marta Felis-Rota, and Carlos Fernández-Herraiz. 2019. The Bitcoin mining breakdown: Is mining still profitable? Economics Letters, Vol. 184 (2019), 108492.
[40]
Department of Homeland Security. 2018. Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks. https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015
[41]
John R Douceur. 2002. The sybil attack. In International workshop on peer-to-peer systems. Springer, 251--260.
[42]
Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor. 1992. Pricing via processing or combatting junk mail. In Annual International Cryptology Conference. Springer, 139--147.
[43]
Aryaz Eghbali and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019. 12 Angry Miners. In Data Privacy Management, Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology. Springer, 391--398.
[44]
Shayan Eskandari, Seyedehmahsa Moosavi, and Jeremy Clark. 2019. SoK: Transparent Dishonesty: front-running attacks on Blockchain. (2019).
[45]
Ittay Eyal. 2015. The miner's dilemma. In 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, 89--103.
[46]
Ittay Eyal and Emin Gün Sirer. 2018. Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable. Commun. ACM, Vol. 61, 7 (2018), 95--102.
[47]
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. 1991. Game theory, 1991. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Vol. 393, 12 (1991), 80.
[48]
Neil Gandal, J. T. Hamrick, Tyler Moore, and Tali Oberman. 2017. Price manipulation in the Bitcoin ecosystem. https://voxeu.org/article/price-manipulation-bitcoin-ecosystem
[49]
Juan Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Nikos Leonardos. 2015. The bitcoin backbone protocol: Analysis and applications. In Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, 281--310.
[50]
Arthur Gervais, Ghassan O Karame, Karl Wüst, Vasileios Glykantzis, Hubert Ritzdorf, and Srdjan Capkun. 2016. On the security and performance of proof of work blockchains. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security. ACM, 3--16.
[51]
Yossi Gilad, Rotem Hemo, Silvio Micali, Georgios Vlachos, and Nickolai Zeldovich. 2017. Algorand: Scaling byzantine agreements for cryptocurrencies. In Proceedings of the 26th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles. ACM, 51--68.
[52]
Guy Goren and Alexander Spiegelman. 2019. Mind the Mining. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.03899 (2019).
[53]
Adam S Hayes. 2017. Cryptocurrency value formation: An empirical study leading to a cost of production model for valuing bitcoin. Telematics and Informatics, Vol. 34, 7 (2017), 1308--1321.
[54]
Dong He. 2018. Monetary policy in the digital age: Crypto assets may one day reduce demand for central bank money. A Quarterly Publication of the International Monetary Fund, Vol. 55, 2 (2018), 20--21.
[55]
WIll Heasman. 2019. Bitcoin's Difficulty Falls As Miners Capitulate; Will They Survive the Halving? https://www.ccn.com/bitcoin-difficulty-falls-miners-capitulate/
[56]
Ethan Heilman, Alison Kendler, Aviv Zohar, and Sharon Goldberg. 2015. Eclipse attacks on bitcoin's peer-to-peer network. In 24th $$USENIX$$ Security Symposium ($$USENIX$$ Security 15). 129--144.
[57]
Alyssa Hertig. 2019. Bitcoin Cash Miners Undo Attacker's Transactions With `51% Attack'. https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-cash-miners-undo-attackers-transactions-with-51-attack
[58]
MINING POOL HUB. 2019. MINING POOL HUB. https://miningpoolhub.com/
[59]
Gur Huberman, Jacob Leshno, and Ciamac C Moallemi. 2019. huberman2019economic. Columbia Business School Research Paper 17--92 (2019).
[60]
Markus Jakobsson and Ari Juels. 1999. Proofs of work and bread pudding protocols. In Secure Information Networks. Springer, 258--272.
[61]
Benjamin Johnson, Aron Laszka, Jens Grossklags, Marie Vasek, and Tyler Moore. 2014. Game-theoretic analysis of DDoS attacks against Bitcoin mining pools. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 72--86.
[62]
Aljosha Judmayer, Nicholas Stifter, Philipp Schindler, and Edgar Weippl. 2018. Pitchforks in Cryptocurrencies: Enforcing rule changes through offensive forking-and. (2018).
[63]
Aljosha Judmayer, Nicholas Stifter, Alexei Zamyatin, Itay Tsabary, Ittay Eyal, Peter Gavz i, Sarah Meiklejohn, and Edgar Weippl. 2019. Pay-To-Win: Incentive Attacks on Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies. (2019).
[64]
Dimitris Karakostas, Aggelos Kiayias, Christos Nasikas, and Dionysis Zindros. 2019. Cryptocurrency egalitarianism: a quantitative approach. arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.02434 (2019).
[65]
Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Maria Kyropoulou, and Yiannis Tselekounis. 2016. Blockchain mining games. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 365--382.
[66]
Aggelos Kiayias, Alexander Russell, Bernardo David, and Roman Oliynykov. 2017. Ouroboros: A provably secure proof-of-stake blockchain protocol. In Annual International Cryptology Conference. Springer, 357--388.
[67]
Joshua A Kroll, Ian C Davey, and Edward W Felten. 2013. The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries. In Proceedings of WEIS, Vol. 2013. 11.
[68]
Yujin Kwon, Dohyun Kim, Yunmok Son, Eugene Vasserman, and Yongdae Kim. 2017. Be selfish and avoid dilemmas: Fork after withholding (faw) attacks on bitcoin. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 195--209.
[69]
Yujin Kwon, Hyoungshick Kim, Jinwoo Shin, and Yongdae Kim. 2019. Bitcoin vs. Bitcoin Cash: Coexistence or Downfall of Bitcoin Cash? arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.11064 (2019).
[70]
Susan Landau. 2013. Making sense from Snowden: What's significant in the NSA surveillance revelations. IEEE Security & Privacy, Vol. 11, 4 (2013), 54--63.
[71]
Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson, and Jens Grossklags. 2015. When bitcoin mining pools run dry. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 63--77.
[72]
Xiaoqi Li, Peng Jiang, Ting Chen, Xiapu Luo, and Qiaoyan Wen. 2017. A survey on the security of blockchain systems. Future Generation Computer Systems (2017).
[73]
Kevin Liao and Jonathan Katz. 2017. Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 264--279.
[74]
Loi Luu, Ratul Saha, Inian Parameshwaran, Prateek Saxena, and Aquinas Hobor. 2015. On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining. In 2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium. IEEE, 397--411.
[75]
P. H. Madore. 2018. Bitcoin Cash: Craig Wright's BSV Suffers Multi-Block Reorg. https://www.ccn.com/competing-blockchains-bitcoin-cash-sv-reorganizes/
[76]
Yuval Marcus, Ethan Heilman, and Sharon Goldberg. 2018. Low-Resource Eclipse Attacks on Ethereum's Peer-to-Peer Network. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Vol. 2018 (2018), 236.
[77]
Francisco J. Marmolejo-Coss'io, Eric Brigham, Benjamin Sela, and Jonathan Katz. 2019. Competing (Semi-)Selfish Miners in Bitcoin. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (Zurich, Switzerland) (AFT '19). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 89--109. https://doi.org/10.1145/3318041.3355471
[78]
Tim Maurer. 2018. Cyber mercenaries .Cambridge University Press.
[79]
Patrick McCorry, Alexander Hicks, and Sarah Meiklejohn. 2018. Smart contracts for bribing miners. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 3--18.
[80]
James McWhinney. 2019. Why Governments Are Afraid of Bitcoin. https://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/042015/why-governments-are-afraid-bitcoin.asp
[81]
Dmitry Meshkov, Alexander Chepurnoy, and Marc Jansen. 2017. Short paper: Revisiting difficulty control for blockchain systems. In Data Privacy Management, Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology. Springer, 429--436.
[82]
Andrew Miller. 2013. Feather-forks: enforcing a blacklist with sub-50% hash power. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=312668.0
[83]
Andrew Miller and Joseph J LaViola Jr. 2014. Anonymous byzantine consensus from moderately-hard puzzles: A model for bitcoin. Available on line: http://nakamotoinstitute. org/research/anonymous-byzantine-consensus (2014).
[84]
ASIC miner value. 2019. Miners Profitability. https://www.asicminervalue.com/
[85]
Bernhard Mueller. 2018a. DoS with Block Gas Limit. https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Safety#dos-with-block-gas-limit
[86]
Bernhard Mueller. 2018b. DoS with (Unexpected) Throw. https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Safety#dos-with-unexpected-throw
[87]
Phil Muncaster. 2017. World's Largest Bitcoin Exchange Bitfinex Crippled by DDoS. https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/worlds-largest-bitcoin-exchange/
[88]
Satoshi Nakamoto et al. 2008. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. (2008).
[89]
Kartik Nayak, Srijan Kumar, Andrew Miller, and Elaine Shi. 2016. Stubborn mining: Generalizing selfish mining and combining with an eclipse attack. In 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). IEEE, 305--320.
[90]
Bitcoin News. 2019. Bitmain Launches Low-Cost Special Edition Antminer S9. https://news.bitcoin.com/bitmain-launches-low-cost-special-edition-antminer-s9/
[91]
Jianyu Niu and Chen Feng. 2019. Selfish Mining in Ethereum. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.04620 (2019).
[92]
Shunya Noda, Kyohei Okumura, and Yoshinori Hashimoto. 2019. A Lucas Critique to the Difficulty Adjustment Algorithm of the Bitcoin System. Available at SSRN 3410460 (2019).
[93]
Stephen O'Neal. 2018. ABC vs SV: Assessing the Consequences of the Bitcoin Cash War. https://cointelegraph.com/news/abc-vs-cv-assessing-the-consequences-of-the-bitcoin-cash-war
[94]
Jun Osawa. 2017. The escalation of state sponsored cyberattack and national cyber security affairs: is strategic cyber deterrence the key to solving the problem? Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 24, 2 (2017), 113--131.
[95]
Rafael Pass, Lior Seeman, and Abhi Shelat. 2017. Analysis of the blockchain protocol in asynchronous networks. In Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, 643--673.
[96]
A Hash Pool. 2017. A Hash Pool. https://www.ahashpool.com/
[97]
Bitcoin Project. 2015. Some Miners Generating Invalid Blocks. https://bitcoin.org/en/alert/2015-07-04-spv-mining
[98]
Fabian Ritz and Alf Zugenmaier. 2018. The impact of uncle rewards on selfish mining in ethereum. In 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW). IEEE, 50--57.
[99]
Eric Roberts. 1999. Multi-Person Prisoner's Dilemma. https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/1998--99/game-theory/npd.html
[100]
Meni Rosenfeld. 2011. Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1112.4980 (2011).
[101]
Meni Rosenfeld. 2014. Analysis of hashrate-based double spending. arXiv preprint arXiv:1402.2009 (2014).
[102]
Ayelet Sapirshtein, Yonatan Sompolinsky, and Aviv Zohar. 2016. Optimal selfish mining strategies in bitcoin. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 515--532.
[103]
SECBIT. 2018. How the winner got Fomo3D prize ? A Detailed Explanation. https://medium.com/coinmonks/how-the-winner-got-fomo3d-prize-a-detailed-explanation-b30a69b7813f
[104]
SFOX. 2019. Bitcoin Cash vs. Bitcoin SV: Six Months after the Hash War. https://blog.sfox.com/bitcoin-cash-vs-bitcoin-sv-six-months-after-the-hash-war-e6d92a03b891
[105]
Scott Shane. 2017. The fake Americans Russia created to influence the election. The New York Times, Vol. 7, 09 (2017).
[106]
Atul Singh et al. 2006. Eclipse attacks on overlay networks: Threats and defenses. In In IEEE INFOCOM. Citeseer.
[107]
Emil Sit and Robert Morris. 2002. Security considerations for peer-to-peer distributed hash tables. In International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems. Springer, 261--269.
[108]
Jakub Sliwinski and Roger Wattenhofer. [n.d.]. Blockchains Cannot Rely on Honesty. In The 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2020) .
[109]
SmartMine. 2019. SmartMine -- An intelligent way to mine cryptocurrency. https://www.smartmine.org/
[110]
Joel Sobel and Ichiro Takahashi. 1983. A multistage model of bargaining. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 50, 3 (1983), 411--426.
[111]
Yonatan Sompolinsky and Aviv Zohar. 2015. Secure high-rate transaction processing in bitcoin. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 507--527.
[112]
Yonatan Sompolinsky and Aviv Zohar. 2018. Bitcoin's underlying incentives. Commun. ACM, Vol. 61, 3 (2018), 46--53.
[113]
Alexander Spiegelman, Idit Keidar, and Moshe Tennenholtz. 2018. Game of coins. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.08979 (2018).
[114]
JOE STEWART. 2014. BGP Hijacking for Cryptocurrency Profit. https://www.secureworks.com/research/bgp-hijacking-for-cryptocurrency-profit
[115]
Jason Teutsch, Sanjay Jain, and Prateek Saxena. 2016. When cryptocurrencies mine their own business. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 499--514.
[116]
Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal. 2018. The gap game. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 713--728.
[117]
Itay Tsabary, Alexander Spiegelman, and Ittay Eyal. 2019. HEB: Hybrid Expenditure Blockchain. arXiv (2019), arXiv--1911.
[118]
Marie Vasek, Micah Thornton, and Tyler Moore. 2014. Empirical analysis of denial-of-service attacks in the Bitcoin ecosystem. In International conference on financial cryptography and data security. Springer, 57--71.
[119]
Bitcoin Wiki. 2017. Difficulty. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Difficulty
[120]
Shawn Wilkinson, Tome Boshevski, Josh Brandoff, and Vitalik Buterin. 2014a. Storj a peer-to-peer cloud storage network. (2014).
[121]
Shawn Wilkinson, Jim Lowry, and Tome Boshevski. 2014b. Metadisk a blockchain-based decentralized file storage application. Tech. Rep. (2014).
[122]
Fredrik Winzer, Benjamin Herd, and Sebastian Faust. 2019. Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners. In 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW). IEEE, 357--366.
[123]
Gavin Wood et al. 2014. Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger. Ethereum project yellow paper, Vol. 151, 2014 (2014), 1--32.
[124]
Shuangke Wu, Yanjiao Chen, Minghui Li, Xiangyang Luo, Zhe Liu, and Lan Liu. 2020. Survive and Thrive: A Stochastic Game for DDoS Attacks in Bitcoin Mining Pools. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (2020).
[125]
Fan Zhang, Ittay Eyal, Robert Escriva, Ari Juels, and Robbert Van Renesse. 2017. $$REM$$: Resource-Efficient Mining for Blockchains. In 26th $$USENIX$$ Security Symposium ($$USENIX$$ Security 17). 1427--1444.
[126]
Wolfie Zhao. 2019. Bitcoin Miners Halt Operations as Rainstorm Triggers Mudslides in China. https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-miners-halt-operations-as-rainstorm-triggers-fatal-mudslide-in-china
[127]
Wolfie Zhao. 2020. Older Mining Machines Turn Profitable Again as Bitcoin Rises Ahead of Halving. https://www.coindesk.com/older-mining-machines-turn-profitable-again-as-bitcoin-rises-ahead-of-halving

Cited By

View all
  • (2024)A Repeated Game-Based Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Mitigation Method for Mining PoolsElectronics10.3390/electronics1302039813:2(398)Online publication date: 18-Jan-2024
  • (2024)Unveiling Vulnerabilities in Bitcoin's Misbehavior-Score Mechanism: Attack and DefenseProceedings of the 19th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security10.1145/3664476.3664509(1-12)Online publication date: 30-Jul-2024
  • (2024)Exploring Blockchain Technology through a Modular Lens: A SurveyACM Computing Surveys10.1145/365728856:9(1-39)Online publication date: 11-Apr-2024
  • Show More Cited By

Recommendations

Comments

Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Conferences
CCS '20: Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
October 2020
2180 pages
ISBN:9781450370899
DOI:10.1145/3372297
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

Sponsors

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 02 November 2020

Permissions

Request permissions for this article.

Check for updates

Author Tags

  1. bitcoin
  2. blockchain
  3. cryptocurrencies

Qualifiers

  • Research-article

Conference

CCS '20
Sponsor:

Acceptance Rates

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,261 of 6,999 submissions, 18%

Upcoming Conference

CCS '25

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)257
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)23
Reflects downloads up to 25 Nov 2024

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all
  • (2024)A Repeated Game-Based Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Mitigation Method for Mining PoolsElectronics10.3390/electronics1302039813:2(398)Online publication date: 18-Jan-2024
  • (2024)Unveiling Vulnerabilities in Bitcoin's Misbehavior-Score Mechanism: Attack and DefenseProceedings of the 19th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security10.1145/3664476.3664509(1-12)Online publication date: 30-Jul-2024
  • (2024)Exploring Blockchain Technology through a Modular Lens: A SurveyACM Computing Surveys10.1145/365728856:9(1-39)Online publication date: 11-Apr-2024
  • (2024)Halting the Solana Blockchain with Epsilon StakeProceedings of the 25th International Conference on Distributed Computing and Networking10.1145/3631461.3631553(45-54)Online publication date: 4-Jan-2024
  • (2024)Optimal Selfish Mining-Based Denial-of-Service AttackIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2023.332638619(835-850)Online publication date: 2024
  • (2024)Routing Attacks on Cryptocurrency Mining Pools2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP54263.2024.00254(3805-3821)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
  • (2024)Scalability and Security of Blockchain-Empowered Metaverse: A SurveyIEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society10.1109/OJCS.2024.34684455(648-659)Online publication date: 2024
  • (2024)Smart Contract Vulnerabilities and Detection Methods: A Survey2024 15th International Conference on Computing Communication and Networking Technologies (ICCCNT)10.1109/ICCCNT61001.2024.10724246(1-7)Online publication date: 24-Jun-2024
  • (2024)A Denial-of-Service Attack Based on Selfish Mining and Sybil Attack in Blockchain SystemsIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2024.349935012(170309-170320)Online publication date: 2024
  • (2024)SP-PoR: Improve blockchain performance by semi-parallel processing transactionsComputer Networks10.1016/j.comnet.2024.110394245(110394)Online publication date: May-2024
  • Show More Cited By

View Options

Login options

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media