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A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic Solution

Published: 17 June 2019 Publication History

Abstract

In this work, we aim to design a data marketplace; a robust real-time matching mechanism to efficiently buy and sell training data for Machine Learning tasks. While the monetization of data and pre-trained models is an essential focus of industry today, there does not exist a market mechanism to price training data and match buyers to sellers while still addressing the associated (computational and other) complexity. The challenge in creating such a market stems from the very nature of data as an asset: (i) it is freely replicable; (ii) its value is inherently combinatorial due to correlation with signal in other data; (iii) prediction tasks and the value of accuracy vary widely; (iv) usefulness of training data is difficult to verify a priori without first applying it to a prediction task. As our main contributions we: (i) propose a mathematical model for a two-sided data market and formally define the key associated challenges; (ii) construct algorithms for such a market to function and analyze how they meet the challenges defined. We highlight two technical contributions: (i) a new notion of "fairness" required for cooperative games with freely replicable goods; (ii) a truthful, zero regret mechanism to auction a class of combinatorial goods based on utilizing Myerson's payment function and the Multiplicative Weights algorithm. These might be of independent interest.

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cover image ACM Conferences
EC '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
June 2019
947 pages
ISBN:9781450367929
DOI:10.1145/3328526
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 17 June 2019

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Author Tags

  1. data marketplaces
  2. online combinatorial auctions
  3. shapley value
  4. value of data

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  • Research-article

Funding Sources

  • MIT Institute for Data Systems and Society (IDSS) Thomson Reuters Fellowship
  • MIT Institute for Data Systems and Society (IDSS) WorldQuant Fellowship

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EC '19
Sponsor:
EC '19: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
June 24 - 28, 2019
AZ, Phoenix, USA

Acceptance Rates

EC '19 Paper Acceptance Rate 106 of 382 submissions, 28%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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