research-article

Trust but Verify: Auditing the Secure Internet of Things

Authors:

Henry Corrigan-Gibbs,

Keith WinsteinAuthors Info & Claims

MobiSys '17: Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services

Pages 464 - 474

https://doi.org/10.1145/3081333.3081342

Published: 16 June 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Internet-of-Things devices often collect and transmit sensitive information like camera footage, health monitoring data, or whether someone is home. These devices protect data in transit with end-to-end encryption, typically using TLS connections between devices and associated cloud services. But these TLS connections also prevent device owners from observing what their own devices are saying about them. Unlike in traditional Internet applications, where the end user controls one end of a connection (e.g., their web browser) and can observe its communication, Internet-of-Things vendors typically control the software in both the device and the cloud. As a result, owners have no way to audit the behavior of their own devices, leaving them little choice but to hope that these devices are transmitting only what they should.

This paper presents TLS--Rotate and Release (TLS-RaR), a system that allows device owners (e.g., consumers, security researchers, and consumer watchdogs) to authorize devices, called auditors, to decrypt and verify recent TLS traffic without compromising future traffic. Unlike prior work, TLS-RaR requires no changes to TLS's wire format or cipher suites, and it allows the device's owner to conduct a surprise inspection of recent traffic, without prior notice to the device that its communications will be audited.

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Cited By

Li CChen RWang YXing QWang B(2024)REEDS: An Efficient Revocable End-to-End Encrypted Message Distribution System for IoTIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2024.335381121:5(4526-4542)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2024
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de Carné de Carnavalet Xvan Oorschot P(2023)A Survey and Analysis of TLS Interception Mechanisms and Motivations: Exploring how end-to-end TLS is made “end-to-me” for web trafficACM Computing Surveys10.1145/358052255:13s(1-40)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2023
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Index Terms

Trust but Verify: Auditing the Secure Internet of Things

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cover image ACM Conferences

MobiSys '17: Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services

June 2017

520 pages

ISBN:9781450349284

DOI:10.1145/3081333

General Chairs:
Tanzeem Choudhury
Cornell University, USA
,
Steve Ko
University at Buffalo, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Andrew Campbell
Dartmouth College, USA
,
Deepak Ganesan
University of Massachusetts, USA

Copyright © 2017 ACM.

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Published: 16 June 2017

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NSF/Intel Partnership on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy (CPS-Security)

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MobiSys'17: The 15th Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services

June 19 - 23, 2017

New York, Niagara Falls, USA

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MobiSys '17 Paper Acceptance Rate 34 of 188 submissions, 18%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 274 of 1,679 submissions, 16%

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Cited By

Li CChen RWang YXing QWang B(2024)REEDS: An Efficient Revocable End-to-End Encrypted Message Distribution System for IoTIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2024.335381121:5(4526-4542)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TDSC.2024.3353811
Du HWang YXu XLiu M(2023)Niffler: Real-time Device-level Anomalies Detection in Smart HomeACM Transactions on the Web10.1145/358607317:3(1-27)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3586073
de Carné de Carnavalet Xvan Oorschot P(2023)A Survey and Analysis of TLS Interception Mechanisms and Motivations: Exploring how end-to-end TLS is made “end-to-me” for web trafficACM Computing Surveys10.1145/358052255:13s(1-40)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3580522
Mazhar MLi LHoque EChowdhury OBoureanu ISchneider SReaves BTippenhauer N(2023)Maverick: An App-independent and Platform-agnostic Approach to Enforce Policies in IoT Systems at RuntimeProceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks10.1145/3558482.3590188(73-84)Online publication date: 29-May-2023
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Alhanahnah MStevens CChen BYan QBagheri H(2023)IoTCom: Dissecting Interaction Threats in IoT SystemsIEEE Transactions on Software Engineering10.1109/TSE.2022.317929449:4(1523-1539)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2023
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Yuan BWan JWu YZou DJin H(2023)On the Security of Smart Home Systems: A SurveyJournal of Computer Science and Technology10.1007/s11390-023-2488-338:2(228-247)Online publication date: 30-Mar-2023
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Zhang ZYu TMa XGuan YMoll PZhang L(2022)Sovereign: Self-Contained Smart Home With Data-Centric Network and SecurityIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2022.31449809:15(13808-13822)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2022
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Biondi GPrati RBorelli FOttolini Dde Oliveira NKamienski C(2022)IoTracker: A probabilistic event tracking approach for data-intensive IoT Smart ApplicationsInternet of Things10.1016/j.iot.2022.10055619(100556)Online publication date: Aug-2022
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