research-article

Effect of Group Based Synchronization on User Anonymity in Mix Networks

Authors:

Dogan KesdoganAuthors Info & Claims

ARES '23: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

Article No.: 146, Pages 1 - 9

https://doi.org/10.1145/3600160.3604998

Published: 29 August 2023 Publication History

Abstract

In so-called closed environments, the MIX network can theoretically provide perfect security, i.e. if perfect protection is envisaged, all senders and receivers should be perfectly synchronized and participate equally in each communication round of the MIX technique. In the context of open environments (e.g., the Internet), there is no synchronization between the participants and here the technique is vulnerable to known analyses such as (statistical) disclosure attacks. In short, the Mix technology is highly dependent on its application context in which it involves the participants. In this work, we study the effect of context in terms of synchronization rate, present two different synchronization approaches and evaluate their protection against disclosure attacks.

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Cited By

Aksoy AKesdoğan D(2024)Enhanced Closed-Loop Control Anonymity Protection Model with Inactive Period Feedback2024 17th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (ISCTürkiye)10.1109/ISCTrkiye64784.2024.10779244(1-6)Online publication date: 16-Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCTrkiye64784.2024.10779244

Index Terms

Effect of Group Based Synchronization on User Anonymity in Mix Networks
1. Security and privacy
  1. Security services
    1. Pseudonymity, anonymity and untraceability

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cover image ACM Other conferences

ARES '23: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

August 2023

1440 pages

ISBN:9798400707728

DOI:10.1145/3600160

Copyright © 2023 ACM.

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Published: 29 August 2023

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ARES 2023

ARES 2023: The 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

August 29 - September 1, 2023

Benevento, Italy

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Cited By

Aksoy AKesdoğan D(2024)Enhanced Closed-Loop Control Anonymity Protection Model with Inactive Period Feedback2024 17th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (ISCTürkiye)10.1109/ISCTrkiye64784.2024.10779244(1-6)Online publication date: 16-Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCTrkiye64784.2024.10779244

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