Article

Auctioning for downlink transmission power in CDMA cellular systems

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MSWiM '04: Proceedings of the 7th ACM international symposium on Modeling, analysis and simulation of wireless and mobile systems

Pages 293 - 296

https://doi.org/10.1145/1023663.1023714

Published: 04 October 2004 Publication History

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Abstract

In this paper, we design a pricing mechanism for downlink transmission power in cellular networks. We propose to adapt an auction-based scheme, that we have defined in a previous work for selling an infinitely divisible resource, to the context of CDMA wireless communications. The scheme aims at solving congestion problems by acting on user demand through prices, and is particularly well-suited for situations where the number of users changes over time.We establish that our mechanism is incentive compatible, i.e. the strategy that yields the highest utility to a player is to truthfully reveal her valuation for the service. The efficiency of the power allocation in terms of social welfare is also proved.

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Cited By

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Kaushik BZhang HYang XFu XLiu BWang J(2014)Providing service assurance in mobile opportunistic networksComputer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking10.1016/j.comnet.2014.07.01874:PB(114-140)Online publication date: 9-Dec-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.comnet.2014.07.018
Marce OTran HTuffin B(2014)Double-sided auctions applied to vertical handover for mobility management in wireless networksJournal of Network and Systems Management10.1007/s10922-013-9269-122:4(658-681)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10922-013-9269-1
Yang Zhang Chonho Lee Niyato DPing Wang (2013)Auction Approaches for Resource Allocation in Wireless Systems: A SurveyIEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials10.1109/SURV.2012.110112.0012515:3(1020-1041)Online publication date: Nov-2014
https://doi.org/10.1109/SURV.2012.110112.00125
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Index Terms

Auctioning for downlink transmission power in CDMA cellular systems
1. Networks
  1. Network types
    1. Mobile networks
    2. Wireless access networks

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Published In

MSWiM '04: Proceedings of the 7th ACM international symposium on Modeling, analysis and simulation of wireless and mobile systems

October 2004

334 pages

ISBN:1581139535

DOI:10.1145/1023663

General Chair:
Simonetta Balsamo
Università Cà Foscari di Venezia
,
Program Chairs:
Carla-Fabiana Chiasserini
Politecnico di Torino
,
Lorenzo Donatiello
Università di Bologna

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 04 October 2004

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MSWiM04

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MSWiM04: 7th International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems 2004

October 4 - 6, 2004

Venice, Italy

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MSWiM '04 Paper Acceptance Rate 45 of 121 submissions, 37%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 398 of 1,577 submissions, 25%

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Cited By

View all

Kaushik BZhang HYang XFu XLiu BWang J(2014)Providing service assurance in mobile opportunistic networksComputer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking10.1016/j.comnet.2014.07.01874:PB(114-140)Online publication date: 9-Dec-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.comnet.2014.07.018
Marce OTran HTuffin B(2014)Double-sided auctions applied to vertical handover for mobility management in wireless networksJournal of Network and Systems Management10.1007/s10922-013-9269-122:4(658-681)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10922-013-9269-1
Yang Zhang Chonho Lee Niyato DPing Wang (2013)Auction Approaches for Resource Allocation in Wireless Systems: A SurveyIEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials10.1109/SURV.2012.110112.0012515:3(1020-1041)Online publication date: Nov-2014
https://doi.org/10.1109/SURV.2012.110112.00125
Alavi SZhou CGen W(2012)Efficient and Fair Resource Allocation Scheme for OFDMA Networks Based on Auction Game2012 IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Fall)10.1109/VTCFall.2012.6399339(1-5)Online publication date: Sep-2012
https://doi.org/10.1109/VTCFall.2012.6399339
Mukherjee AKwon H(2010)General auction-theoretic strategies for distributed partner selection in cooperative wireless networksIEEE Transactions on Communications10.1109/TCOMM.2010.082010.08024858:10(2903-2915)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TCOMM.2010.082010.080248
Mukherjee AKwon H(2008)Multiple partner selection in cooperative OFDM networks using an auction strategyMILCOM 2008 - 2008 IEEE Military Communications Conference10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753594(1-7)Online publication date: Nov-2008
https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753594
Pal SKundu SChatterjee MDas S(2007)Combinatorial Reverse Auction based Scheduling in Multi-Rate Wireless SystemsIEEE Transactions on Computers10.1109/TC.2007.108256:10(1329-1341)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2007
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TC.2007.1082
Mukherjee AKwon H(2007)Robust Auction-Theoretic Partner Selection in Cooperative Diversity Wireless Networks2007 Conference Record of the Forty-First Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers10.1109/ACSSC.2007.4487249(443-447)Online publication date: Nov-2007
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACSSC.2007.4487249
Rodriguez VMoessner KTafazolli R(2006)Market driven dynamic spectrum allocation over space and time among radio-access networksMobile Networks and Applications10.1007/s11036-006-0053-211:6(847-860)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2006
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s11036-006-0053-2
Rodriguez VMoessner KTafazolli R(2005)Auction Driven Dynamic Spectrum Allocation: Optimal Bidding, Pricing and Service Priorities for Multi-rate, Multi-Class CDMA2005 IEEE 16th International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications10.1109/PIMRC.2005.1651761(1850-1854)Online publication date: 2005
https://doi.org/10.1109/PIMRC.2005.1651761

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