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LEAP: TrustZone Based Developer-Friendly TEE for Intelligent Mobile Apps

Published: 01 December 2023 Publication History

Abstract

ARM TrustZone is widely deployed on commercial-off-the-shelf mobile devices for secure execution. However, many Apps cannot enjoy this feature because it brings many constraints to App developers. Previous works have been proposed to build a secure execution environment for developers on top of TrustZone. Unfortunately, these works are still not fully-fledged solutions for mobile Apps, especially for emerging intelligent Apps. To this end, we propose LEAP, which is a lightweight developer-friendly TEE solution for mobile Apps. LEAP enables isolated codes to execute in parallel and access peripheral (e.g., mobile GPUs) with ease, flexibly manages system resources upon different workloads, and offers the auto DevOps tool to help developers prepare the codes running on it. We implement the LEAP prototype on the off-the-shelf ARM platform and conduct extensive experiments on it. The experimental results show that Apps can be adapted to run with LEAP easily and efficiently. Compared to the state-of-the-art work along this research line, LEAP can achieve an average 3.57× speedup in supporting intelligent Apps using mobile GPU acceleration.

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Cited By

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  • (2024)SoKProceedings of the 33rd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3698900.3699193(5233-5250)Online publication date: 14-Aug-2024
  • (2024)FAMOSProceedings of the 33rd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3698900.3698917(289-306)Online publication date: 14-Aug-2024
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cover image IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing  Volume 22, Issue 12
Dec. 2023
649 pages

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IEEE Educational Activities Department

United States

Publication History

Published: 01 December 2023

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  • (2024)SoKProceedings of the 33rd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3698900.3699193(5233-5250)Online publication date: 14-Aug-2024
  • (2024)FAMOSProceedings of the 33rd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3698900.3698917(289-306)Online publication date: 14-Aug-2024

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