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Zero-determinant strategies in repeated asymmetric games

Published: 15 March 2020 Publication History

Abstract

Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies are conditional strategies which allow players adopting them to establish a relation between their expected payoffs and those of their opponents. The ZD strategies were investigated in different models including finite and infinite repeated two players’ games, multiplayer games, continuous action spaces and alternating move games. However, all previous studies considered only symmetric games between players, i.e., players have the same strategies and the same associated payoffs, thus the players’ identities are interchangeable without affecting the game's dynamics. In this study, we analytically model and derive the ZD strategies for asymmetric two players’ games, focusing on one-memory strategies and infinite repeated encounters. We derive the analytical bounds of equalizer and extortionate ZD strategies in 2  ×  2 asymmetric games, which differ from the symmetric games case. Furthermore, we derive under what conditions a player using an extortionate ZD strategy will get a higher expected payoff than his/her opponent. Finally using a numerical example, we investigate ZD strategies in 2  ×  2 asymmetric prisoner's dilemma game.

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Cited By

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  • (2021)Modeling Replicator Dynamics in Stochastic Games Using Markov Chain MethodProceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3463952.3464006(420-428)Online publication date: 3-May-2021

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Published In

cover image Applied Mathematics and Computation
Applied Mathematics and Computation  Volume 369, Issue C
Mar 2020
651 pages

Publisher

Elsevier Science Inc.

United States

Publication History

Published: 15 March 2020

Author Tags

  1. Asymmetric games
  2. Repeated games
  3. Zero-determinant strategies
  4. Prisoner's dilemma game
  5. Stochastic strategies

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  • (2021)Modeling Replicator Dynamics in Stochastic Games Using Markov Chain MethodProceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3463952.3464006(420-428)Online publication date: 3-May-2021

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