Article

A Modular Treatment of Cryptographic APIs: The Symmetric-Key Case

Authors:

Thomas Shrimpton,

Bogdan WarinschiAuthors Info & Claims

Proceedings, Part I, of the 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO 2016 - Volume 9814

Pages 277 - 307

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_11

Published: 14 August 2016 Publication History

Abstract

Application Programming Interfaces APIs to cryptographic tokens like smartcards and Hardware Security Modules HSMs provide users with commands to manage and use cryptographic keys stored on trusted hardware. Their design is mainly guided by industrial standards with only informal security promises.

In this paper we propose cryptographic models for the security of such APIs. The key feature of our approach is that it enables modular analysis. Specifically, we show that a secure cryptographic API can be obtained by combining a secure API for key-management together with secure implementations of, for instance, encryption or message authentication. Our models are the first to provide such compositional guarantees while considering realistic adversaries that can adaptively corrupt keys stored on tokens. We also provide a proof of concept instantiation from a deterministic authenticated-encryption scheme of the key-management portion of cryptographic API.

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Cited By

Almeida JBarbosa MBarthe GCampagna MCohen EGregoire BPereira VPortela BStrub PTasiran SCavallaro LKinder JWang XKatz J(2019)A Machine-Checked Proof of Security for AWS Key Management ServiceProceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3319535.3354228(63-78)Online publication date: 6-Nov-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3319535.3354228
Patton CShrimpton T(2019)Security in the Presence of Key Reuse: Context-Separable Interfaces and Their ApplicationsAdvances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 201910.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_26(738-768)Online publication date: 18-Aug-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_26
Stanley-Oakes R(2017)A Provably Secure PKCS#11 Configuration Without Authenticated AttributesFinancial Cryptography and Data Security10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_8(145-162)Online publication date: 3-Apr-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_8

A Modular Treatment of Cryptographic APIs: The Symmetric-Key Case

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Published In

cover image Guide Proceedings

Proceedings, Part I, of the 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO 2016 - Volume 9814

August 2016

661 pages

ISBN:9783662530177

Editors:
Matthew Robshaw
Impinj, Inc., Seattle, USA
,
Jonathan Katz
University of Maryland, College Park, USA

Publisher

Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 14 August 2016

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Cited By

Almeida JBarbosa MBarthe GCampagna MCohen EGregoire BPereira VPortela BStrub PTasiran SCavallaro LKinder JWang XKatz J(2019)A Machine-Checked Proof of Security for AWS Key Management ServiceProceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3319535.3354228(63-78)Online publication date: 6-Nov-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3319535.3354228
Patton CShrimpton T(2019)Security in the Presence of Key Reuse: Context-Separable Interfaces and Their ApplicationsAdvances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 201910.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_26(738-768)Online publication date: 18-Aug-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_26
Stanley-Oakes R(2017)A Provably Secure PKCS#11 Configuration Without Authenticated AttributesFinancial Cryptography and Data Security10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_8(145-162)Online publication date: 3-Apr-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_8

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