Economic mechanisms for shortest path cooperative games with incomplete information
Abstract
References
Recommendations
Frugal path mechanisms
We consider the problem of selecting a low-cost s - t path in a graph where the edge costs are a secret, known only to the various economic agents who own them. To solve this problem, Nisan and Ronen applied the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) ...
Frugal path mechanisms
SODA '02: Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithmsWe consider the problem of selecting a low cost s --- t path in a graph, where the edge costs are a secret known only to the various economic agents who own them. To solve this problem, Nisan and Ronen applied the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) ...
The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information
EC '12: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic CommerceWe define smooth games of incomplete information. We prove an "extension theorem" for such games: price of anarchy bounds for pure Nash equilibria for all induced full-information games extend automatically, without quantitative degradation, to all ...
Comments
Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.Information & Contributors
Information
Published In
Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Berlin, Heidelberg
Publication History
Qualifiers
- Article
Contributors
Other Metrics
Bibliometrics & Citations
Bibliometrics
Article Metrics
- 0Total Citations
- 0Total Downloads
- Downloads (Last 12 months)0
- Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0