Article

Electromagnetic eavesdropping risks of flat-panel displays

Author:

Markus G. KuhnAuthors Info & Claims

PET'04: Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

Pages 88 - 107

https://doi.org/10.1007/11423409_7

Published: 26 May 2004 Publication History

Abstract

Electromagnetic eavesdropping of computer displays – first demonstrated to the general public by van Eck in 1985 – is not restricted to cathode-ray tubes. Modern flat-panel displays can be at least as vulnerable. They are equally driven by repetitive video signals in frequency ranges where even shielded cables leak detectable radio waves into the environment. Nearby eavesdroppers can pick up such compromising emanations with directional antennas and wideband receivers. Periodic averaging can lift a clearly readable image out of the background noise. The serial Gbit/s transmission formats used by modern digital video interfaces in effect modulate the signal, thereby making it even better suited for remote reception than emanations from analog systems. Understanding the exact transmission format used leads to new attacks and defenses. We can tune screen colors for optimal remote readability by eavesdroppers. We can likewise modify text-display routines to render the radio emanations unreadable.

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Cited By

Álvarez LMoser DLenders V(2022)High Data Throughput Exfiltration Through Video Cable EmanationsCritical Information Infrastructures Security10.1007/978-3-031-35190-7_3(27-48)Online publication date: 14-Sep-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-35190-7_3
Choi JYang HCho DLigatti JOu XKatz JVigna G(2020)TEMPEST Comeback: A Realistic Audio Eavesdropping Threat on Mixed-signal SoCsProceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3372297.3417241(1085-1101)Online publication date: 30-Oct-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3372297.3417241
Schmitt EVoigt-Antons J(2020)Predicting Tap Locations on Touch Screens in the Field Using Accelerometer and Gyroscope Sensor ReadingsHCI for Cybersecurity, Privacy and Trust10.1007/978-3-030-50309-3_43(637-651)Online publication date: 19-Jul-2020
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Index Terms

Electromagnetic eavesdropping risks of flat-panel displays
1. Mathematics of computing
  1. Information theory
    1. Coding theory

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image Guide Proceedings

PET'04: Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

May 2004

344 pages

ISBN:3540262032

Editors:
David Martin
Artificial Intelligence Center, SRI International
,
Andrei Serjantov
Artificial Intelligence Center, The Free Haven Project

Sponsors

Microsoft Corp.
Bell University Labs: Bell University Labs
Information and Privacy Commissioner's Office (Ontario): Information and Privacy Commissioner's Office (Ontario)
University of Toronto: University of Toronto

Publisher

Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 26 May 2004

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Cited By

Álvarez LMoser DLenders V(2022)High Data Throughput Exfiltration Through Video Cable EmanationsCritical Information Infrastructures Security10.1007/978-3-031-35190-7_3(27-48)Online publication date: 14-Sep-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-35190-7_3
Choi JYang HCho DLigatti JOu XKatz JVigna G(2020)TEMPEST Comeback: A Realistic Audio Eavesdropping Threat on Mixed-signal SoCsProceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3372297.3417241(1085-1101)Online publication date: 30-Oct-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3372297.3417241
Schmitt EVoigt-Antons J(2020)Predicting Tap Locations on Touch Screens in the Field Using Accelerometer and Gyroscope Sensor ReadingsHCI for Cybersecurity, Privacy and Trust10.1007/978-3-030-50309-3_43(637-651)Online publication date: 19-Jul-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-50309-3_43
Bolshakov ATyulkin D(2019)Experimental Estimation of a Potential Eavesdropping Distance for Electromagnetic Emanations of Video SystemProceedings of the 24th Conference of Open Innovations Association FRUCT10.5555/3338290.3338372(589-593)Online publication date: 15-Apr-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3338290.3338372
Boitan ABătuşică RHalunga SFratu O(2019)Electromagnetic Vulnerabilities of LCD ProjectorsProceedings of the 6th Conference on the Engineering of Computer Based Systems10.1145/3352700.3352722(1-6)Online publication date: 2-Sep-2019
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Camurati GPoeplau SMuench MHayes TFrancillon ALie DMannan MBackes MWang X(2018)Screaming ChannelsProceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3243734.3243802(163-177)Online publication date: 15-Oct-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3243734.3243802
Schulz MKlapper PHollick MTews EKatzenbeisser SHollick MPapadimitratos PEnck W(2016)Trust The Wire, They Always Told Me!Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks10.1145/2939918.2940650(43-48)Online publication date: 18-Jul-2016
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Carrara BAdams C(2016)Out-of-Band Covert Channels—A SurveyACM Computing Surveys10.1145/293837049:2(1-36)Online publication date: 30-Jun-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2938370
Kovačević TPerković TČagalj M(2016)Flashing displaysSecurity and Communication Networks10.1002/sec.14009:10(1050-1071)Online publication date: 10-Jul-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1002/sec.1400
Hayashi YHomma NMiura MAoki TSone HAhn GYung MLi N(2014)A Threat for Tablet PCs in Public SpaceProceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/2660267.2660292(954-965)Online publication date: 3-Nov-2014
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