article

Internet pricing with a game theoretical approach: concepts and examples

Authors:

Rodolfo Milito,

Patrica WirthAuthors Info & Claims

IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), Volume 10, Issue 2

Pages 208 - 216

Published: 01 April 2002 Publication History

Abstract

The basic concepts of three branches of game theory, leader-follower, cooperative, and two-person nonzero sum games, are reviewed and applied to the study of the Internet pricing issue. In particular, we emphasize that the cooperative game (also called the bargaining problem) provides an overall picture for the issue. With a simple model for Internet quality of service (QoS), we demonstrate that the leader-follower game may lead to a solution that is not Pareto optimal and in some cases may be "unfair," and that the cooperative game may provide a better solution for both the Internet service provider (ISP) and the user. The practical implication of the results is that government regulation or arbitration may be helpful. The QoS model is also applied to study the competition between two ISPs, and we find a Nash equilibrium point from which the two ISPs would not move out without cooperation. The proposed approaches can be applied to other Internet pricing problems such as the Paris Metro pricing scheme.

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Cited By

Hajimirsadeghi MMandayam NReznik A(2017)Joint Caching and Pricing Strategies for Popular Content in Information Centric NetworksIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications10.1109/JSAC.2017.267216135:3(654-667)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2017
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Zheng LJoe-Wong CBrinton CTan CHa SChiang M(2016)On the Viability of a Cloud Virtual Service ProviderACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review10.1145/2964791.290145244:1(235-248)Online publication date: 14-Jun-2016
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Internet pricing with a game theoretical approach: concepts and examples

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cover image IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking

IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking Volume 10, Issue 2

April 2002

125 pages

ISSN:1063-6692

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IEEE Press

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Published: 01 April 2002

Published in TON Volume 10, Issue 2

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Cited By

Hajimirsadeghi MMandayam NReznik A(2017)Joint Caching and Pricing Strategies for Popular Content in Information Centric NetworksIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications10.1109/JSAC.2017.267216135:3(654-667)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672161
Farhat SSamhat ALahoud SCousin B(2017)Radio Access Network Sharing in 5GWireless Personal Communications: An International Journal10.1007/s11277-017-4321-196:2(2715-2740)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s11277-017-4321-1
Zheng LJoe-Wong CBrinton CTan CHa SChiang M(2016)On the Viability of a Cloud Virtual Service ProviderACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review10.1145/2964791.290145244:1(235-248)Online publication date: 14-Jun-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2964791.2901452
Zheng LJoe-Wong CBrinton CTan CHa SChiang MAlouf SJean-Marie AHegde NProutière A(2016)On the Viability of a Cloud Virtual Service ProviderProceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGMETRICS International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Science10.1145/2896377.2901452(235-248)Online publication date: 14-Jun-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2896377.2901452
Azimi SManshaei MHendessi F(2016)Cooperative primary---secondary dynamic spectrum leasing game via decentralized bargainingWireless Networks10.1007/s11276-015-0999-822:3(755-764)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s11276-015-0999-8
Karaoglu HGupta AYuksel MLiu WKar K(2013)Bailout forward contracts for edge-to-edge internet servicesComputer Communications10.5555/2745552.274568236:17(1708-1725)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2745552.2745682
Gu YGoh MChen QSouza RTang G(2013)A new two-party bargaining mechanismJournal of Combinatorial Optimization10.1007/s10878-011-9424-025:1(135-163)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10878-011-9424-0
Neelakanta PSardenberg R(2011)Consumer benefit versus price elasticity of demandNetnomics10.1007/s11066-010-9055-012:1(31-60)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s11066-010-9055-0
Ma RChiu DLui JMisra VRubenstein D(2010)Internet economicsIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2010.204920518:3(775-787)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2010
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Biczók GKardos STrinh T(2010)Pricing Internet access in the presence of user loyaltyNetnomics10.1007/s11066-010-9050-511:2(119-147)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2010
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