Balanced Outcomes in Wage Bargaining
Authors: 
Pingzhong Tang, Dingli YuAuthors Info & Claims
Pages 2091 - 2093
Abstract
Balanced outcomes are a subset of core outcomes that take into consideration fairness and agents' power in bargaining networks. In this paper, following the seminal works by [3] and [6] on modeling and computing balanced outcomes in unit-capacity trading networks, we explore this concept further by considering its generalization in the so-called wage bargaining network where agents on one side (the employers side) may have multiple capacity. It turns out that previous definitions do not trivially extend to this setting. Our first contribution is to incorporate insights from the bargaining theory and define a generalized notion of balanced outcomes in wage bargaining networks.
We then consider computational aspects of this newly proposed solutions. We show that there are polynomial-time combinatorial algorithms to compute such solutions in both unweighted and weighted graphs. Our algorithms and proofs are enabled by novel generalizations of techniques proposed by Kleinberg and Tardos and an original technique proposed in this paper called "loose chain''.
References
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Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Maria Polukarov, and Nick R Jennings. 2010. Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Vol. 39, 1 (2010), 179--216.
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Karen S Cook and Toshio Yamagishi. 1992. Power in exchange networks: A power-dependence formulation. Social Networks, Vol. 14, 3--4 (1992), 245--265.
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Viet Dung Dang, Rajdeep K Dash, Alex Rogers, and Nicholas R Jennings. 2006. Overlapping coalition formation for efficient data fusion in multi-sensor networks AAAI, Vol. Vol. 6. 635--640.
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Gianluigi Greco, Enrico Malizia, Luigi Palopoli, and Francesco Scarcello. 2009. On the Complexity of Compact Coalitional Games. IJCAI, Vol. Vol. 9. 147--152.
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Jon Kleinberg and Éva Tardos. 2008. Balanced outcomes in social exchange networks. In Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. ACM, 295--304.
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Zhiyuan Li, Yicheng Liu, Pingzhong Tang, Tingting Xu, and Wei Zhan. 2017. Stability of generalized two-sided markets with transaction thresholds Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 290--298.
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Yicheng Liu, Pingzhong Tang, and Wenyi Fang. 2014. Internally Stable Matchings and Exchanges. In AAAI. 1433--1439.
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Suiqian Luo and Pingzhong Tang. 2015. Mechanism Design and Implementation for Lung Exchange. IJCAI. 209--215.
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David Schmeidler. 1969. The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal on applied mathematics Vol. 17, 6 (1969), 1163--1170.
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Index Terms
- Balanced Outcomes in Wage Bargaining
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Information
Published In
July 2018
2312 pages
- General Chairs:
- Elisabeth Andre,
- Sven Koenig,
- Program Chairs:
- Mehdi Dastani,
- Gita Sukthankar
Sponsors
In-Cooperation
Publisher
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
Publication History
Published: 09 July 2018
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- Research-article
Funding Sources
- Alibaba Innovative Research program
- National Natural Science Foundation of China Grant
- China Youth 1000-talent program
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AAMAS '18
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AAMAS '18 Paper Acceptance Rate 149 of 607 submissions, 25%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%
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