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Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences

Published: 19 August 2017 Publication History

Abstract

The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider this problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with uncertainty leads to a number of interesting questions including the following ones. How to compute an assignment with the highest probability of being Pareto optimal__ __ What is the complexity of computing the probability that a given assignment is Pareto optimal__ __ Does there exist an assignment that is Pareto optimal with probability one__ __ We consider these problems under two natural uncertainty models: (1) the lottery model in which each agent has an independent probability distribution over linear orders and (2) the joint probability model that involves a joint probability distribution over preference profiles. For both of these models, we present a number of algorithmic and complexity results highlighting the difference and similarities in the complexity of the two models.

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  • (2019)On the problem of assigning PhD grantsProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3367032.3367052(130-136)Online publication date: 10-Aug-2019
  1. Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences

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    cover image Guide Proceedings
    IJCAI'17: Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
    August 2017
    5253 pages
    ISBN:9780999241103

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    • Australian Comp Soc: Australian Computer Society
    • NSF: National Science Foundation
    • Griffith University
    • University of Technology Sydney
    • AI Journal: AI Journal

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    Published: 19 August 2017

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    • (2019)On the problem of assigning PhD grantsProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3367032.3367052(130-136)Online publication date: 10-Aug-2019

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