Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]

skip to main content
10.5555/1813084.1813116guideproceedingsArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesConference Proceedingsacm-pubtype
Article

Model-checking DoS amplification for VoIP session initiation

Published: 21 September 2009 Publication History

Abstract

Current techniques for the formal modeling analysis of DoS attacks do not adequately deal with amplification attacks that may target a complex distributed system as a whole rather than a specific server. Such threats have emerged for important applications such as the VoIP Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). We demonstrate a modelchecking technique for finding amplification threats using a strategy we call measure checking that checks for a quantitative assessment of attacker impact using term rewriting. We illustrate the effectiveness of this technique with a study of SIP. In particular, we show how to automatically find known attacks and verify that proposed patches for these attacks achieve their aim. Beyond this, we demonstrate a new amplification attack based on the compromise of one or more SIP proxies. We show how to address this threat with a protocol change and formally analyze the effectiveness of the new protocol against amplification attacks.

References

[1]
Abadi, M., Blanchet, B., Fournet, C.: Just fast keying in the pi calculus. In: Schmidt, D. (ed.) ESOP 2004. LNCS, vol. 2986, pp. 340-354. Springer, Heidelberg (2004).
[2]
Agha, G., Gunter, C.A., Greenwald, M., Khanna, S., Meseguer, J., Sen, K., Thati, P.: Formal modeling and analysis of DoS using probabilistic rewrite theories. In: International Workshop on Foundations of Computer Security, FCS 2005 (2005).
[3]
Agha, G., Meseguer, J., Sen, K.: PMaude: Rewrite-based specification language for probabilistic object systems. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 153(2), 213-239 (2006).
[4]
AlTurki, M., Meseguer, J., Gunter, C.A.: Probabilistic modeling and analysis of DoS protection for the ASV protocol. Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 234, 3-18 (2009).
[5]
Chadha, R., Gunter, C.A., Meseguer, J., Shankesi, R., Viswanathan, M.: Modular preservation of safety properties by cookie-based DoS-protection wrappers. In: Formal Methods for Open Object-Based Distributed Systems, pp. 39-58 (2008).
[6]
Clavel, M., Durán, F., Eker, S., Lincoln, P., Martí-Oliet, N., Meseguer, J., Talcott, C.: All About Maude - A High-Performance Logical Framework: How to Specify, Program, and Verify Systems in Rewriting Logic. LNCS. Springer, Heidelberg (2007).
[7]
Denker, G., Meseguer, J., Talcott, C.L.: Protocol specification and analysis in Maude. In: Proc. of Workshop on Formal Methods and Security Protocols (1998).
[8]
Durgin, N., Lincoln, P., Mitchell, J., Scedrov, A.: Multiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols. J. Comput. Secur. 12(2), 247-311 (2004).
[9]
Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: A rewriting-based inference system for the NRL protocol analyzer and its meta-logical properties. Theor. Comput. Sci. 367(1), 162-202 (2006).
[10]
Goodloe, A.E.: A Foundation for Tunnel-Complex Protocols. PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania (2008).
[11]
Gupta, P., Shmatikov, V.: Security analysis of voice-over-ip protocols. In: 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Venice, Italy, pp. 49-63. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2007).
[12]
IETF. SIP: Session Initiation Protocol. RFC 3261 (Proposed Standard), Updated by RFCs 3265, 3853, 4320, 4916, 5393 (June 2002).
[13]
IETF. Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in Forking Proxies draft-ietf-sipfork-loop-fix-00. Internet-Draft (February 2006).
[14]
IETF. Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Forking Proxies. RFC 5393 (Proposed Standard) (December 2008).
[15]
Kim, M.-Y., Stehr, M.-O., Talcott, C., Dutt, N., Venkatasubramanian, N.: A probabilistic formal analysis approach to cross layer optimization in distributed embedded systems. In: Bonsangue, M.M., Johnsen, E.B. (eds.) FMOODS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4468, pp. 285-300. Springer, Heidelberg (2007).
[16]
Lafrance, S., Mullins, J.: An information flow method to detect denial of service vulnerabilities. J. UCS 9(11), 1350-1369 (2003).
[17]
Mahimkar, A., Shmatikov, V.: Game-based analysis of denial-of-service prevention protocols. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-18 2005). IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2005).
[18]
Meadows, C.: A formal framework and evaluation method for network denial of service. In: CSFW, pp. 4-13 (1999).
[19]
Meseguer, J.: Conditional rewriting logic as a unified model of concurrency. Theor. Comput. Sci. 96(1), 73-155 (1992).
[20]
Meseguer, J.: Rewriting logic and maude: a wide-spectrum semantic framework for object-based distributed systems. In: Smith, S.F., Talcott, C.L. (eds.) FMOODS. IFIP Conference Proceedings, vol. 177, pp. 89-117. Kluwer, Dordrecht (2000).
[21]
Sen, K., Viswanathan, M., Agha, G.A.: On Statistical Model Checking of Stochastic Systems. In: Etessami, K., Rajamani, S.K. (eds.) CAV 2005. LNCS, vol. 3576, pp. 266-280. Springer, Heidelberg (2005).
[22]
Wang, X., Zhang, R., Yang, X., Jiang, X., Wijesekera, D.: Voice pharming attack and the trust of VoIP. In: SecureComm 2008: Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks, pp. 1-11. ACM Press, New York (2008).
[23]
Younes, H.L.S., Simmons, R.G.: Statistical probabilistic model checking with a focus on time-bounded properties. Inf. Comput. 204(9), 1368-1409 (2006).
[24]
Yu, C.-F., Gligor, V.D.: A specification and verification method for preventing denial of service. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 16(6), 581-592 (1990).
  1. Model-checking DoS amplification for VoIP session initiation

    Recommendations

    Comments

    Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

    Information & Contributors

    Information

    Published In

    cover image Guide Proceedings
    ESORICS'09: Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
    September 2009
    706 pages
    ISBN:3642044433
    • Editors:
    • Michael Backes,
    • Peng Ning

    Sponsors

    • DCSSI
    • Alcatel-Lucent
    • EADS
    • Fondation Métivier
    • INRIA: Institut Natl de Recherche en Info et en Automatique

    Publisher

    Springer-Verlag

    Berlin, Heidelberg

    Publication History

    Published: 21 September 2009

    Qualifiers

    • Article

    Contributors

    Other Metrics

    Bibliometrics & Citations

    Bibliometrics

    Article Metrics

    • 0
      Total Citations
    • 0
      Total Downloads
    • Downloads (Last 12 months)0
    • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)0
    Reflects downloads up to 28 Nov 2024

    Other Metrics

    Citations

    View Options

    View options

    Login options

    Media

    Figures

    Other

    Tables

    Share

    Share

    Share this Publication link

    Share on social media