Attacking trapdoors from matrix products
Authors
Abstract
Recently, Geraud-Stewart and Naccache proposed two trapdoors based on matrix products. In this paper, we answer the call for cryptanalysis. We explore how using the trace and determinant of a matrix can be used to attack their constructions. We fully break their first construction in a polynomial-time attack. We show an information leak in the second construction using characteristic polynomials, and provide two attacks that decrease the bit security by about half.
References
How to cite
Thomas Decru, Tako Boris Fouotsa, Paul Frixons, Valerie Gilchrist, and Christophe Petit, Attacking trapdoors from matrix products. IACR Communications in Cryptology, vol. 1, no. 3, Oct 07, 2024, doi: 10.62056/avrxrudhdj.
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.