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Electrical Engineering and Systems Science > Systems and Control

arXiv:2212.01570 (eess)
[Submitted on 3 Dec 2022 (v1), last revised 12 Mar 2023 (this version, v2)]

Title:Two-Player Incomplete Games of Resilient Multiagent Systems

Authors:Yurid Nugraha, Tomohisa Hayakawa, Hideaki Ishii, Ahmet Cetinkaya, Quanyan Zhu
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Abstract:Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a game-theoretical approach of multiagent systems where the players have incomplete information on their opponents' strength. We consider repeated games with both simultaneous and sequential player actions where players update their beliefs of each other over time. The effect of the players' optimal strategies according to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium on agents' consensus is examined. It is shown that an attacker with incomplete knowledge may fail to prevent consensus despite having sufficient resources to do so.
Comments: 9 pages, 6 figures. Accepted in IFAC-WC 2023
Subjects: Systems and Control (eess.SY); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Cite as: arXiv:2212.01570 [eess.SY]
  (or arXiv:2212.01570v2 [eess.SY] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2212.01570

Submission history

From: Yurid Nugraha [view email]
[v1] Sat, 3 Dec 2022 08:01:18 UTC (358 KB)
[v2] Sun, 12 Mar 2023 03:36:21 UTC (358 KB)
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