Title:Detecting Adversarial Data via Perturbation Forgery

Abstract:As a defense strategy against adversarial attacks, adversarial detection aims to identify and filter out adversarial data from the data flow based on discrepancies in distribution and noise patterns between natural and adversarial data. Although previous detection methods achieve high performance in detecting gradient-based adversarial attacks, new attacks based on generative models with imbalanced and anisotropic noise patterns evade detection. Even worse, existing techniques either necessitate access to attack data before deploying a defense or incur a significant time cost for inference, rendering them impractical for defending against newly emerging attacks that are unseen by defenders. In this paper, we explore the proximity relationship between adversarial noise distributions and demonstrate the existence of an open covering for them. By learning to distinguish this open covering from the distribution of natural data, we can develop a detector with strong generalization capabilities against all types of adversarial attacks. Based on this insight, we heuristically propose Perturbation Forgery, which includes noise distribution perturbation, sparse mask generation, and pseudo-adversarial data production, to train an adversarial detector capable of detecting unseen gradient-based, generative-model-based, and physical adversarial attacks, while remaining agnostic to any specific models. Comprehensive experiments conducted on multiple general and facial datasets, with a wide spectrum of attacks, validate the strong generalization of our method.