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Electrical Engineering and Systems Science > Systems and Control

arXiv:2403.18166 (eess)
[Submitted on 27 Mar 2024 (v1), last revised 1 Oct 2024 (this version, v4)]

Title:Incentive-Compatible Vertiport Reservation in Advanced Air Mobility: An Auction-Based Approach

Authors:Pan-Yang Su, Chinmay Maheshwari, Victoria Tuck, Shankar Sastry
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Abstract:The rise of advanced air mobility (AAM) is expected to become a multibillion-dollar industry in the near future. Market-based mechanisms are touted to be an integral part of AAM operations, which comprise heterogeneous operators with private valuations. In this work, we study the problem of designing a mechanism to coordinate the movement of electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, operated by multiple operators each having heterogeneous valuations associated with their fleet, between vertiports, while enforcing the arrival, departure, and parking constraints at vertiports. Particularly, we propose an incentive-compatible and individually rational vertiport reservation mechanism that maximizes a social welfare metric, which encapsulates the objective of maximizing the overall valuations of all operators while minimizing the congestion at vertiports. Additionally, we improve the computational tractability of designing the reservation mechanism by proposing a mixed binary linear programming approach that leverages the network flow structure.
Comments: 23 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables
Subjects: Systems and Control (eess.SY); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Theoretical Economics (econ.TH); Optimization and Control (math.OC)
MSC classes: 91B03, 91A68, 90B06, 90C27
Cite as: arXiv:2403.18166 [eess.SY]
  (or arXiv:2403.18166v4 [eess.SY] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2403.18166

Submission history

From: Pan-Yang Su [view email]
[v1] Wed, 27 Mar 2024 00:21:49 UTC (841 KB)
[v2] Sun, 7 Jul 2024 17:30:31 UTC (849 KB)
[v3] Sun, 8 Sep 2024 16:34:10 UTC (852 KB)
[v4] Tue, 1 Oct 2024 03:48:03 UTC (852 KB)
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