Article Contents

2015, Volume 9, Issue 4: 471-514. Doi: 10.3934/amc.2015.9.471

This issue Previous Article The nonassociative algebras used to build fast-decodable space-time block codes Next Article Index calculus in the trace zero variety

FORSAKES: A forward-secure authenticated key exchange protocol based on symmetric key-evolving schemes

Mohammad Sadeq Dousti^1, and
Rasool Jalili^1,

1.
Data & Network Security Lab, Department of Computer Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran

Received: March 2014

Revised: March 2015

Published: November 2015

Abstract / Introduction Related Papers Cited by

Abstract

This paper suggests a model and a definition for forward-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, which can be satisfied without depending on the Diffie--Hellman assumption. The basic idea is to use key-evolving schemes (KES), where the long-term keys of the system get updated regularly and irreversibly. Protocols conforming to our model can be highly efficient, since they do not require the resource-intensive modular exponentiations of the Diffie--Hellman protocol. We also introduce a protocol, called FORSAKES, and prove rigorously that it is a forward-secure AKE protocol in our model. FORSAKES is a very efficient protocol, and can be implemented by merely using hash functions.

Keywords:

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 94A62; Secondary: 68M12, 94A60.

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