Article

Presentation and structure of substitutes valuations

Authors:

Meir Bing,

Daniel Lehmann,

Paul MilgromAuthors Info & Claims

EC '04: Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Pages 238 - 239

https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988812

Published: 17 May 2004 Publication History

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Abstract

We propose two different methods for presenting substitutes (a.k.a. gross-substitutes) valuations. Each provides short descriptions for a family of substitutes valuations. We also show that substitutes valuation are closed under k-satiation.

References

[1]

S. Fujishige and Z. Yang. A note on Kelso and Crawford's gross substitutes condition. Mathematics of Operations Research, 28(3):463--469, August 2003.

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F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes. Journal of Economic Theory, 87:95--124, 1999.

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A. S. Kelso and V. P. Crawford. Job matching, coalition formation and gross substitutes. Econometrica, 50:1483--1504, 1982.

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B. Lehmann, D. Lehmann, and N. Nisan. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. Games and Economic Behavior, 2003. To appear. A preliminary version appeared in EC'01, 2001.

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P. Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: the simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2):245--272, 2000.

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P. Milgrom. Matching with contracts. unpublished draft, March 2003.

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K. Murota. Discrete Convex Analysis. Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications. SIAM, Philadelphia, 2003.

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Cited By

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Gul FPesendorfer WZhang M(2024)The Efficient Allocation of Indivisible GoodsJournal of Political Economy10.1086/730561Online publication date: 25-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1086/730561
Hafalir IKojima FBumin Yenmez M(2022)Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignmentJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2022.105441(105441)Online publication date: Mar-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105441
Kojima FSun NYu N(2020)Job Matching under ConstraintsAmerican Economic Review10.1257/aer.20190780110:9(2935-2947)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2020
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190780
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Index Terms

Presentation and structure of substitutes valuations
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

EC '04: Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

May 2004

278 pages

ISBN:1581137710

DOI:10.1145/988772

General Chair:
Jack Breese
Microsoft
,
Program Chairs:
Joan Feigenbaum
Yale University
,
Margo Seltzer
Harvard University

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 17 May 2004

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Conference

EC04

Sponsor:

EC04: Fifth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004 ( held in conjunction with WWW'04: The 2004 World Wide Web Conference )

May 17 - 20, 2004

NY, New York, USA

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EC '04 Paper Acceptance Rate 24 of 146 submissions, 16%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

View all

Gul FPesendorfer WZhang M(2024)The Efficient Allocation of Indivisible GoodsJournal of Political Economy10.1086/730561Online publication date: 25-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1086/730561
Hafalir IKojima FBumin Yenmez M(2022)Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignmentJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2022.105441(105441)Online publication date: Mar-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105441
Kojima FSun NYu N(2020)Job Matching under ConstraintsAmerican Economic Review10.1257/aer.20190780110:9(2935-2947)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2020
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190780
Balkanski EPaes Leme R(2019)On the Construction of SubstitutesMathematics of Operations Research10.1287/moor.2019.0991Online publication date: 18-Jul-2019
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.0991
Hajek B(2019)Substitute valuationsPerformance Evaluation10.1016/j.peva.2008.07.00165:11-12(789-803)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.peva.2008.07.001
Fukuda SShioura ATokuyama T(2017)Buyback problem with discrete concave valuation functionsDiscrete Optimization10.5555/3163581.316366026:C(78-96)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3163581.3163660
Dughmi SRoughgarden TYan Q(2016)Optimal Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex RoundingJournal of the ACM10.1145/290873563:4(1-33)Online publication date: 21-Sep-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2908735
Murota KShioura AYang Z(2016)Time bounds for iterative auctionsDiscrete Optimization10.1016/j.disopt.2016.01.00119:C(36-62)Online publication date: 1-Feb-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.disopt.2016.01.001
Fukuda SShioura ATokuyama T(2016)Buyback Problem with Discrete Concave Valuation FunctionsApproximation and Online Algorithms10.1007/978-3-319-28684-6_7(72-83)Online publication date: 13-Jan-2016
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28684-6_7
Ostrovsky MPaes Leme R(2015)Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuationsTheoretical Economics10.3982/TE184010:3(853-865)Online publication date: 9-Oct-2015
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1840
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